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“I do not regret the prison life that sucked my youth inside of it,
that had me spending my glorious age inside the cells. I did what
I thought was right in gaining and accomplishing my goal:
to return, to be a resistor. If I succeed, if I do not succeed,
I will still count it as resistance, and this resistance will never
end for me. So no, I do not regret anything.”1

Introduction
In the fall of 2012, I met Sami al Jundi whose book, The Hour of Sunlight, is well
known amongst those involved in Palestine studies, or even just living and working in the
Jerusalem area. A highly readable co-authored autobiography, the book tells the story of
his life, much of which was defined by his experience as a political prisoner. Sami is the
classic example of the ex-prisoner I find intriguing: someone who had entered an Israeli
security prison with very little formal education and came out highly educated, both
culturally and politically. While we sat at the since shuttered Gate Café, Sami’s hangout
just inside Damascus Gate, I told him about my project and he sized me up suspiciously. I
recounted to him that I had first become interested in life inside Israeli prisons intended
for those labeled “security prisoners” the previous year when Israel had reversed the
policy of prisoner access to undergraduate and graduate degrees through the Open
University. I told him how surprised I was that this access had existed at all. After all,
why would the Israeli government allow individuals who had been deemed national
security threats to study subjects like Zionist thought, the subject of at least one in-prison

1

Yacoub Odeh, interview with author, September 2015.
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doctoral dissertation in the early 2000s?2 I also told him about how reading his book had
made me realize that the educational programming long preceded the Open University’s
degree offerings3: by the time of his imprisonment in the 1980s, prisoners underwent
rigorous academic training, divided into stages with defined objectives and
accompanying reading lists. I expressed to Sami that I wanted to better understand how
the education these men received helped shape their role in political life after their
sentences ended. What is so intriguing about this period in Palestinian history is that
many of today’s political players are those very same individuals who were trained
behind prison gates. These individuals cut their political teeth inside Israeli prisons.
I became aware that the conversation was not moving beyond the surface. As I
had experienced with the handful of other ex-prisoners with whom I had already spoken,
neither my well-rehearsed pitch about my academic interests, nor my assertions about the
way I was planning to use the material, were persuading Sami to share details that had
not appeared in his book. Through these initial interviews, I learned a very important
lesson: academic credentials alone cannot advance research of this kind. As it turned out,
the years I had spent in the West Bank and the connections I have forged across
communities mattered much more. Among the many cultural complexities researchers
encounter in the West Bank and Jerusalem, human trust is one of the most difficult to
navigate; it is either based on an individual’s intuition or rooted in a trusted source’s
personal recommendation. I gained access to interview subjects only after many months

2

This is the focus of Jabril Rajoub’s doctoral dissertation. Rajoub has been the Deputy Secretary of the Fatah Committee since 2009
and is currently the Minister of Sport. He also teaches at Al Quds University.
3
After Oslo, the Open University of Isarel allowed for prisoners to complete academic degrees. Ynet reported in 2009 that by that
time 250 political prisoners were part of this program. [Ynet news, “100 Palestinian Prisoners Complete Academic Studies in Jail,”
Ronny Shaked, August 4, 2009.]
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of cultivating existing contacts and forging new ones, but especially by having reputable
colleagues and friends vouch for me.
Since 2012, I have conducted dozens of interviews with ex-prisoners from the
West Bank and Jerusalem. Through these conversations I have begun to untangle the
complicated world of the political prisoner, both during time inside the prison, but also
post-release. These interviews, especially with key figures who will be introduced later in
this chapter, combined with political manifestos and other written sources salvaged from
the prisons and archived in the Abu Jihad Prisoner’s Museum in the West Bank, serve as
the basis for my examination of a political prisoner movement.

Why study Palestinian Prisoners?
Since 1967, close to one million Palestinians have been arrested as security
prisoners by the Israeli army or the Israeli police.4 This roughly breaks down to 20% of
the population of the Territories and 40% of males.5 These extraordinary numbers mean
that every single Palestinian living within the historic borders, and many beyond, has an
arrest story of someone with whom they are close – a family member, a friend, or a
neighbor. Although the typical “security” prisoner is the young man between 18 – 30, as
opposed to women, children, or men over 50, arrest is certainly neither gender nor age
blind.

4

The terminology used to refer to such prisoners is as loaded as anything in the region. The Israeli government and the prison
administration refer to them as security prisoners, while Palestinians self-define as political prisoners. The prisoner is a marker, for the
Israelis of maintaining control, and for the Palestinians as markers of resistance. Throughout this project I use both terms depending
on the context.
5
Addameer, the Ramallah-based Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, tracks these figures. Their website continuously
updates the number of individuals held by the Israelis, including the total number as well as a breakdown of women, children, and
administrative detainees held without trial. The The Territories refers to the areas taken by Israel during the 1967 war. Although some
consider 1948 an occupation as well, the internationally recognized borders are those that existed between 1948 and 1967.
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Arrest, incarceration and detention of Palestinians by the Israelis is carefully
tracked by West Bank and Jerusalem-based organizations. The well-known Ramallahbased group, Addameer, is the most active in the field of monitoring the situation of
political prisoners.6 As their May 2016 homepage graphic (below) illustrates, Israel held
7,000 political prisoners at the time of writing, of which only a small number were
female, but a much more significant number were under 18 years of age.

7

A further breakdown from the same day shows even more startling numbers. Of
the number of Palestinians detained for what the Israelis call security violations and the
Palestinians refer to as political acts, seven members of the Palestinian Legislative
Council (PLC) are included. This body, a kind of legislature of the Palestinian Authority,
is housed in Ramallah and continues to meet in spite of political challenges dating to
2006.8 While the number of incarcerated, cited as seven as of May 2016, may seem low,
it is significant when compared with the total membership of around 130. So, too, the fact
that 30 prisoners remain incarcerated from the pre-Oslo agreements, which included mass
release, is also striking.

6

The Palestinian organization based in Israel, Adalah, and the Israeli NGO, B’Tselem, also carefully monitor the numbers. I will cite
from reports from all three organizations throughout this project.
7
Infographics like this one are regularly updated on http://www.addameer.org/. This data is from May 2016. The Council for
European Palestinian relations set the number at 6,800 rather than 7,000.
8
The split between Fatah and Hamas has hindered the PLC’s lawmaking.
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The Palestinian political prisoner has become a signpost of the Palestinian
resistance movement. Both within and beyond the Occupied Territories, universal
symbols evoke notions of revolution, political resistance, and liberation movements: Che
Guevara’s face is among the most prominent examples, but the Palestinian flag and the
black and white checkered scarf, the keffiyeh, trail closely behind. While these symbols
carry significant weight in the Territories, the political prisoner also resonates powerfully
within the Palestinian community, with common images showing the prisoner behind
bars or on hunger strike,10 featured in local newspapers and adorning placards at political
protests. I first comprehended the power of the Prisoner as symbol of political resistance
at a 2012 event celebrating the release of two long-held men and one young woman. The
event took place in a sizable hall in Ramallah and was attended by a coterie of Palestinian
Authority ministers, including Issa Qaraqai, the Minister of Prisoner Affairs. With welllaid banquet tables seating over a dozen people, the affair featured a selection of mezze
and brightly colored drinks, encouraging attendees to linger for the event’s duration.
There was a scheduled program of speakers, punctuated by nationalist songs, performed

9

http://www.addameer.org/. This data is from May 2016.
I will address political prisoner imagery in detail in chapter five.
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live; each of the songs explicitly addressed the struggle of political prisoners. For over
two hours the energy was high, alternating between joy over the reuniting of families and
rage against the occupation, and the volume was almost deafening. Events like these
happen with a degree of regularity, whenever well-connected or long-serving prisoners
are released. They are performative, intended to highlight the enormity of Palestinian
suffering at the hands of Israeli prison authorities, but also celebratory in that they
showcase prisoners’ strength and ability to survive the torture and trauma of prison.
Thus, the political prisoner is inextricably linked to the Occupation and ongoing
resistance to it. In fact, Palestinian prisoners are windows into understanding the way in
which the Occupation functions. They are also important to teasing out how both
individuals and communities resisted aspects and structures of Israeli control. As former
prisoner, now writer, Walid Daka eloquently puts it: “in order to understand the general
picture of Palestinian reality, it is worthwhile to study the life of the Palestinian prisoner,
as a parable of the lives of civilians in the Territories.”11 In part, the significance attached
to the prisoner as lens emerges from the fact that the history of the political prisoner
spans the entire history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Indeed, it dates back to well
before the 1967 Occupation. One can look at the period immediately following the 1948
establishment of the state and gauge the perceived power of detention: by early 1949,
approximately 70,000 Palestinian civilians had been expelled from major towns such as
Lydda and Ramle, while one quarter of the male population was being held in prisoner of

11

Walid Daka, “Consciousness Molded or the Re-identification of Torture,” in Threat: Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israel, edited
by Abeer Baker and Anat Matar, (London: Pluto Press, 2011), 235.
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war camps.12 During this period there were many unrecognized detention sites, in which
the number remain unknown. What is certain is that prisoner testimony points to at least
17 of these sites.13
Contending with the prisoner as representational icon, this project attempts to
reconstruct the experience of Palestinian prisoners affiliated with the Fatah movement
inside Israeli prisons between 1967 and 1985. Focusing on these two decades, I will use
prisoners as lenses for tracing the evolution of a new kind of resistance movement inside
the political prison that was inextricably linked to resistance writ large.14 To understand
these linkages, this project examines the experience in Israeli prisons located in the West
Bank and within the 1948 borders, focusing on prisoners affiliated with the Fatah
movement of the Palestinian resistance. A striking feature of this era is the highly
counterintuitive process by which strictly monitored and circumscribed spaces for
punishment came to produce a transparent internal national movement. Although the
prison movement institutionalized a set of state-like structures similar in appearance to
those of the top-down, authoritarian Fatah movement-in-exile, the emergent complex
political programs and committees behaved quite differently. The prisons present a
remarkably complex portrait of locally spun resistance.

Challenges of the Sources

12

Salman Abu Sitta and Terry Rempel, “The ICRC and the Detention of Palestinian Civilians in Israel’s 1948 POW/Labor Camps,”
Journal of Palestine Studies 43, no. 4 (Summer 2014): 11-38.
13
Salman Abu Sitta and Terry Rempel, 17.
14
The explicit link with the outside is beyond the scope of the disseration, as per my proposal committee. It will be dealt with more
explicitly in the book.
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A common assertion amongst Palestinians is that one cannot tell stories about the
past with any kind of academic distance when the lines between past and present are so
blurry. This manner of thinking certainly prevails when it comes to creating a history of
political prisoners: because imprisonment is an ongoing tool of the Occupation,
Palestinians do not perceive the topic as part of a historical narrative, but as
contemporarily relevant and politically charged. As Lila Abu-Lughod recently wrote,
“Palestinian memory is, at its heart, political.”15 Thus, written accounts by historians are
rare, with the existing literature consisting of a handful of difficult to locate Arabic
language prisoner memoirs, individually framed with a chronological bent; they privilege
personal narrative over historical argument in an attempt to bare what many would claim
as the ultimate truth.16 Those that I have located are published in Arabic by small presses
in the West Bank or Jordan by individuals whose reputations already precede them.
Individuals like Marwan Barghouti and Abu Ali Shaheen are two such writers; they seek
to tell their story and to glorify their experiences. In the case of Barghouti, still
imprisoned to this day, his book makes a subtle case for his post-prison political career,
highlighting how his prison experience makes him the ideal resistor and future leader.
Such texts lend themselves to the Palestinian tradition of memorializing events through
individuals’ stories, successes and challenges, rather than using information gleaned from
these experiences as a lens for understanding Palestinian politics and resistance, or to

15

Ahmad Sa’adi and Lila Abu-Lughod, eds. Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2007), 8.
16
Scholarship on political prisoners is limited. Esmail Nashif’s book, Palestinian Political Prisoners: Identity and Community, does
deal with part of this period from a sociological perspective. His interest lies in the cultivation of a prisoner community, as I will
explicate in a later section.
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answer broader questions about the significance of the period of internment in Palestinian
lives.
Not surprisingly, piecing together an historical timeline of Palestinian history in
the wake of the 1967 Occupation necessitates a heavy reliance on individuals’ oral
narratives. Drawing on such stories to shape historical narratives has a substantive past
amongst Palestinians; tales pass from one family member to the next, and are maintained
by villages and told to each successive generation. The Ottoman, British and even Israeli
periods of systematic control are preserved in the memories and the mouths of the
average person. In particular, Palestinians orally memorialize historical watersheds, such
as the events of the 1948 foundation of the Israeli state, popularly referred to as the
Nakba (catastrophe in Arabic). As a recent collection has pointed out, in contemporary
Palestinian history, “the Nakba is the point to which Palestinians return when they reach
the age at which they want to sum up their lives.”17 These memories from “ordinary
Palestinians” are gathered and “made public in a variety of contexts that we draw our
conclusions about the larger significance of the Nakba.18 We recognize that these
memories have adjusted to each other, produced what one scholar calls a “canonization”
of some stories and symbols.”19 Still, oral sources offer real insight into how people felt
about events, rather than just recounting a list of events. Such sources help us capture
monotonous daily events, augmenting the sense that the bulk of history is hidden.20 Oral
histories allow Palestinians not only to preserve, but more significantly to recover and
17

Ahmad Sa’adi and Lila Abu-Lughod, 5.
Rafi Nets-Zehngut, “Palestinian Autobiographical Memory Regarding the 1948 Palestinian Exodus,” Political Psychology, 32, no. 2
(2011) uses 1948 as a case study for examining the collective memory of conflict and to what degree Palestinian oral history can serve
as a source of historical research.
19
The scholar, O. Hammer, is quoted in Ahmad Sa’adi and Lila Abu-Lughod, 7.
20
Nets-Zehngut also talks about the notion of “hidden histories.”
18
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participate in, the past. Oral accounts and the history derived from them legitimizes the
Palestinian experience.
Oral sources were my first research foray into this still nascent field, with formal
interviews preceding archival work. This was necessary given that written Arabic sources
related to political prisoners in the immediate aftermath of the Naksa are scarce.21 Initial
interviews were conducted over an intensive four-month period in 2012, with subsequent
conversations taking place as needed to fill in gaps after my permanent return to the
region in the fall of 2013. Ex-prisoners were identified through various West Bank
contacts, including, among others, Raymonda Tawil, Imad Abu-Kishek, Radi Jara’ai, and
Abu El Haj, as well as through the subjects themselves, who often mentioned others with
whom I should speak. As the number of interview subjects grew, I sought out those who
had played a leading role inside the prisons with their committee work or position within
the prison’s Central Committee (a version of what existed for the formal Fatah leadership
on the outside).22 I met with prisoners in a variety of locales, from office buildings and
Ministries to coffee shops and hotel lobbies, the important thing being that the subject
chose the location in which s/he would feel comfortable. Many requested anonymity and
refused recording. Others, including the protagonists of this dissertation’s story, were
more eager to spin their tale and to have it be made public. There is no obvious
correlation between an individual’s current public profile and a desire for anonymity or
vice versa. To take a few examples of those in this project’s spotlight who allow me to
use their names and current affiliations, one is high ranking in a branch of the Palestinian
21

Several prisoners mentioned that they were able to smuggle letters out as early as 1969, but these were personal letters transmitted
via family members, and if they even survive would be in individuals’ hands.
22
These structures will be discussed in great detail in Chapter Three.
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Authority, another is retired from all public life, and a third is a university professor who
broke with Fatah and is now a leader in an one-state solution grassroots movement.23
Each conversation with an individual ex-prisoner led to more questions, but also slowly
gave shape to day-to-day living inside Israel’s security prisons. So, too, interviews
provide a basic framework in which to situate the archival material, most of which lacked
dates and names, making contextualization challenging when documents are read in
isolation. Through conversations with these former prisoners, I was able to piece together
when certain pieces of writing circulated throughout the prison system, as well as to get a
sense of general prisoner reception to the plans and structures put in place, neither of
which the documents themselves can tell us.
Relying on oral sources in constructing narratives poses a plethora of challenges.
First, verbal retellings assume that humans are capable of retaining vast amounts of
information about their experiences and, moreover, in extraordinary detail. Of course,
this raises questions about the relationship between memory, authenticity, and accuracy.
Of course, generating a timeline is difficult many decades later, and thus establishing
dates with relative precision requires a lot of cross-referencing of individual stories.
Furthermore, when an individual reflects on any experience, including those over 30
years in the past, the researcher must question what the subject is privileging and what he
is leaving out. In some cases, it was clear that prisoners were reluctant to talk about
certain moments of their incarceration, as evidenced, for example, by how many sought
to brush over the interrogation period and instead focusing on the positive energy family
visits brought once they were convicted. Secondly, in the case of Palestinian prisoners,
23

These individuals will be introduced by name later in this chapter.

15

constructing a narrative is made complicated by the fact that this history is not closed,
that political imprisonment is publicly framed as an ongoing act of resistance that both
reaches back 50 years and has a present and future. This is not the case, say, with
histories of political imprisonment in South African and North of Ireland, respectively
post-conflict and transitional states. For example, it was next to impossible to get the exprisoners to speak about their direct interactions with the Israeli administration inside the
prisons. Instead, they would speak openly about general forms of resistance to those in
charge, with a particular emphasis on the hunger strike.24 The conversation about personto-person interaction would often begin and end with a subject emphasizing that by the
mid-1970s only those elected to represent the prisoners before the administration were
authorized to have these conversations.25 Most importantly, and a focus of this project
that will be discussed later in greater detail, those who were imprisoned in the first two
decades of the Occupation place a great deal of emphasis on a particular positive element
of the experience: unity. Former prisoners have memorialized this period in their lives as
one in which they strove in harmony with like-minded individuals towards a common
goal; they rely on discourses of empowerment rather than those of victimization. Subjects
would actively minimize conversations tending toward resistance within the ranks to the
evolving leadership structures, as well as about the issue of spies and what became of
them.26 As one scholar of the First Intifada notes, “as they gain greater temporal distance

24

Hunger Strikes are the subject of Chapter Two.
This silence left a gap in my research, one that will have to be filled during further research for the book and possibly by drawing on
Israeli sources. The only evidence that these interactions were frequent and sustained is from more recent research with those who
later became leaders in the Unified Leadership of the First Intifada, who have discussed mid-to-late1980s formal meetings between
Israeli and prison representatives, with the intention of the former trying to persuade the latter to work closely with them. These
conversations, however, are beyond the scope of this dissertation, which has an established end point of 1985.
26
As will be discussed on Chapter Three, we know these breaks were present from the need for prisoners to form a security committee
to handle such issues.
25
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from their prison experiences, they are more inclined to gloss over memories that provide
reminders of passivity; in doing so, they decenter the notion of the prison as primarily a
space of suffering.”27 Former prisoners “remember their role fondly, as a way to
disempower the Israelis.” Hence a focus on aspects of the prison experience which can be
positively reframed.28 One can also account for this optimistic tone in terms of a kind of
creeping nostalgia for a time in which the prisons were organized centers for educational,
cultural, and political growth. Today’s prisons do not feature anything resembling unity;
rather, prisoners are individuals and their release is campaigned for as such.29 The
contemporary focus on individuality extends deeper into prison hallways, with a
complete collapse of all of the structures this dissertation’s subjects speak to with such
eloquence. Ex-prisoners with whom I spoke thus remember their period of incarceration
not only as the height of organization and unity, but also as the moment in history when
the resistance movement was on fire, when it had potential to evoke substantive change
for the Palestinian people.
While oral sources are used to understand both decades of the period in question,
written sources are increasingly important from the late 1970s onward. At first, lawyers
and family members smuggled in pens, and the prisoners wrote on paper from cigarette
packets, found pieces of cardboard, or cooking margarine wrappers. Not until the second
half of the seventies did prisoners win full access to paper and writing implements in
most prisons, at which point they were provided with Israeli school exam booklets for

27

John Collins, Occupied by Memory: The Intifada Generation and the Palestinian State of Emergency (New York: NYU Press:
2004), 125.
28
Collins talks on p. 128 about how for his interview subjects, entering prison was like entering a “wider social universe,” in which
education was open to them.
29
I will address this explicitly in Chapter five.
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sketching out their organization and educational system.30 I draw heavily on clusters of
these surviving notebooks in later chapters, as they offer fascinating glimpses into the
ways in which prisoners spent their time. Interviews were critical to placing these
documents on a historical timelines, and more so for understanding how these documents
were drafted, as well as the reception they received. Another significant challenge in
working with these sources has been the profound lack of cataloguing and
systematization.31 What this meant in practice was a great deal of digging, as well as help
from certain staff members through whose hands these documents passed during their
own periods of imprisonment.32

Locating Palestinian Resistance
Palestinian resistance evolved into an official movement well before the 1967
occupation, with the founding of the Arab Nationalists Movement (around 1951) and
Fatah (1956) in Lebanon and Kuwait, respectively. Coming of age during Arab
Nationalism’s heyday, both groups appealed to the declining Palestinian trust in parties
whose ideologies did not privilege the liberation of Palestine over Nasser’s Pan-Arabism.
In the wake of the 1967 war, and the failure of the Arab states to combat Israeli forces,
Pan-Arabism was largely discredited and the Jordan-based Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) – consisting of Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
30

Acquisition of these materials will be discussed in Chapter Two.
When I first began this project, the notebooks were almost entirely un-cataloged. Since they, the museum has attempted
systematization, numbering documents and tagging some with key words in a database. As of early 2016, the database remained
unsearchable.
32
The largest known collection of these notebooks can be found at the Abu Jihad Museum for Prisoners’ Movement Affairs on the al
Quds University Campus. The story goes that these were salvaged from ruin after the Oslo Accords by Qadura Fares, member of the
Palestinian Authority and current director of the Prisoners’ Club in Ramallah. Others have said that some documents were taken by
the Israelis and are housed at Hebrew University, but I have yet to find anybody on the Israeli side to corroborate this theory. A second
and sizable collection is housed in the Nablus Public Library. At the Abu Jihad library, Radi Jara’ai was a critical guide to locating
certain materials; he was involved in drafting many of the materials dating to the late 1970s while he was Asqalon.
31
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Palestine (PFLP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) –
became the focus of mass-based Palestinian nationalism, with its “statist ambition” and
distinct Palestinianism.33 Thus, during the late 1960s and through the 1970s, these
Diaspora-born factions became the guiding force behind Palestinian resistance in the
West Bank and Israel.
It is therefore not surprising that much of the literature on the Palestinian
Resistance is focused on goings-on outside of Palestine’s historic borders. Indeed, many
scholars agree that the Diaspora has been key to shaping Palestinian identity and its
relationship to the conflict with Israel. As Helena Lindholm Schulz has noted, it was “in
exile that the resistance was formulated, that the ideology of armed struggle and
revolution was asserted as a strategy to overcome processes of victimization and to
transcend the state of dispossession, denial, and statelessness.”34 Indeed, as Helen
Cobban argues, much of the PLO rhetoric of the 1960s and 1970s focused on “a
hegemonic discourse of [the right of] return,” sometimes demonstrating a disconnect
from the more practical challenges of the occupation in the West Bank.35 Notable
scholars Rosemary Sayigh, Julia Peteet, and Yezid Sayigh also emphasize that resistance
gestated largely outside of Palestine in the 1960s, at universities in Europe amongst anticolonial, Marxist types, and more significantly, amongst those educated at Arab
universities.36 Palestinians’ access to education in Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, and Amman

33

Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (London: Oxford
University Press, 2000), 98.
34
Helena Lindholm Schulz, The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism: Between Revolution and Statehood (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1999), 2.
35
Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press,1984), 228.
36
See Rosemary Sayigh, The Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries (London: Zed Books, 1979), Julia Peteet, Gender in
Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), and Yezid Sayigh.
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meant new networks were forged and a different leadership emerged. These leaders
derived their power from “the manipulation of the tools and values of modern education,”
rather than from traditional roots within Palestine’s notable-dominated society.37
While the resistance was very much an outside movement, the 1967 Occupation
managed to geographically reunite the Palestinian majority, making it easier for factions
to penetrate society.38 Up until this point, most Palestinians had remained outside formal
affiliation with any resistance faction. By the beginning of the 1970s this shifted
dramatically, as the popularity of guerilla fighters peaked alongside hundreds of
successful attacks on Israel.39 Scholars emphasize how the PLO, with Fatah at its helm,
garnered support by undermining traditional power networks in two ways: first, the
official narrative emphasized fellahin (peasant) culture, and the necessity of turning
peasants into revolutionaries, a goal that was visually represented by Arafat’s adoption of
the keffiya peasant scarf40; secondly, the PLO systematically circumvented the longstanding notable class, and worked to cultivate a mid-level command within the
Territories.41 As Hillel Frisch argues, the PLO had a vested interest in undermining and
controlling OPT leaders for “fear that they may become an alternative leadership to the
PLO.”42 Thus, their goal in penetrating Palestinian society, he argues, was to cultivate a
“middle command” that would not attempt to define strategy, but would obey commands
from the “Diaspora center” outside of the Territories, helping to propel political
mobilization in the “territorial periphery.” According to Frisch, the prisons were a
37
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primary producer of this middle command. Of the 53 middle command leaders from the
First Intifada he studied, 13 had been imprisoned for more than four years and another 24
for shorter periods.43 PLO success with grooming detainees to be obedient leaders was
due to their need for support from the outside organization, dependency that continued
after release. More significant to this project is Frisch’s suggestion that the prison
experience is one of “prolonged indoctrination and organizational training;” this prepared
the longest-serving prisoners for roles as Intifada committee leaders, and readied the
younger generation to politicize universities and develop PLO-affiliated mass mobilizing
organizations after their release.44 Thus, according to Frisch, the resistance movement
established a firm presence in the OPT during the 1970s, in particular via the prisons.45
Other scholars, such as Glenn Robinson, Emile Sahliyeh, Mark Heller, and Moshe
Ma’oz, agree with Frisch that by the late 1970s the traditional notable class had been
marginalized in favor of new types of political mobilization and leaders.46 Robinson dates
the political shift to the 1976 municipal elections in the West Bank. At this time there
was a noticeable swing away from the traditional rural-based leadership, who avoided
open confrontation with the Occupation authorities and were pro-Jordanian, to a younger,
better-educated generation of nationalist political activists, who were openly pro-PLO
and vocally anti-occupation.47 By the 1980s, pro-PLO leaders focused more of their
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energy promoting their cause outside of Palestine, and as a result had become
increasingly disconnected from the general population.
It was clear to many of the younger generation that the Diaspora resistance
movement could promote something akin to a nationalist project, but was incapable of
actual nation building. To meet observed needs, popular organizing increased
dramatically, originating from within the PLO resistance movement, but quickly
extending beyond pure occupation concerns. As Salim Tamari shows, many Palestinians
were frustrated by what they perceived as widespread passivity alongside political and
financial dependence on outside powers. In response, they cultivated a populist ideology
and established grassroots alternatives aimed at improving daily life.48 PLO-affiliated
organizations like the General Union for Palestinian Women, the General Union of
Palestinian Teachers, and the General Union of Palestinian Doctors and Pharmacists, just
to name a few, connected individuals and issued calls to action based on professional
association and with a dual intention: to protect the social and monetary interests and to
provide a forum for participation in the resistance within the context of social networks.49
As a result resistance politics became two-tiered within the PLO-framework: popular
organizations serviced society while politicians focused on international diplomacy and
fighting the Occupation in the global arena.
Given that much of the official resistance movement took place on an
international rather than a local stage, it is not surprising that the 1982 Lebanon War dealt
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the PLO a large blow. Located in Beirut since 1970, their expulsion from the country
after the war led to a state crisis of sorts. Relocated to Tunis, psychologically and
geographically far from the conflict itself, the resistance movement in its current framing
was called into question. As Rashid Khalidi has pointed out, Arafat increasingly became
a head of state in all but name, more powerful than many Arab rulers, while the PLO
because a vigorous “para-state,” no longer simply a “humble revolutionary movement.”50
It was outside of official politics where resistance truly thrived: within the confines of
Israeli prisons for political prisoners, on university campuses, and amongst the various
unions.
When it comes to understanding what constitutes resistance and how movements
function, political prisoners can provide interesting insight. For starters, their charges,
when known, can tell us something about the extent of a population’s anger and/or
suffering, as well as the lengths individuals will go to achieve their goals of justice and
freedom.51 So too, political prisoners complicate the notion of resistance, as they are
usually seen as suffering behind bars, victims of a repressive regime, and thus completely
removed from political action. Contrary to these expectations, the commitment of the
Palestinian prisoner to resistance is augmented, with leaders going so far as to replicate
and even grow the factions inside the prisons. Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s, a number
of Fatah-affiliated prisoners residing in these strictly monitored and circumscribed spaces
of punishment re-appropriated the Diaspora movement’s political organizations by
institutionalizing a transparent, highly organized structure on the inside. They resisted the
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occupation in several ways: by forcing the hand of the Israeli Prison Administration
through hunger strikes and violence to grant improved conditions52; by strengthening the
resolve and political understanding of future foot soldiers for the movement upon their
release; and, most significant to this project, by contributing to the cultivation of a
locally-based resistance movement that had the potential to serve as a viable and
productive alternative to the movement-in-exile.53 Indeed, Palestinian prisoners confirm
Yezid Sayigh’s assertion that “National liberation has been the goal of many movements
in the colonial and post-colonial eras of the 20th century, but the Palestinian case shows
that the state-building dynamic does not come into operation only after independence.
Rather, the search for state shapes the articulation of goals, formulation of strategies,
choice of organizational structures, and conduct of internal politics through much of the
preceding struggle.”54
Prisoners in the 1970s and into the 1980s conceived of themselves as tangentially
connected to the outside resistance, and yet the prison environment enabled them to
produce something radically different. Because Fatah was based in the Diaspora and only
existed as highly secret cells inside the Green Line55 and the Occupied Territories, an
intimate view of the movement’s political beliefs and resistance ideology can be
discerned through the lens of the prison. For starters, prisoners replicated the basic
structure of Fatah in the Diaspora, with members embracing the by-laws as a starting
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point for their own organization.56 What is most interesting about the prison experience,
however, is that party members no longer had to hide their affiliation; secret cells were
undone behind prison walls and political strategies of various organizations were
unveiled. By the late 1970s, unlike life on the outside, prisoners had moved away from
connecting with one another primarily via familial networks. Instead they had created a
kind of democratic political structure and civil society behind prison walls, participation
in which was based on a set of qualifications they themselves defined during over the
course of that decade. Furthermore, vibrant debate resulted in reams of political writings
neatly inscribed in small school notebooks, allowing a rare look into the inner workings
of what constituted resistance. This open dialogue led to the establishment of a complex
political system, in which regular elections took place to staff the multiple layers of
committee leadership.57 An examination of political movements inside prisons thus
reveals something startling: under certain circumstances resistance can result in a kind of
institution building resembling nascent state structures.

Contextualizing Prisoner Resistance
One of the challenges of writing about Palestinian prisoners in relation to political
resistance is the dearth of scholarly material. To date much of the available literature
consists of analyses from a humanitarian perspective or memoiristic accounts published
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by the ex-prisoners themselves.58 It was not until recently that scholars began to take an
interest in the subject of political imprisonment as yet another way into understanding the
workings of the Israeli occupation.
Two texts published in 2004 include the prison as one site among many for
examining specific groups of Palestinians living under occupation: children and refugees.
John Collins’s Occupied by Memory: The Intifada Generation and the Palestinian State
of Emergency shows how individuals who were between the ages of 10 and 18 when the
First Intifada began recollect their attempts to disempower the Israeli Occupation. Prison
factors into his text in so far as his subjects remember their experience of internment as
having entered a “wider social universe,” in which education was open to them.59 In
Confronting the Occupation, anthropologist Maya Rosenfeld includes a short section on
prisoners in her study tracing the UNRWA-inspired educational and professional
achievements of Dheishehan refugees.60 In regards to prisoners, she briefly argues that
internal educational programming shifts a prisoner’s emotional connection with the
national struggle to one that is ideologically driven. Praising UNRWA's efforts to inspire
change, Rosenfeld seeks to minimize the prevalence of Israeli power by highlighting
Palestinian agency in social and education projects.
Few texts have honed in on the prison as a specific site of examination in its own
right. One such work, anthropologist Esmail Nashif's Palestinian Political Prisoners:
Identity and Community, employs a larger framework of analysis which foregrounds
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Israel's subjugation of Palestinians. Notable for being the first study attempting a social
history of Palestinian political prisoners between 1967 and 1993, Nashif reads everything
through the lens of colonial encroachment on Palestinians. By analyzing prison poetry
and prose, he looks at how prisoners built a community as a way to show their full
engagement in the dynamics of domination and counter-domination accompanying a
colonial prison situation. In particular, he draws on Foucault to argue that the Israelis
used a variety of institutions and technologies of power to control political will, while the
Palestinians instituted their own communal relations as a form of resistance.61 Thus,
Nashif demonstrates how the prisons became a site of the Palestinian resistance
movement.
Since the end of the Second Intifada, essays have boldly asserted the importance
of studying the Palestinian prisoner as a way towards understanding something deeper
about the experience of the Occupation. Ghazi-Walid Falah draws on his own experience
of having been detained for his published scholarship. He illustrates how Israel uses the
various spaces of the prison for the purposes of gathering information about those
involved in the resistance movement; he refers to the prison system as “hyper-dynamic
space” which is “highly confined and pressurized…to extract intelligence under the
impress of limited legal time.”62 A 2011 collection of essays entitled Threat: Palestinian
Political Prisoners in Israel, is most notable for introducing key areas in need of further
research. With a range of contributors –lawyers, ex-prisoners, human rights professionals,
activists, philosophers and anthropologists (including Rosenfeld and Nashif themselves)
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– the slim volume of short essays points to many issues, including: Israel’s categorization
of Palestinians as security rather than political prisoners (Alon Harel, Yael Berda),
reasons for the contemporary downturn of the prisoners’ movement (Maya Rosenfeld),
comparisons between prison policies in Northern Ireland and Israel (Alina Korn), legal
questions surrounding administrative detention (Tamar Pelleg-Sryck, Sharon Weill), and
treatment of political prisoners (Sigi Ben-Ari and Ana Barsella, Sahar Francis and
Kathleen Gibson, and Ruchama Marton). The importance of this book lies primarily in its
raising of many yet unanswered questions, as well as its extensive bibliographies of
potential source material for further exploration.63
Several essays emphasize the colonial prison as a key shaper of Palestinian
identity. Caroline Rooney’s 2014 article argues that Israeli efforts to criminalize all
Palestinian actions have had a profound impact on the formation of a collective
consciousness. She looks at the experience of prisoners to help illustrate how that
consciousness changed in the wake of the First Intifada. She argues that today’s prisoners
are despondent and lack motivation, whereas those imprisoned in the 70s, 80s and early
90s demonstrated solidarity and forged deep community ties. So, too, Lena Meari’s 2014
article, “Sumud: A Palestinian Philosophy of Confrontation in Colonial Prisons,” shows
how Israeli prisons permanently mark individuals. She argues that “brutal experience of
the large number of Palestinians in Israeli colonial prisons and interrogation centers
constitutes a crucial part of recent Palestinian political history, representing both a
formative political moment for those involved and standing more widely as a key trope
63

See, too, Avram Bornstein, “Military Occupation as Carceral Society: Prisons, Checkpoints, and Walls in the Israeli-Palestinian
Struggle,” Social Analysis (61:2), June 2008, 106-130, which argues that prisons (as well as checkpoints and walls) is part and parcel
of the Occupation architecture debilitating the Palestinian economy.

28

through which the Palestinian experience of Israeli colonization is understood. Further,
the interrogation encounter epitomizes the colonial relation between the Israeli colonizer
and the Palestinian.”64 Scholars taking this approach emphasis the prison as colonial
endeavors that impact identity formation.
On the other end of the political spectrum, some scholars approach Palestinian
political prisoners through a lens that can be characterized as Orientalist. A 2010 study by
Anat Berko, Edna Erez and Julie Globokar compares “Arab Israeli” women who were
arrested as terrorists with women classified as criminals.65 According to their analysis,
those arrested for what Israel terms security violations were more traditional and
conservative than the criminals. Primarily based on interviews, their article concludes
that security prisoners viewed their prison experience as liberating, a fertile ground for
stoking resistance, while many criminals embraced Islam and other traditional practices
whilst on the inside.66 So, too, some scholars argue that Israel upholds a system of deradicalization via its prison system; they claim that humane treatment is intended to
evoke positive change in the security violators.67 Finally, others suggest that Palestinian
political discourse is negatively shaped by the rhetoric and performance surrounding
security prisoners.68
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Initial analyses of the Palestinian prisoner movement privilege the Israeli state’s
hegemonic power over colonial prisons. I contend that scholars who employ a
Foucauldian approach in examining the Palestinian prisoner experience will view
resistance as merely a response to state coercion and surveillance. Seen in this
monochromatic tone, one fails to grasp the complexities of the prisoner relationship to
resistance: that it extended beyond the prison walls, that it was not simply formulated in
simple reaction to Israeli technologies of power, that it represented an engagement with
rethinking the movement-in-exile, and finally that the prisoner served as a symbol of
resistance.
The limited available scholarly material on Palestinian political prisoners, as well
as the absence of a solid narrative for either the day-to-day or the “movement,” means
basic questions remain unanswered in the literature to date. While Rosenfeld and Nashif
both touch on the work of the various committees and the building of structures, they also
suggest that both power and prisoner resistance are unidirectional, the former emanating
from Israeli authorities toward the prisoners, and the latter merely a reaction to these
exertions of control. My project will take a different approach, engaging more fully with
facets of internal Palestinian politics: it will problematize the resistance narrative by
asking how these places of punishment became sites of political change and progress by
constructing state-like structures and the framework to support their building.
To move beyond existing scholarship, one can draw on the plethora of literature
concerning colonial prison contexts. The literature on South and East Asia is useful in
rethinking how to approach the Palestinian case. David Arnold, one of the first to
30

critically engage Foucault, examines the British colonial prison in India and suggests that
his model does not neatly apply to non-European contexts. He argues that not only did
the “prison often became a focus or symbol of wider defiance against the British,”
contained within its walls “is unexplored subalternity,” which had been largely silenced
by the sheer volumes of colonial archival materials.69 From his perspective, historians
should focus more on how the resistance shaped the prison system, rather than simply
looking at how the prison system exerted provocative power over the colonized.
Disagreeing even more strongly with Foucault’s model for viewing colonial
imprisonment, Peter Zinoman’s The Colonial Bastille: A History of Imprisonment in
Vietnam, argues that Vietnamese prisons were anything but manifestations of modernity
and power. In fact, he argues that they were chaotic and undisciplined, and actually
reflected the fragmented and decentralized nature of French colonialism. According to his
analysis, not only did prisons fail to aid French civilizing efforts, they actually
contributed to the colonialism’s decline by stoking the flames of resistance.70 By tracing
the emergence of social revolutionaries and the expansion of the Indochina Communist
Party inside the prisons, he demonstrates the profound impact of the experience on
Vietnamese nationalist discourse. Finally, and most strikingly, he argues that because
prisoners were often sent to the far reaches of Vietnam to serve their time, they
experienced a new sense of connectedness; they imagined themselves as part of a larger
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political community. Thus, the prison was an “institutional mainspring for the
development in Indochina of a modern political identity.”71
Zinoman helps one consider shifts in Palestinian identity as it is connected to the
resistance inside the prisons. Traditionally, kin-based networks and urban notables were
central to the direction of political life.72 Being from the Nashashibi, Dajani, or Husseini
families, for example, carried a certain cache and invited political participation in
Ottoman and Mandate debates. In the 1970s, with the new political culture of social
mobilization, family networks were in some cases replaced with lateral community ties.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the prisons, where political detention enabled a
breakdown of primordial ties, opening up a space in which new links could be forged
through literacy, engagement with ideas and “public” discourse.73 Over the course of two
decades, prisoners slowly evolved a complex structural system which supplanted the
traditional familial power hierarchy with other required qualifications: educational
accomplishments, a demonstrated ability to carry out the important day-to-day missions,
and to a far lesser degree, one’s role in the outside movement prior to prison.74
Taking a slightly different approach from that of Zinoman, Clare Anderson and
Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied both argue that colonial power empowered imprisoned
anti-colonialists. In the case of India, Anderson argues that the British penal regime
“endowed prisoners with both a sense of shared grievance and a vehicle for the formation
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of their own social and religious categories.”75 Thanks to a common enemy, prisoners
were driven to negotiate cultural change and to use their imprisonment as “vehicles of
social mobility.”76 Likewise, Aljunied outlines how political prisons in colonial Malaya
were “fertile grounds” for anti-colonialists to engage in new forms of collective action
and to build a leadership hierarchy.77 In both cases, the prison experience serves as a
springboard beyond culturally and socially circumscribed roles.
Finally, literature about prisoners in apartheid South Africa is an appropriate point
of comparison, for South Africa maintained a structural approach to imprisonment similar
to that of Israel. In contrast with Palestinian prisoners, incarcerated black South Africans
were granted political prisoner status; however, like Palestinians, they were neither
granted the benefits nor status commensurate with that categorization. Furthermore, the
prisoners’ socio-political organization presents avenues for comparison: 1) prisons for
black political prisoners were both sites of resistance and political education and 2) South
African prisoners participated in a vibrant movement that existed inside and outside their
cells. Early South African accounts focused on the relationship of exchange between
black resistance and political imprisonment. Historian Steve Mufson, for example,
touched on the prison in his work on resistance movements, arguing that it was a “sort of
graduate school for revolutionaries” where “released prisoners formed a peculiar sort of
alumni association, schooled in concrete cells and taught by tenured faculty of lifetime
maximum-security prisoners.”78 Almost a decade later, Fran Buntman co-authored an
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article comparing the role played by political imprisonment in South Africa with Taiwan.
In it, she argues that the political order developed within South African prisons was
“intended” to shape external resistance politics.79 Her later book-length study, Robben
Island and Prisoner Resistance to Apartheid, expands on her earlier thesis by offering a
narrative of the political imprisonment experience at the prison that produced important
post-apartheid political players, including Nelson Mandela.80 Focusing on the period
between 1962 and 1991, she uses this key site to examine patterns of prisoner resistance
and to show how political imprisonment played a vital role in shaping movements
beyond prison gates. Additionally, Buntman employs Robben Island as a tool to
reexamine theories of resistance, including how prisoners re-signified and re-appropriated
the authorities’ power when it came to ordering life in prison, molding the prisoners’
educational experience and creating structural organization.81 Such literature concerning
South Africa aids in framing narratives of the prison experience and its relationship to
resistance movements.82
Scholarship detailing colonial prison experiences is helpful in thinking about the
situation of Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli jails. In each of the aforementioned
examples, not only do the prisoners have a great deal of agency, they actually effect
sweeping changes in the prisons themselves and/or within their local nationalist
movement. This certainly complicates the image of the political prisoner suffering
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meekly at the mercy of the colonial power. While this narrative is focused on Palestinian
political prisoners’ activities of the 1970s and 1980s during confinement, chapter five and
the conclusion will take up the notion that such efforts behind bars led to the prisoners
becoming symbols of the revolution and resistance beyond prison walls.83

Methodology: The Prisons and their Inhabitants
The Israeli prison system was built on existing structures, left over from the
Ottomans, the British Mandate, the Jordanians and the Egyptians. Mandate structures and
laws had the most profound impact, as they set the tone for strict control over the
Palestinians. 84 Dating back to 1921, the British system was established as part of the
Palestine Police Administration, under the command of the Inspector General of Police
and Prisons. In 1946 the Department of Prison separated administratively from the Police,
but the latter continued to actually run the prisons. It was not until early 1949 that the
Israeli Prison Services (IPS) was established as a separate administrative unit
organizationally linked to the Minister of Police. They inherited four buildings from their
predecessors: the Acre Fortress, an old prison in the Russian Compound85, a Turkish
prison in Jaffa and the Haifa prison. Between 1949 and 1967, although the Arab minority
faced arrest and conviction at a disproportionate rate, the numbers were still low in
comparison with after the beginning of the Occupation. Almost half of these arrests were
for violations of the Defense Emergency Regulations left in place after the departure of
83
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the British, but only applied to Arabs.86 After the 1967 war, the IPS acquired five new
buildings, spaces that would be well utilized as the number of Palestinian arrests
skyrocketed. In addition, they immediately opened five additional prisons in the
Territories – Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron, and Gaza – and in 1968, yet another,
Asqalon. This spike from just four buildings to 15 is evidence of Israeli plans for
controlling the nascent Palestinian National Movement.
Though this project references many of these architectural structures, Asqalon,
Beer Saba’, and Nafha are the most visible. All three prisons were operational by 1980
(Nafha being the last to open on May 2nd, 1980), and contained large numbers of
prisoners serving long sentences. Asqalon and Beer Saba’ are particularly interesting
because they were the sites of inception for many of the structural developments.87 As I
will explain in later chapters, during the 1970s the prisoners in these two institutions
wrote manifestos, constitutions and by-laws for Fatah that served as the basis for a
similar style of prison organization across the West Bank and inside the 1948 borders.
Nafha is also significant because it was opened for the express intention of isolating 100
individuals who were considered faction leaders inside the various prisons. Out of the
dozens of interviews I conducted, many of the long-serving prisoners circulated through
one of these prisons during the 1970s and 1980s.
The focus is limited to prisons inside Israel and the West Bank, excluding Gaza
from the narrative. This choice is in part driven by practicalities: I have no access to
Gazans who remain there. Beyond this, though, is the more substantative reason that
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Gaza presents a very different portrait by being largely cut off from the Palestinian
Authority, and ruled by Hamas rather than a Fatah-dominated structure. Furthermore, the
individuals I work with remain in Fatah territory, even if they are no longer politically
active. They are profoundly aware of the long and complex relationship between the
resistance movement inside the ’48 and the West Bank and the movement in exile prior
to the Oslo Accords. The West Bank, abutting the crown jewel of Jerusalem, is the seat of
government and thus offers a site for future analyses of the effects of prison-generated
political structures and education.88
Just as the spotlight primarily focuses on these three prisons, weaving the others
in as interview subjects circulate through the system, certain ex-prisoners feature more
heavily than others. When I began this project, I was narrowly interested in how prisoners
educated themselves during their internment, especially by demanding access to formal
exams and degree-granting programs. While education is the focus of Chapter Four, the
project’s scope has broadened to account for how a clear and structured political system,
enabled by educational activities, unfolded inside the prison system amongst members of
the Fatah faction. To accomplish this, I showcase three Fatah members repeatedly, with
others peppered throughout the text to corroborate and deepen the story, but also to add
flavor. The key players in this work were chosen because of their significance in building
Fatah’s prisoner movement in the 1970s and 1980s: Mahmoud Abu Bakr, Radi Jara’ai,
Ibrahim Khrishi, and Yacoub Odeh. Abu Bakr self-identifies as the Occupation’s first
prisoner. A former officer in the Jordanian army, he was arrested shortly after the 1967
war and thus entered prison when there was no structure in place and conditions were
88
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atrocious. Now in his 80s, he remained politically active with Fatah for many years and
even served as an advisor to Arafat for a period. Radi Jara’ai was one of the founders of
the Fatah organization inside Beer Saba’ in the 1970s. He and two of his students were
captured in 1976 in Netanya, having joined the Fatah movement just two years earlier
and received arms training in Beirut, carrying an explosive, which he admits they
intended to use against civilians. He was heavily involved in writing Fatah’s prisoner
constitution. Today, Jara’ai remains only loosely identified with Fatah; not only does he
not hold an official political position, he is also a leading voice in the one state
movement. For his day job he teaches at al Quds University and works in the Abu Jihad
Prisoner’s Museum. Ibrahim Khrishi is a person of special interest: he held many
important Fatah political positions inside the prison in the early 80s once the structure
was established and remains an important leader as a key member of the Palestinian
Legislative Council. Finally, Yacoub Odeh was sentenced to three life sentences plus 10
years in 1969 for his role in the Fatah movement after completing his university
education. He was released in 1985 in a large prisoner exchange, having spent 17 years in
Israeli custody. By focusing on these four Fatah ex-prisoners, whose sentences spanned
the entire period in question, and weaving in stories of others, one can see the ways in
which Fatah ex-prisoners were shaped by and also constructed their own version of an
internal national movement by reimagining political organization and structure.

A Note on Terminology

38

Within this Occupation context, terminology is highly contested. Last year, after
giving a research talk, the first question from the audience asked me about my use of IDF
(Israeli Defense Forces) rather than IOF (Israeli Occupation Forces). Throughout this
project, I refer to groups of individuals by the terms they themselves would employ.
Thus, the Israeli army is the IDF rather than the IOF, and Palestinian prisoners are
political prisoners rather than security prisoners.89 I use the term security prisoners only
when referring to how the prisoner was viewed by the Israeli public, the prison warden,
or the military administration. Spatial terminology is important, too: the project examines
prisons inside the Israeli State, referred to as “inside ‘48” or “inside the Green Line,” as
well as within the West Bank or The Territories. Because Palestinians themselves employ
these terms interchangeably in conversation and analysis, I employ similar flexible
conventions.
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“An unheard of physical resistance…
how can one explain their
incomprehensible stubbornness?”90

Chapter One
On Becoming and Being a Prisoner

Imprisonment is far from a discrete period in one’s life. Rather, it is a
permanently altering experience, with release signifying something apart from a clear
ending or a final salute to a bad nightmare. Former convicts across language, class and
economic boundaries would assert that an indelible mark is made by time spent in prison.
Just as the prison experience extends beyond one’s reentry into the light of day, so too it
begins long before the convicted pass from the free world into an enclosed and closely
monitored space intended to disempower and punish. This chapter traces the prisoner’s
encounter with the complex Israeli system of punishment for Palestinians, from detention
or arrest to interrogation and trial. I will illustrate how much of the architecture of the
Israeli prison system, both in legal and physical terms, represented a degree of continuity
with the Ottoman, British, and Jordanian periods. The chapter will conclude with two
sections on conditions inside these structures between 1967 and the mid-1980s. This
initial exploration of the day-to-day living situation of prisoners is an important precursor
to Chapter Two, which focuses on the hunger strike as a way to demand material and
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physical improvements.91 The main thrust of this chapter is to portray how the experience
of imprisonment is a key part of the Occupation’s system of control. Through this tool,
the Occupation permeates the lives of individuals and families. This takes us beyond the
usual association of the Israeli army as the primary weapon of the Occupation.92 And yet,
as the stories of interview subjects illustrate, not only did this experience not break them,
it also provided a platform for personal and political development.

Before Prison Gates: The Suspect’s Arrest
According to most reports, since 1967 around 800,000 Palestinians have been
arrested and interrogated, with a large percentage of these individuals having been
convicted and served time, while the rest suffered through the netherworld of
Administrative Detention.93 Indeed, from the onset of Occupation Palestinians have
earned the unfortunate stigma of the highest per capita incarceration rate in the world.94
As one Israeli scholar has pointed out, from the 1970s until the Oslo Accords, “the Israeli
state made a tactical choice to use mass incarceration to crush political and militant
resistance against the colonization of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.”95 What is
most striking about Palestinian arrest and interrogation stories is how little they have
changed since 1967. Both of these stages in the prison experience are driven in large part
by the Israeli military establishment, which since the very beginning has demonstrated
91
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more disregard for than observance of international human rights standards. While the
occasional scholar references arrest in the 1970s and early 1980s, the bulk of the
literature highlights the mass roundups of the First Intifada.96 As discussed in the
Introduction to this project, privileging this period has been a natural move, given that it
is seen as a watershed moment in Palestinian history. Shocking statistics from the
beginning of the Intifada state that 20,000 – 30,000 were arrested annually, while
approximately 15,000 were held in custody at any given moment.97 Another reason that
so much writing exists on the Intifada period is the availability of material produced by
NGOs and research institutes. Throughout this project, I draw on many such documents
published by HaMoked98, B’Tselem99, Adalah, Al Haq100, and Addameer101, chosen
because their findings and reports have garnered local and international respect, as well
as the fact that they represent both “sides” of the Green Line: HaMoked, B’Tselem and
Adalah are Israel-based organizations, while the latter two are Palestinian. Although the
plethora of documentation coming out of such institutions dates either to the end of my
project’s time frame (in the case of Al Haq) or after its cut off date (as with the other four
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organizations), the material remains an excellent resource for scholars seeking to tease
out a narrative of Palestinian prisoners in the decade and a half after the beginning of the
Occupation. Because these organizations collect testimonies and catalogue physical and
emotional violations during interrogation and inside the prisons, they contain a wealth of
information on the liberties Israel takes behind prison walls and inside the Territories
more generally, as well as hundreds of oral testimonies of the experiences of those
confronting arrest and questioning, all of which one can draw on to understand the
continuing utter debasement to which prisoners are subjected.102 Thus, even though these
reports date to the Intifada period, they are useful in that they help establish markers for
what had not changed by the late 1980s, thus allowing us to read backwards,
corroborating oral testimony. Thus, these documents are important to piecing together the
narrative of the pre-conviction experience of prisoners between 1967 and the early 1980s.
During the period on which this project focuses, the primary reasons leading to
individuals’ arrests were broad, ranging from operations to others styles of political
engagement. Then and now, Israel’s foundational policy has been to block the
development of any type of security threat. As one writer succinctly put it in 1970: “Who
gets arrested? In conditions where absolute control is denied legitimate sanction and force
is the principal means for securing compliance, everybody is suspect. Power distinguishes
only between categories of suspects, between degrees of complicity.”103 Roughly
speaking, from 1967 and into the 1970s, ranks of the imprisoned were dominated by
individuals who attempted or carried out guerilla attacks, but also included those who had
102
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identified as – or were accused of being – fedayeen.104 As the decade progressed, the
Israeli lens for those who were considered a threat widened; nearly every young male was
considered a security risk, and even non-military affiliation with Fatah, the PFLP, the
DFLP or the Communist Party would land shabab in interrogation at the very least, or in
prison if charges could be brought against them.105 Under Israeli military orders,
attending a demonstration or distributing political posters constituted security breaches.106
As Hajjar points out, by the 1980s, “even children throwing stones at military
patrols…were arrested and charged with felonies.”107 With the rise of the Palestinian
university system in the West Bank in the late 1970s, a great deal of student-driven
popular activism spread throughout the Territories, which resulted in large numbers or
arrests.108 Mere reports of pro-PLO rhetoric amongst Palestinians at Israeli universities
resulted in detention or arrest109; the widespread belief amongst Israelis by the end of the
1970s was anyone supporting the PLO publicly was guilty of a serious crime.110 Faculty
and administrators were also seen as possible instigators, and were thus subject to
questioning or arrest at checkpoints if political books were found on their persons.111
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Thus, universities were seen as a real threat to the Israeli grip on West Bank society, as
sites for the stoking of nationalist fervor.112
Shoring up the Occupation’s system of control, arrests also resulted from
information provided by “collaborators” (asafeer), individuals who provided information
to the Israeli security wing called the Shabak or Shin Bet. These individuals were often
bribed to take on this role of reporting on their neighbors and friends, either to avoid their
own arrest or for reasons such as ensuring the renewal of their Israeli work permit.113 As
Yaakov Perry, the former director of the Shin Bet in the 1980s and early 1990s, notes:
payments must be small since “sudden riches arouse suspicion” amongst one’s
neighbors.114 These collaborators tended to remain loyal to the Israelis once they had
accepted a payment, and were thus critical to the system of detention, arrest and
conviction.115
More unfortunate reasons for arrest included having a name similar to a
politicized person, sharing a bloodline with a convicted terrorist, or simply being at the
wrong place at the wrong time. Since the Occupation’s inception, large-scale roundups of
individuals have been common, as evidenced by news reports in the 1970s and 1980s,
with 11 separate instances reported in the Israeli press during 1981 alone.116 Some
scholars suggest that “arbitrary and mass arrests” were tools for addressing a particular
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challenge: to “disrupt the plans and activities of the leaders and terminate”117 uprisings;
others argue that mass imprisonment was one “technique that aimed to reinstate the
colonial order and its power relations” in the post-1967 surge in resistance activities.118
Thus, the reasons why a Palestinian might see the inside of a jail cell during his life time
are many, which explains the commonly cited statistic that one in three Palestinian men
have been imprisoned at some point in their lives.
By the 1980s, the policy of mass arrest had a profound impact on prison
demographics. Most notably, diversity was apparent, with individuals drawn from all
sectors of society and geographic locations. The mixing of individuals who might not
come into contact with one another in their day-to-day lives was a major contributing
factor to prisoners moving away from connecting with each other based on familial or
tribal networks, replacing these connections with relationships forged through the
burgeoning complex political system.119 This diversity also enabled the cultivation of
educational programs since the highly educated were mixed with individuals from
marginalized communities, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four. Thus, the
demographic shifts in part enabled the birth of prison structures, as well as a soaring of
the general education level; a subtle, yet definitive, undermining of the colonial agenda.
In addition to tracing patterns of reasons for arrest, one can see consistency in the
sites of arrest, with the most common site alluded to being the home. Arrest serves more
than one function for the Israeli authorities: first, to remove a so-called threat from
society; and second, to instill fear in the population by underscoring Israeli power and
117
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control over spaces deemed private. As one scholar put it, “their homes were violated and
their ability to sleep soundly permanently threatened.”120 When Israelis show up, en
masse, usually in the middle of the night to demand the handover of a family member, the
image of the home as sanctuary is destabilized. The result of this action is that the
suspect’s entire family becomes part of the arrest experience; they became part of the
narrative of imprisonment as it unfolds. There is never an explanation of the reason for
arrest since it is always a matter of state security. Furthermore, neither arrests nor the
simultaneous house searches121 are accompanied by a warrant, nor are suspects read
anything resembling their rights prior to being taken away. In some cases, the wanted
family member is not even present when the soldiers come calling, although this does not
lessen the aggression of the soldiers. As Ibrahim Khrishi recollected, when the military
visited his family he was not even in the village, but living closer to Bir Zeit University
where he was studying for his first degree. His story is consistent with the narrative of
others arrested in the 1970s, 1980s and even today.122 He retells his family’s version of
the story, that the military “invaded the house in a really unbelievable way:” the soldiers
showed up after midnight, when everyone was sleeping and the house was completely
dark, and that his family told him it was “very scary.” They demanded that his father
hand him over, and when pressed for a reason, his family recounted that the response was
120
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something to the effect of “we want him.” As others have also indicated, the military
authorities are always clear that they need not give an explanation but merely state a
demand that must be obeyed for security reasons. The soldiers gave the family 24 hours
to convey Ibrahim’s person to them or else they would arrest all of his brothers. The
tactic of threatening the entire family is what motivated Ibrahim to appear at the station
the very next day, although he claims he did not know why they sought him. Others
report that arrests occur at the hands of men in civilian clothes, albeit accompanied by
border police and/or IDF soldiers.123
Invoking anxiety and fear during and in the immediate aftermath of arrest seems
to be a tactic directed not only at the suspect, but at the entire family. Once a suspect is in
the hands of the authorities, Israeli law states “information regarding his arrest and place
of incarceration should be immediately conveyed to a relative, unless the prisoner
requests otherwise.”124 As is evident in subjects’ testimony, as well as published material,
this statute is rarely upheld. Not knowing where an individual is being held is yet another
way in which arrest targets the entire family. Lawyer testimony to B’Tselem underscores
the level of heightened tension a family undergoes. As one reports, “failure to notify
harms the relatives of the prisoner as well, in that from the moment the imprisonment
begins, they lose all contact with the prisoner. They must put themselves out and travel in
order to locate the place of incarceration. They are unable to send a lawyer to care for the
prisoners and they live under fear and by rumor.”125 Indeed, the threat of arrest hangs
over the heads of all Palestinians. Between 1967 and the mid-1980s, the Israeli state
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responded to every incident with punishment, including “total curfews extending for
days, destructive searches, mass arrests.”126 Arrests were the crowning victory of the
Israelis, aiming not “only at apprehending the guilty, but also at crushing the will to
resist.” The goal, one could argue, was to cultivate “an environment in which the cost of
resistance would become increasingly prohibitive.”127 Thus, arrest quickly became a
specter within Israel.

The Interrogation: A Physical and Psychological Inquisition
From the moment of a suspect’s capture, he enters the dreaded world of the prison
system, which operates “as an autonomous kingdom within the larger state,” vividly
referred to as the “wild west of human rights in Israel” in a 1977 text.128 The first stop for
a suspect is a detention center for interrogation. These centers were highly secretive and
“inaccessible” to all but the secret agents overseeing the process. What this means is that
“the only sources of information are people who have been interrogated.”129 This presents
challenges for the researcher, as many subjects are unwilling to speak about this stage,
even after more than one meeting in which some trust is built. As this section will
illustrate, methods were often extremely punishing, both physically and mentally. The
difficulty of accessing these stories is unsurprising given recent studies on Palestinians
who have undergone torture. One scholar argues that individuals experience
psychological symptoms similar to PTSD, including anxiety, hyperalertness,
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concentration, and memory disturbances.130 For female prisoners, shame is a major
factor, derived from threats – or the reality – of rape or humiliation.131 Thus, many
interview subjects were unwilling to revisit this experience, refusing to assign language
to their traumatic memories.
In spite of the obstacles in the path of clarifying what goes on behind these closed
doors, both Israelis administrators and Palestinian prisoners suggest that this period is
critical to the incarceration process writ large, albeit for different reasons. From the
Israeli perspective, the goal of interrogation “is to protect the very existence of society
and the State against terrorist acts… to collect information about terrorists and their
modes of organization and to thwart and prevent the perpetration of terrorist acts whilst
they are still at a state of incubation.”132 Interrogation is key because “confessions
represent the most common source of evidence (sometimes the only source) to charge
and prosecute Palestinians.”133 From 1970, the responsibilities of the military court
system expanded significantly, which resulted in an increased “demand for forms of
evidence that would hold up in court;” confessions were deemed enough for conviction.
As mentioned earlier, the period of interrogation is prescribed, after which the suspect
should appear before a military judge, although these rules were more frequently bent
than not, with the interrogation sometimes lasting for months. These weeks grant a kind
of unsupervised autonomy to the interrogators, during which time they employ a variety
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of tactics intended to force confession and extract information. The result is unspeakable
acts of violence against prisoners’ bodies and minds.134
Given that many ex-prisoners alluded to the period of interrogation in a manner
similar to Yacoub Odeh’s assessment, who says it is “the most important period” because
“it affects a man’s life in the future,” it is worth dwelling on what the prisoners
underwent. Due to ex-prisoner reticence, NGO reports help add to the limited accounts I
was able to extract from individuals.135 Indeed, an entire NGO industry has grown up
around Israeli interrogation practices. The earliest formal reports date to the early 1980s,
recording the experiences of those during the 1970s. B’Tselem “estimates that Shabak
annually interrogated at least 1,500 Palestinians and used methods constituting torture
against some 85% of them, that is at least 850 persons a year.”136
Unlike many of my interview subjects, Ibrahim Khrishi spoke very openly about
his interrogation. During our second interview, he described the treatment in great detail,
claiming to recall the period of questioning in a clear chronology. After he turned himself
in at a military base in Tul Karam near his village, the soldiers hooded him and tied him
up outside of the interrogation center, attaching him to “something on the ground they
usually used to tie the horses.”137 According to his account, he stayed there for “around
six hours,” with his hands tied behind him, while passing soldiers kicked him or threw
things on him. He describes this as a humiliating process,” rather than as particularly
physically painful; as treatment designed for pure humiliation rather than to extract
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information. They asked him no questions, which led him to believe that this was
intended merely as the “preparation stage” for the interrogation; he believed the goal was
to psychologically damage him enough to force a quick confession.138 From this animallike position, he was thrust into a van with others, blindfolded, and driven, for what he
thinks was at least an hour, to an interrogation center.139 From the transport vehicle, they
shoved him into what he describes as “less than a cell,” where he just sat with his hands
tied for early one hour. At every moment Khrishi is unsure: from the tiny room he is
pulled into another room and left standing, trying to follow the Hebrew chatter of the
guards. Without warning, he recounts, “something pushes me to the wall in a very strong
movement and my head was in the wall. I didn’t see anything, I could just feel someone
who is pushing me in a very strong way.”140 He recalls that “I felt I was unconscious” and
that they continued “kicking my body.” According to Khrishi, soldiers shouting in
Hebrew accompanied every move the blinded prisoner was forced to make. By obscuring
the suspect’s sight during such movements, the Israelis create a situation in which they
dominate by crippling the prisoner’s sense of confidence, and also heightening the other
senses so that the shouting had more of an impact. None of these actions are intended to
get information; rather, says Khrishi, “this is only the start.”
Not surprisingly, by the time a guard actually questions the prisoner, he is
exhausted, confused about his location and the hour of the day, and suffering from
injuries. And yet, even at this point the actual interrogation did not begin. Rather, the
guards tried to force a confession through accusations that the prisoner had performed the
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action, and “blah, blah, blah,” recounted Khrishi. In Khrishi’s case, all of this took place
while hooded, hands tied behind him, psychologically infringing on his defense
mechanisms. Accompanying the verbal abuse, Khrishi says he was forced into a chair at
some point, after which the interrogator sat above him on a table and pressed down hard
on Khrishi’s legs, hitting him all the while. As he says, blindfolded and with one’s hands
tied, “you are like a football in his hands.” He recalls being moved again, to another
room, still blindfolded, but this time his hands were chained to a pipe in the wall. In this
room, he says, “I could feel at the time that there is other people around me, and maybe
only a few meters away.” Even before the actual interrogation had begun, the prisoner
had spent hours blindfolded, with bound hands, completely at the will of the guards, and
would surely have lost track of time, unsure if it was day or night. The face covering was
only removed briefly to use the bathroom or take a meal.141
So, too, Yacoub Odeh recalled his interrogation in oft-minute detail. Unlike
Khrishi, Odeh was interrogated at Moscobeyya in Jerusalem. He recounts that all of the
mistreatment took place on the fourth floor, a remarkably specific memory given that his
arrest was decades ago. His first actual encounter with the interrogators’ violent approach
preceded his own experience: he describes seeing a “naked man hanging while being
questioned and beaten” in a room he passed by with the guards.142 He also recalls the
time of day: his first night, at nine o’clock, the “chief interrogator,” flanked by two
others, told him that he will “be with me until five o’clock in the morning when his shift
ends.” During this time he was subjected to repeated beatings “with meter length sticks,”
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including his head, while questions were fired at him. Unlike Khrishi, he does not
reference multiple positions or locations, with the exception of his cell and the
interrogation room. His memory privileges actions taken against his body. During our
second conversation, he shows me scars on his hands, which he says are remnants from
the time his questioners secured them with electric wires to stop him from flinching
during beating. Finally, Odeh recalls the moment when he realized the extraordinarily
damaging lengths to which the administrators would go in an attempt to obtain
information, illustrating his point by referencing a girl he had known outside prison and
who was detained just before him. He remembers that upon being escorted into the room
where she was sitting only half-dressed, with the remainder of her clothing in a pile on
the floor, her face registered zero recognition. He quickly realized this was due to the fact
that his own face had been completely disfigured by a repeated refusal to give up
information.
As interview subjects elucidate, the act of questioning was part of an elaborate,
multi-person and multi-stage process. There was a kind of inexact, yet notable, pattern:
first, the prisoner was kept in isolation for a week or two, then he would usually be
moved into a room with other people, often including a collaborating “spy” to try to
extract information, followed by a more cramped cell with a large number of people.143 In
the midst of these movements, prisoners would be brought regularly, but on no particular
schedule, to the interrogation room to undergo questioning. This questioning was
reportedly always accompanied by a combination of physical, psychological and verbal
abuse. As interview subjects recount, the interrogators would ask the same question over
143
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and over again, often insisting that they already knew what had happened since people
had revealed important information that affected the person undergoing questioning. A
1981 Al Haq report cites testimony by a 17-year-old similar to that of Khrishi and other
interview subjects. He is quoted as saying:
I was taken into a special room… and three sacks were put
on my head. I was ordered to stand on my legs and not
move… I think I stood so for 20 hours. Afterwards… I was
stripped naked and put under a cold shower. After a time…
I was taken to the interrogation room. When I did not
confess to ‘inciting’ … I was put under the same shower,
but this time someone poured cold water on me with a
hose, in addition to the shower... when I again refused to
confess, I was ordered to stand on my legs without moving
for a full two days… I was beaten by the interrogators in all
parts of my body. They beat me with their fists, kicked me,
my head was repeatedly beaten against the wall. When I
fell on the floor from exhaustion, not only was I beaten and
kicked more, but one of the interrogators used to force my
mouth open and put his shoe there for a long time, another
used to force my mouth open then spit into it. During all
that time, the interrogators also threatened that they would
bring before me my mother and sister and rape them.144
The sack over the head was intended to disorient the detainee. One
interview subject reported to me that he wore this urine-soaked sack, while
handcuffed, for a 15 full days, never knowing the time of day, which
direction he was facing in the room, or who was around him.145 Khrishi
also noted the use of the urine-soaked sack, but interspersed with the
treatment discussed earlier in this chapter.146
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The rooms containing spies working for the Israeli administration were
particularly dangerous for the exhausted and traumatized detainee.147 Spies, referred to as
“birds” by the prisoners, appeared as sympathetic and attentive listeners, cozying up to
the suspect, offering to lend their ears to the abused woes. According to prisoner
testimony, these spies would try to convince the suspect that they could “take their case
to an outside source that would be able to help them,” so long as they had all of the
details.148 Especially in the early years of the Occupation, before either the circulation of
literature intended to offer advice and support or the establishment of an organized
political structure inside the prisons, this tactic was successful.149 A spy’s report was
enough evidence of guilt for the Israelis; it would form the basis for additional ill
treatment, punishment for a sustained period of refusal to cooperate and confess, as well
as for a Hebrew-language confession the suspect was expected to sign.
The conditions of the interrogation centers were atrocious. Many interview
subjects described Moscobeya, the Russian Compound, still located off of Jaffa Street in
Jerusalem, as having tiny cells with no heat during the freezing cold winters. When they
were put into cells with others, they were so densely packed one had to sleep with his
head on his neighbor’s leg. Khrishi eloquently sums up these cells as not just small, but
as a “catastrophe.”150 Apart from the lack of adequate square footage, the cells were
completely deficient in anything resembling even the remotest creature comfort. Khrishi
remembers everything in the Jenin interrogation rooms as being “gross:” dank air
enveloped them, with only a small window inside the door for the solider to open, made
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worse by the fact that they were not allowed to wash their bodies during this period;
compounding the thick atmosphere was the near complete darkness, with only one very
low wattage lamp per cell of approximately 150 by two meters that was shut down by
seven o’clock each evening.
Taken together, such reports underscore the horrors of 1970s and 1980s
interrogation practices, which sometimes resulted in a “conflict” for the suspect: either
continue to undergo treatment akin to torture or confess to charges that were either untrue
or would reveal political secrets and compromise future operations as well as the freedom
of others.151 Thus, those involved in military actions or the broader resistance movement
needed to be prepared for this reality. Acknowledgement of the treatment fedayeen and
faction members were sure to encounter, combined with planning for how to grapple with
it, resulted in the exertion of agency by the detained and their comrades. Over the first
decade of the Occupation, political prisoners developed the concept of sumud, translated
as refusal to cooperate, through their encounters with prison authorities. Anthropologist
Lena Meari writes in detail about sumud, arguing that it involves not only an
unwillingness to cede information, but also a refusal to “recognize the interrogators and
the embodied order of power that structures the colonial relation.”152 Thus, she argues
that it is an anti-colonial act, a revolutionary assertion; the prisoner actively chooses to
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resist the urge to give into pain in order to protect his faction, comrades, and the
revolution writ large.153
According to interview subjects, a kind of sumud was solidified in writing in the
late 1970s and early 1980s in highly secretive documents circulated inside and outside of
prison amongst members of all political groups. The factions produced these materials to
prepare members for a possible future encounter with military authorities and/or shabak,
particularly when it came to interrogation. According to ex-prisoners with whom I spoke,
the most commonly read text was entitled The Document on the Philosophy of
Confrontation Behind Bars (Falsafat al-muwajaha wara’ al-qudban), which was
intended to emotionally prepare fedayeen for the day when they had to endure torture
while not giving up anyone’s name or information about the faction’s future plans.
Multiple copies are available at Abu Jihad library, each consisting of over 200 pages of
small handwriting inscribed into notebooks. The text bears no author’s name, pointing
not only to its clandestine nature, but also to a collective Palestinian rhetoric and
experience.154 The writing suggests the influence of international revolutionaries, as well
as inspiration by international revolutionary movements. Based on the collection of books
gathered from the prisons, these influences likely included Che Guevera and Franz
Fanon, among others.155 As Odeh recounted, this document prepared individuals for the
inevitable: sustained beating during interrogation “so you will confess and give them the
information they want.”156 He adds that “of course we do not fall for this”157 given that so
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many prisoners had read The Philosophy of Confrontation and, after one period of
imprisonment, had also engaged in conversations with others about shabak’s techniques
and how they should respond. By calling this approach a “philosophy,” the book suggests
a kind of higher order resistance, one that asks prisoners to access their deepest recesses
in resisting the urge to give in to physical, psychological, and mental exertions of
pressure, in the interest of a greater cause: defeating the Occupation.158 Interview subjects
proudly spoke about their ability to endure physical and emotional torture for moral and
ethical reasons connected to the resistance movement and their brothers, a main focus
during the segments of interviews dealing with interrogation.159 Through this positive
framing of their experience, reports of open prisoner discussions about how to contend
with this stage of arrest, as well as surviving writings addressing the challenges of
interrogation and the dangers of giving in, Palestinians carved out a space of agency in a
process that otherwise rendered them helpless and dependent on their oppressors.
It is clear that for many interview subjects the hesitancy to discuss certain details
of the period of interrogation is rooted in an attempt to avoid the deeply rooted cultural
issue of shame. These former prisoners want the message of their struggle with the
military and prison authorities to be one of strength and accomplishment, rather than pain
and suffering. As one psychology scholar eloquently put it, emphasizing "the just cause
of the Palestinian struggle,” patriotism, loyalty toward their own people, as well as
feelings of pride and defiance were all coping mechanisms during and after experiences
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of torture.160 Moreover, widely accessible documentation offering common strategies for
this difficult period is part and parcel of creating internal power relations amongst the
prisoners and a kind of unified approach.

Telling the Truth: Israeli and Palestinian Accountability
Even when prisoners are willing to talk about the interrogation period, the
difficulty of establishing what happened in these sessions is that only two people are
present: the victim and the interrogator.161 Describing Israeli interrogation practices thus
requires a cross-referencing of ex-prisoner narratives with published reports, many of
which were based on testimony combined with attorney descriptions of physical injuries.
In 1977, a startling three-part report by the Insight Team in The Times of London
(hereafter referred to as the Insight Report) broke the story of Israeli use of torture against
Palestinian political prisoners. According to the five-month investigation, regularly
employed techniques “place Israel’s practice firmly in the realm of torture.”162 The most
commonly reported mode of extraction is prolonged and repeated beatings. Other
techniques include hooding or blindfolding prisoners, sleep/food/drink deprivation,
freezing cold showers, beating on the soles of their feet (called falaka), hanging by one’s
wrists for long periods of time, sexual molestation, electric shock (including to the
testicles), and “at least one detention centre has (or had) a specially constructed
160
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‘cupboard,’ about two feet square and five feet high, with concrete spikes set in the
floor.”163 A particularly revolting story recounted in the report involved an interrogator
who “swung” the detainee around the room by his hair until it all fell out. He then made
him eat the hair and wash it down with salty water. A second interrogator followed this
horror show by shoving a glass bottle up the detainee’s rectum. That same individual
reported that the very next day he was hung by his wrists on a pulley and beaten
continuously. This subject’s state was corroborated a report by Felicia Langer in which
she notes that the injuries he had sustained made him unable to walk by himself, his face
was yellowed, and broken ribs made it difficult for him to breathe. She claims “he did not
know his age, place of birth, address, or whether he had children” and he “started
trembling terribly” when asked if he had been tortured using electricity.164 Israeli officials
were asked about this particular case and although they denied torture, they were caught
in a lie. The Israelis claimed that he had already served three years of an 11-year sentence
when he requested medical treatment in Jordan. This medical treatment was for the
wounds from the interrogation, into which he had just been taken, a fact proven by other
recent medical records he created as a free man.
According to the report’s findings, torture is “systematic” and planned, and “it
appears to be sanctioned at some level as deliberate policy.” As one psychologist has
pointed out, it is “an integral part of the government’s security policy, thus the Israeli
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government officially sanctioned Shin Bet interrogators in the 1980s to use psychological
pressure alongside “light violence” when interrogating those suspected of terrorist acts.165
Targeting anyone suspected of a connection with the Palestinian resistance, the policy
was aimed at punishing the suspect, “as well as acquiring information about Palestinian
political and military organization, obtaining a confession as primary evidence against the
accused, and warning and frightening others from further political activity.”166 In the late
1970s, mistreatment was reported in the well-known interrogation centers of Nablus,
Ramallah, Hebron and Moscobiyya. As Felicia Langer says in her description of
Moscobiyya, “only a special kind of detainee is brought in there: the new victim.”167
According to the Insight Report, there is also a “special military intelligence centre whose
whereabouts are uncertain, but which testimony suggests is somewhere inside the vast
military supply base at Sarafand, near Lod airport on the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road.”168
Underscoring this notion that ill treatment was a kind of deliberate terrorism, a
common form of torture extended beyond the detainee to his family. At some point
increased physical pain would fail to yield further results. Indeed, research related to
torture has shown that “more injury does not produce more pain, but it’s opposite,” thus
suspects at some point shut down the physical.169 Indeed, “desensitization is well
documented,” and thus prisoners report that they lost all power of feeling when forced to
perform tasks for too long.170 To counter this, interrogators also played on suspects’
emotions. Odeh mentions a horrifying sight to which he was intentionally exposed: one
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of his handlers walked him by two of his female colleagues undergoing physical torture
whilst naked.171 He also recalls seeing a friend of his being kicked so hard he say him
“fly, yes, fly, in front of [him].” For example, interrogators would often threaten to
destroy the family home or arrest his brothers if the detainee did not reveal the necessary
information. They would also threaten sexual violence against female relatives.172 At
other times, the interrogator would expose a family member to the detainee’s state. For
example, the aforementioned man who experienced consecutive days of bodily harm and
intrusion, had to face his wife on the “third or fourth day.” It is clear from the report that
he does not remember the precise details, given the horror he had undergone, which had
finally resulted in a loss of consciousness. According to his recollection, her screams
elicited a beating from the guards, which continued until her husband “confessed.” There
are multiple accounts of couples being beaten in front of each other.
It is particularly problematic that information upon which charges are based is
obtained through these methods. As my interview subjects discussed, torture – even the
mere threat of it – is a kind of terrorism, as they fully realized the dangers too much
psychological or physical pressure could pose to the movement. Those who were
politically involved in the 1970s had advance preparation for this impending doom,
including via aforementioned documentation such as the Philosophy of Confrontation. As
the prisoner movement unfolded, current and ex-prisoners realized the importance of
documenting how to silently endure interrogation as a support to others.
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Likewise, it is clear that the Israeli prison administration recognized the
challenges of interrogation, especially that too much physical and psychological pressure
could result in false confessions. As one scholar has pointed out, “the problem of torture
does not lie with the prisoner who has information; it lies with the prisoner with no
information. Such a person is also likely to lie, to say anything, often convincingly. The
torture of the informed may generate no more than a normal interrogation, but the torture
of the ignorant and innocent overwhelms investigators with misleading information.”173
During Rabiha Diab’s excruciating 112 days in interrogation, she broke only once, and
confessed to things she did not do.174 It was not the physical treatment that resulted in her
mistruths, but ultimately unbearable threats to her honor. She quietly and matter-of-factly
relayed to me how the interrogators forced her to remove pieces of clothing, one at a
time, all the while threatening to bring relatives to witness her “behavior.”175 It was this
threat of shame before – and thus for – her family that pushed her to mis-confess. As
lawyers have reported, defendants would attempt to retract these confessions once they
were in the safety of the courtroom. Not only was this impossible, but as Lea Tsemel
notes, “there was certainly no chance of obtaining a decision that criticized the GSS or
the Military Intelligence.”176 She further recounts that, “every person in this industry,
policeman and guard, doctor and nurse, and every judge, prosecutor, and soldier
involved, knew about the torture and ill-treatment of detainees. Detainees used to be
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dragged into [military] courtrooms stinking, shivering and crying. It was common
knowledge.” 177
The Israelis were aware of the psychological and philosophical preparation of
fedayeen for this period of interrogation, and reportedly were aware of the existence of
preparatory texts, such as the aforementioned Philosophy of Confrontation Behind Bars.
According to the Landau Report, the Israelis realized that their work was “hampered by
the determination of those interrogated not to reveal information known to them, as the
result of ideological indoctrination which includes a thorough briefing on how to cope
with an interrogation, with this coping as such being considered an act of bravery by the
terrorist’s organization.”178 Thus, those in charge of interrogation had to try to break the
suspects without coming too close to killing them.
When detained individuals did start to provide information, the tone of the
interrogation changed. As soon as a suspect is willing to talk, a policeman takes over
from the interrogator and the entire tone shifts. Every interview subject who confessed to
his own crime(s) reports being given a cigarette, coffee, food, and treated by the
policeman as an old friend, in an obvious attempt to garner more information about
others. This division of labor is problematic when it comes to court cases verifying
evidence; the policeman is telling the truth when he says everything was normal because
it was his colleague – who is not present in the courtroom since he did not take the
statement – who performed the deeds for extraction. According to Leah Tsemel, it is
almost impossible for defendants to bring their interrogators before the court since they
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do not use their real names. Even in rare cases when it happens, the interrogator denies
ever having seen the person in his life. In the case of the aforementioned couple that
witnessed each other’s mistreatment, both of them confessed to having harbored bombs,
each trying to save the other. False confessions did not end the cycle of abuse, but merely
served as starting points. When the interrogators could find no bombs, the special
treatment resumed, this time out of anger at the lie. The suspect reported that one of the
interrogators applied crushing pressure to his genitals in an attempt to either force further
confession or merely for reasons of sadistic punishment.179
The intention of harsh Israeli interrogation techniques was to extract information
and sometimes to humiliate or punish detainees, but never to kill them. Indeed, as Joost
Hilternmann points out in his work on torture during the Intifada, “if deaths occurred, it
was usually because the interrogators had made a mistake, or had not judged the
detainee’s physical state of health correctly.”180 Rather, the Israeli interrogator would
likely agree with Dan Mitrione, an American torture instructor in Uruguay: “you must
cause only the damage that is strictly necessary, not a bit more. We must control our
tempers in any case. You have to act with the efficiency and cleanliness of a surgeon and
with the perfection of an artist.”181 As one Israeli General Security Services interrogator
put it in a 1990 interview with notable Haaretz reporter Gideon Levy, “however funny
179
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and disproportionate from the point of view of causing a person’s death it may sound to
you – it’s a serious punishment in a service in which the worker’s involvement is so
great. He might even be kicked out of the service.”182 Israel, the only “democracy” in the
Middle East, a civilized nation of descendants from Western Europe, America, and the
Middle East that rhetorically insists its values extend beyond the places from which their
ancestors came, maintains a vibrant press industry. In fact, Israeli newspapers reported on
torture of Palestinian security prisoners, with at least 40 cases described during 1981
alone.183 It also has an international community to whom it must answer, and answer it
did: Israeli spokesmen would tell the press, that harsh means were often necessary to
control the rowdy terrorists.184 The death of a prisoner was highly inconvenient. When it
did happen, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters, it was covered in the Arabic
press, and reportedly in the Hebrew press as well. “Terrorists” needed to confess, to be
punished, and to serve their time, but not to put the Israeli state in a position in which it
was deemed unjust or a regular violator of human rights. To that end, Israel did, and
continues, to cover up causes of prisoners’ deaths. Odeh recalls one of his friends who
suffered kidney damage from his beatings, and eventually died of kidney failure. The
interrogators told the family that he was critically injured while running to see his parents
on visitation day.185 The bruises on the body and the subsequent autopsy told a different
story. Thus, given Israel’s position as a civilized and humane state, proving the
authenticity of reports was critical. In 1981, ABC-TV filmed a 17-year-old student
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reporting on his violent interrogation for it’s 20/20 program. Notably, a part of the
broadcast included footage of him taking a polygraph test as he recollected his
experiences.186 The authenticity of the story was critical because Israel’s reputation was
at stake. Thus, NGO’s are careful to corroborate and verify their sources.
Until 1987, the only sources of information we have about what happened during
interrogations are based on testimonies much like the ones I recount from Khrishi and
Odeh. Al Haq and B’Tselem gathered many such accounts, as did human rights lawyers
Felicia Langer, Leah Tsemel and Walid al Fahoum. Then, a decade after The London
Times expose, the Israeli government constituted the “Commission of Inquiry into the
Methods of Investigation of the General Security Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist
Activity,” also known as the Landau Commission [note: the report is hereafter referred to
as the Landau Report], to evaluate the General Security Services (also known as Shabak
or Shin Bet).187 Answering to an international community meant that Israel also had to
respond to allegations that interrogations went too far.188
This resource is invaluable for research into the 1970s and early 1980s, as it offers
a way to confirm many of the allegations of State-approved and/or directed prisoner
torture leading up to 1987. The investigation resulted in a two-part report: the first was
public and summarized GSS activities, while the second was secret and reportedly
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contained “guidelines for permissible interrogation methods.”189 The report concluded
that “the exertion of a moderate degree of physical pressure cannot be avoided” when
dealing with individuals suspected of “hostile terrorist activity,” and that “national
security imperatives required coercion in the interrogation of Palestinians and that the
state should sanction such tactics in order to eliminate the GSS agents’ need to resort to
perjury.”190 The idea is that torture can be used against suspects who might have time
sensitive information about an upcoming attack, those referred to as “ticking bombs” in
the report. Interestingly, as B’Tselem points out, those with this kind of information
“were tortured during interrogations on weekdays, while on weekends, when the
interrogators did not work, the "bombs" stopped "ticking" until Sunday, when the process
started over again.”191 Lea Tsemel summarizes the findings as follows: “torture is
sometimes permissible, but lying to the courts is intolerable…if you have to torture
someone, you must refer to the secret list of permitted and non-permitted methods, and if
you use any of these permitted methods you must disclose it…the security service
interrogators even had to fill out forms. Can you imagine? I have some of those
forms.”192 Thus, while this study might have resulted in a reduction of the cases of
torture, and possibly even eliminated some tactics, this act of bureaucratizing also made it
somehow permissible.
As evidenced by B’Tselem’s tracking, many of the techniques employed prior to
the Landau report continued, including: multi-day sleep deprivation while contorted into
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awkward positions; enduring loud music; the urine-soaked head sack; exposure to
extreme cold and heat; tying the detainee to a low chair, whilst tilted forward; tight
handcuffs; positioning the detainee over a high stool, with his back arched backwards;
violent shaking; long squatting with hands cuffed behind his back; threats against one’s
family. According to human rights organizations, this report had little to no impact on
improving the interrogation process for Palestinians.193 Rather, one could argue that it
gave Israel a bureaucratic framework for its approach to interrogation. Indeed, the report
states that the urgency of this report reflects a “crisis of confidence which must now be
overcome for the sake of the common goals of these State authorities.”194 These findings
both confirm prisoner testimony, while also providing a rare look into the history of the
Shabak, which to this day operates almost entirely shrouded in mystery.195

On Trial
Once a Palestinian is arrested for security violations, they become part of a
military judicial system.196 Both Al Haq and B’Tselem have extensively studied the
courts system in the West Bank, creating many reports about the issues at stake. Based on
interview testimony, however, the trial is the least-discussed period in the prisoner’s
journey from arrest to release. In contrast with interrogation, which prisoners resist
discussing given the shame and painful memories attached to it, there is simply less for
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the prisoner to comment on regarding trial and sentencing. This is in large part due to
language, since the deliberations were conducted in Hebrew. Indeed, from what I was
able to glean from interview subjects, as well as from NGO reports on trials concerning
security violations, the court experience is designed to be alienating and impenetrable for
the defendant.
By the time a trial date is set, many prisoners have been in detention and
undergoing interrogation for months. Any Palestinian accused of what Israel deems a
“security offense” is tried in a military court, as set out in the 1967 Order Regarding
Security Instructions (re-issued in 1970).197 During the period on which this project
focuses, military trials took place in Ramallah and Nablus, with the former serving the
districts of Ramallah, Hebron, Bethlehem, and Jericho, while the latter heard cases from
the regions of Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarem.198 The outlined bases for trial in such courts
are connected to the issue of security, and are determined by the Israeli police at the
suggestion of the Attorney General and the Military Advocate General, including: any
resident of the Territories who violates security orders; actions which infringe upon IDF
security; anyone, including a Jew or a foreigner, who violates security orders, even if the
violating act is not illegal according to Israeli law; and crimes that the chief police
investigator recommends as being suited to a military court. In short, the military
administrative leadership has a great deal of leeway and power. Although these orders
have the potential for broad application, the reality is that only Palestinians are subject to
such trials.
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The starting point for any court appearance is presumed guilt rather than habeas
corpus. The order establishes a two-tiered system for judgment: for lesser security
offenses (stone throwing, for example), a single-judge court is convened; for serious
charges (incendiary devices, for example), the defendant faces a three-judge panel. The
1967 Order gives the Military Advocate General the authority to recommend army
officers to the posts of military judges and prosecutors. For trials requiring three judges,
IDF officer judges are appointed, with the only requirement being that one of them must
have had six years of training at the Israeli Bar; for a single-judge trial, a judicial officer
is appointed.199 Although sentences issued by the military court of three must be
approved by a regional commander, this system places a great deal of authority in the
hands of those who have very little legal training or experience.200 An additional problem
with the structure is that officers who serve as prosecutors and judges are part of the same
military unit, and thus competition is fierce; those who serve as judges are frequently
promoted to other senior positions.201
Although military trials are, according to Israeli law, meant to be open to the
public, much of the evidence used in trials against suspects is questionable. Signed
confessions constitute the primary evidence and is often the only incriminating material
the prosecution has for the trial.202 As the aforementioned section on interrogation
suggests, these confessions are frequently obtained via arguably illegal methods, but just
as importantly they are written in Hebrew. Thus, almost all suspects are required to sign
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documents they cannot read. Prisoners handled this fact differently, some signing under
pressure, while others refused via special tactics. For example, evidence for a 1978
Ramallah trial for four boys, observed by two US Consular Officers in 1978 with Israeli
permission, reportedly included information obtained in the following way: the boys
“were beaten and threatened by the police until they signed statements written in Hebrew,
a language none of the boys understands…the boys confessed to throwing rocks at [a]
bus.”203 In other cases, detainees refused to sign. As Rabiha Diab proudly recollected,
even in spite of 112 days of humiliating interrogation, she refused to sign her supposed
confession. As she pointed out:
I don’t know the Hebrew Language and they said just sign.
They write whatever they want. I refused to sign. They said
the lawyer went home. I said, I don’t trust you and I can’t
sign unless the lawyer comes. The lawyer came back and she
translated and after she read everything written, she went out
to bring cigarettes. I scratched all of the things I did not say
and wrote something different from what they said I said. I
was precocious.204
While Diab is an aberration in terms of her brave approach to revising the presented
document, prisoners increasingly refused to sign as a system of communication regarding
how to contend with the interrogation period developed between fedayeen and faction
members.
Apart from evidence, multiple factors arguably impacted the trial’s legitimacy and
fairness.205 Language continued to be an issue since they were conducted almost entirely
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in Hebrew, supposedly with simultaneous translation into Arabic. Reports, however,
indicate that translation was inconsistent, with the translator “speak[ing] in a low,
monotonous voice” so that “it was difficult to understand his words,” and were full of
errors or not verbatim, mistakes that would sometimes be corrected by bilingual defense
attorneys.206 In some cases, the judges and prosecutors would even communicate with the
Arab defense lawyers in English.207 Besides linguistic challenges, trials were poorly
planned and executed, including frequent delays and even misplaced materials. There are
multiple accounts of soldiers or police witnesses, as well as attorneys, failing to appear,
and the accused files are frequently lost. Such mismanagement could mean that by the
time a second hearing was set, a new judge and prosecutor could have taken over the
case, resulting in further complications and delays. Prisoners seeking to avoid such delays
sometimes felt the pressure to plead guilty quickly, “to avoid serving a period of pretrial
detention which would exceed the sentence likely to apply as a result of a plea bargain.208
Influencing this decision is the fact that it is extremely rare for Palestinians to be found
innocent when tried for security offences.209
Further exacerbating the unfairness of the trial experience was the generally
atrocious conditions of the courts, which had underscored the humiliation factor while
also having legal ramifications. During the 1970s, courts were “dirty in the extreme,”
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while the “court rooms and the surrounding area show signs of neglect appropriate for
neither a courtroom nor a military compound.”210 They were also designed to be small
with no private space for client-lawyer consultation.211 Ramallah, for example, consisted
only of three courtrooms and an administrative office. The result of these conditions is
that suspect-attorney conversations were conducted within earshot of the judge or
prosecutor, which could have profound implications in the trial itself.212 In short, one can
argue that trials are pro forma, in spite of State claims to the contrary.
Apart from the fact that trials can be read as farcical, court encounters were also
entirely humiliating for suspects, their families, and even for Palestinian attorneys. For
example, in Ramallah, defendants awaited courtroom appearances in “one of two small
dirty rooms with no seating” where “large numbers of prisoners are kept in crowded
conditions for many hours, without proper lighting or ventilation.”213 Although families
are theoretically permitted to attend trials, the lack of waiting rooms means that “dozens
of people wait for long hours,” outside the court, often in the blazing sun, “and nobody
bothers to inform them of what is happening in the courtroom.”214 Information is not easy
to obtain since these courtrooms are located inside Military Government compounds,
with entrances guarded by (read: blocked) soldiers. Arab defense attorneys were not
treated with more respect than suspects and their families, as they were barred from
eating in the compound’s small dining room or purchasing provisions at the army store,
to which Jewish lawyers had access.
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Trials often resulted in sentences that were excessively punishing. Multiple life
sentences were common. In Odeh’s case, his eleven-month trial concluded in 1970 with a
sentence of “three lives and ten years.”215 The courts had a clever way of dealing with
lengthy sentences: they would be divided into what was called “active” and the
“suspended” periods. For example, in the case of Khrishi, his 1985 arrest resulted in a
ten-year sentence, six active and four suspended. What this meant in practice is that if the
individual “did anything during the six years they will give you the four additional as a
guarantee and they will judge you again.”216 Although many lengthy sentences were cut
short with a major prisoner exchange in 1985, and then again with the Oslo Accords,
some of those convicted in the 1970s remained in jail until well into the 2000s, spending
close to thirty years of their lives inside the dreaded Israeli prison system.

Legal Wrangling: Why Reinvent the Wheel?
The system of arrest, interrogation, trial and eventual imprisonment is integral to
the Israeli administration’s efforts to manage the Palestinian population by complicating,
hindering and fragmenting the resistance movement. As the preceding sections illustrate,
once an individual enters the system, it is almost always a lengthy journey to eventual
release – in some cases spanning multiple decades or even the rest of one’s life, given
that once arrested, re-arrest is a constantly impending doom. This system, over sixty
years in the making, represents a remarkable pillar of stability in Occupation
215
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management. An examination of Israeli laws related to security prisoners elucidates this
constancy in control.
For starters, one of the most consistent aspects of a Palestinian prisoner’s life is
the encounter with the complicated and biased, yet stable, Israeli law, especially within
the OPT. While the law has evolved since 1948, the base upon which it has built has not
changed; whether a prisoner was arrested in 1967 or today, legal parameters have not
substantially altered. Residents of the Territories are often subjected to the military law
established by the British Defense Emergency Regulations of 1945, promulgated by the
British High Commissioner of Palestine who acted with the authority of the Palestine
Defence Order from 1937.217 According to the Israeli argument, this was merely a
continuation of Jordanian policy, and thus a way of maintaining some consistency.218
There Mandate-era orders authorized the proclamation of seemingly extraordinary
security regulations to protect the colony, at the time from the Zionists. With the
beginning of the Occupation, the Israelis maintained this structure, thus subjecting the
Territories to a military judicial system, a different system than operates within the state
of Israel. That said, military courts handle all security offences, even for Arabs living
within 1967 borders. At the same time, the Israeli authorities have granted lawyers access
to the Supreme Court to challenge decisions.
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Israel exists in a constant state of emergency and in a proclaimed state of war.
What this means on a practical level for prisoners is that security and military orders can
be issued without much fanfare. In 1970, Israel issued the Order Regarding Security
Instructions for Judea and Samaria, a lengthy document outlining a starting point for
managing the Occupation. Article 78 of the Order allows for an individual to be detained
for up to 18 days without the issuing of an arrest warrant.219 Furthermore, a judge many
extend the period of detention to six months, even in the absence of an indictment. Even
more dramatic, once an indictment is issued, there is no limit placed on the length of
detention before a formal conviction in court. According to lawyers’ testimonies, the
most common reason cited to them for repeated extensions is that the indictment was not
yet prepared.220 Article 79 of the same Order authorizes the court to release detainees on
bail, although this almost never happens.221
This is in stark contrast with the detention law inside Israel, which only allows for
up to 48 hours without a clear order from a judge; an extension up to 90 days can only be
made by the Attorney General and formally granted by a judge. The double standards are
propagated by the fact that the military authority ruling the Territories can issue any
orders it deems necessary. All orders must be published in Arabic and Hebrew and
readily available so that those affected are properly notified. The first Military
Proclamation was issued on June 7, 1967, justified “in the interests of security and public
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order.”222 In the four decades that followed, the Israelis issued over 2,500 such orders.223
In 1978, Order 378 stated that a person can be arrested for reasonable suspicion of having
committed a criminal act, but also that they can be held in solitary confinement for up to
eight days without access to a lawyer.224 Since the very first order, these decrees become
law immediately and are binding on all Palestinians in the Territories. The Israeli
rationale for these orders is that they are necessary for security. In spite of the war state,
one of the many contradictions at play in Israel is that Palestinian prisoners do not have
political prisoner or prisoner of war status, although the IDF has always been authorized
to judge and convict. While there are checks in place, organizations such as B’Tselem say
that “this system has had a tendency to be practiced increasingly in theory alone.”225 The
fact that military law has a long history, since it is based on that of the British Mandate
period, relieves the burden of responsibility for Israeli administrators.
The constant state of emergency also means that Israel can justify certain actions
against Palestinians on emergency grounds. For example, inside Israel a suspect has the
immediate right to see an attorney, who will ensure that the investigation is executed in a
responsible manner. In the Territories, the initial client-lawyer meeting is frequently
delayed 30 days for the security of the interrogation. Israel often violates its own orders
as well. Article 78 of the Order Regarding the Security Instructions confirms that the
prisoner’s place of internment must be conveyed to a family member and his lawyer.
According to B’Tselem, this rarely happens. The wait can seem interminable as families
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worry about mistreatment, but it also delays a family’s ability to engage legal services to
construct a defense. B’Tselem also discovered that attorneys are rarely notified and in
fact each one they spoke with “described difficulties in locating prisoners.”226 In one
case, the report describes a prisoner’s father and lawyer traveling to the place where it
was rumored he was being held. Not only did the place in question deny his presence, the
father had to wait eight weeks and submit a petition to the High Court of Justice to be
notified of his son’s location.227 Likewise, prisoners were frequently moved from one
location to another, without notifying the attorney representing them.
The best example of this is the policy of Administrative Detention, a renewable
and often lengthy holding period during which neither charges are issued nor a trial held.
As B’Tselem pointed out in a comprehensive study of the military judicial system during
the First Intifada, “many of the imprisoned Palestinians do not reach the courts,” even
though they are imprisoned for long stretches of time.228 Like other practices, the law
permitting administrative detention is British in origin and was first applied to Jewish
resistance fighters as early as 1937.229 Within the Territories, the Emergency Regulations
established that the military commander has the right to order administrative detention if
there is “a reasonable basis to suppose that regional security or public security necessitate
that the person should be imprisoned.”230 For prisoners within the jurisdiction of the
Israel proper, the Israeli Minister of Defense can issue the order.231 In other contexts, this
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vague, sweeping “law” would be illegal. According to the 1979 Camp David Accords, an
administrative order could be issued by a military Regional Commander for a period up
to 96 hours, after which a detainee was meant to be brought before a military judge; a sixmonth order could only be issued by an Area Commander and the detainee had the right
to petition the Israeli High Court of Justice to review that order.232 The military
commander is endowed with the power to execute this order “if there is a reasonable
basis to suppose that regional security or public security necessitate that the person
should be imprisoned,”233 although usually the Shin Bet makes the request. Approval of
detention is not necessary except if the subject is a woman or a male under 16, in which
cases the Area Commander needs to issue permission. What this means is that a great
deal of power and control is centralized in the hands of one individual.234 In every other
case the military commander has near complete authority, with the only exception being
the existence of the Area Advisory Committee, which meets a few times a year to review
detention extensions. Those under administrative detention are denied basic rights
enjoyed by criminal defendants, especially straightforwardness: the criminal is
interrogated and released or prosecuted for having committed an act, while the detainee is
kept under wraps to “thwart a prospective danger,” the specifics of which are not shared
with him, nor is he enlightened as to the existing evidence against him.235 Moreover, the
judge and prosecution have the right to withhold information about charges and evidence
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from the detainee and his lawyer.236 Ultimately there are neither restrictions on the length
of detention nor are the rules for appeal clear. Although in theory an appeal committee,
also appointed by the Area Commander, to which any detainee can submit, appeals are
rarely granted. Furthermore, in theory a detainee can petition the Israeli Supreme Court to
revoke the detention order, but as Goldstein pointed out in 1978: “how much of a last
resort this really is, is questionable.”237 He argues this is because the judiciary is very
reluctant to get involved in affairs considered the military’s domain. According to
Goldstein, although some Israelis in government “feel quite uncomfortable” with the
continued use of the Mandate Emergency Regulations, “there seems to be a feeling that,
despite deep misgivings, there is no alternative.”238 The ongoing conflict and the idea that
every Arab is a potential terrorist, allows normally rational individuals to justify the use
of administrative detention.
Israel’s continued emphasis on the state of emergency also means that the law can
become malleable and civil liberties are compromised. In Diab’s case, she surprised the
administrators by knowing something about the law, which meant that they simply
adjusted the situation to fit within Israeli legal parameters. Although she hails from a
small village outside Ramallah, at the time of her third arrest in 1981, she was brought to
Jerusalem’s Moscobeyya for the duration of her interrogation. After a grueling 112 days,
she was sent to prison without being sentenced. According to the Israeli law, if you spend
one year and one day without appearing before a judge, the system must release the
individuals. As Diab recounts, “when it became one year and one day, I reminded the
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administration of the prison that the law says this, so you should release me. They were
surprised.”239 After consultation the administration concluded that the four months she
spent in Moscobeyya could not be counted. After another four months, she inquired again
and in response was moved to Ramle prison, at which point she was told the clock started
over. Another 366 days passed. When Diab approached the administration and said
“okay, now it’s been one year and one day,” they responded that the law was not
applicable to individuals from the Territories. She tells the end of the story with a bitter
laugh: “So I waited two years and twenty-four days without any sentence, without any
court. And then finally I was sent to the court and I was sentenced for five years.”240
Diab’s case is not unusual. In fact, according to the Israeli Bar Association representative
to the Knesset Law Committee, 33,000 men and women were detained (some briefly)
over the course of 1976, of which “only 8,000 were charged because the police follow a
policy of indiscriminate mass arrests.” The rest remained in administrative detention until
their release, often in violation of Israel’s self-defined policies.241
The policy of administrative detention has long been controversial in Israel and
the Territories, in large part because it is illegal to imprison people on “the speculation
that an individual may be dangerous in the future.”242 Thus, it has long been critical to the
prisoner movement, with the status of detainees a key site of prisoner resistance.243 In
spite of the questionable legality, the number of administrative detainees peaked starting
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in 1970 and then witnessed an overall decline through the decade. According to an
interview with the Defense Minister in 1970, Moshe Dayan, Israel held 1131 detainees,
509 from the West Bank, 556 from the Gaza Strip, and 34 from Israel. He goes on to
claim that over the course of that following year, the number dropped to 560 in total, as
the police organized and more effectively targeted terrorist activities.244 The fact that the
detention experience is so miserable often leads to acts of desperation manifested as plea
bargains, when a trial finally takes place. This is in part because after a year of detention,
the prosecution almost always had a signed confession to at least some of the charges,
arguably forced by ill treatment. According to lawyers, this means that defendants often
plead guilty to charges they did not commit.245 The B’Tselem report claims that prisoners
were sometimes also pressured to take a plea bargain with statements such as: “finish it
today and you’ll be out tomorrow. If you refuse the deal, the trial will be postponed and
you’ll sit in detention until the end of the trial, and then if you’re convicted you’ll get an
additional punishment.”246 This is particularly interesting given the widespread belief
amongst prisoners and lawyers that it is a way for the Israelis to punish while stalling
until a confession is made. As Langer reports, one of her clients, Abdallah Yusef Udwan,
said: “I’m here under administrative detention order because they couldn’t find any proof
against me.”247

Visual Markings of an Israeli Prison
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A second pillar of stability in the complex Occupation organization is the
architecture of the prisons itself. The Israeli prison system accommodating “security
prisoners” between 1967 and the mid-1980s was, and continues to be extensive. Dotted
across Israel and the Territories, prisons inside the Green Line often housed prisoners
from the Territories and vice versa. Many of the prisons the Israelis utilized were not of
their own making, with buildings dating to the Turkish or British periods converted to
house the growing number of security risks. Also, after the 1967 war, the Israeli Prison
Services received five buildings that had served as prisons during the Jordanian and
Egyptian rule. To add to those existing structures, the authorities immediately opened
five prisons: Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron, and Gaza. Over a decade into the
Occupation, in 1980, they opened Nafha, and then in 1984 the Central Prison in Tul
Karam, what the Israelis call the Judea-Samaria Central.248 The characteristics and traits
of a given prison are determined in part by the space itself, including its size, but not
necessarily by location.
The administration made full use of the sturdy existing structures. One very large
former Ottoman building in Nablus was known in the 1970s as the Central Prison. With a
capacity of 600 people, it was the biggest in the West Bank, and a site through which
many prisoners passed. Ramle, inside the Green Line, had first been a British police
station and then a stable for horses, but was converted to a major detention center for
Palestinians from both Jerusalem and the Territories. Atta Qaymery, who was imprisoned
there, referred to it as the “window shopping prison,” since it was often visited by
representatives assessing the situation of prisoners. Throughout the 1970s, it was mostly
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inhabited by Jerusalemites, with around 100 prisoners at a time. He notes that Ramle was
known for being “10 years advanced in everything,” recollecting that there were beds
there, whereas in other places this was not possible until at least 1980. Given the prison’s
relative advancement, Qaymery was able to propose an educational partnership with Bir
Zeit in 1978.249
The authorities alternated between a policy of assigning prisoners in proximity to
their point of origin, and then sometimes disregarding this entirely, and arguably
intentionally. In fact, between 1967 and the mid-1980s, Asqalon prison, Nafha prison, the
main wing of Beer Saba’a prison and the special wing of Ramle prison, located within the
pre-1967 borders, were major hubs for Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza.
Likewise, prisons earmarked for certain periods of incarceration hosted mixed
populations. In the early 1970s, Beit Lyd, housed only about 50 prisoners, most of them
Fatah members. Interview subjects dwell on this prison less than others because it was
intended for those awaiting trial, thus inhabitants did not form the same attachment to this
space. Even still, there was still a group of individuals who helped oversee daily life
there, as will be discussed in Chapter Three.
While size was a factor in a prison’s conditions, the Israelis also earmarked
prisons for certain purposes, upon which the prisoners would sometimes capitalize.
Asqalon and Beer Saba’a, both inside the Green Line, are the best examples of prisons
with purposes: both were intended for prisoners serving lengthy sentences. In Asqalon,
situated in a former Tegart fort, a critical mass of long time residents meant that it
became the site in which many of the democratic structures first evolved to their full
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capacity.250 Organization was driven not only by the large population, but also by the fact
that it was reportedly “hell” in the early 1970s.251 One contemporary Israeli report
describes it as a “place where prisoners – mainly Arabs – are sent to break their spirit.
Not for interrogation, God forbid, but only after their trial. Ashkelon is a special
punishment jail. Prisoners transferred healthy and upright from Ramle, go back to Ramle
after a few weeks broken, destroyed – silent.”252 Beer Saba’a, opened in 1969, was the
first prison to be built expressly for its intended use. In spite of its enormous capacity, the
1970s witnessed serious overcrowding across the system.253 By the end of this decade,
there were reportedly about 900 prisoners, of which approximately 700 were affiliated
with the Fatah movement.254 This did not stop the influx: in 1980, Beer Saba’a served as
a relief valve for overcrowded Ramle when 100 East Jerusalem residents were transferred
there. Given the density, as well as the critical mass of Fatah prisoners, it is not surprising
that it was among the first prisons to organize.
Yet another prison with a purpose is Nafha, opened in May 1980 for the stated
purpose of alleviating overcrowding across the prison system. As multiple interview
subjects stressed, its location, as well as the timing of the prison’s opening, spoke to a
different driving force: to separate the perceived prison leadership from their followers.255
Indeed, the first cohort of inmates consisted of those identified as top leaders from the
other prisons, the most dangerous and threatening, thus turning it into “a storage bin for
250
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the most troublesome guerrillas, eight of whom are placed in each barren cell.” The
location was not accidental. Deep in the Negev, prisoners were removed from
civilization, even more psychologically removed from society than in a prison located
within a town or city. By moving them into the middle of the desert, the administration
hoped to deprive them of their connection to and role in the prisoner movement. Within
just two months of the prison’s opening, the inmates agreed it was the “absolute worst,”
already severely overcrowded. The intention was to relocate 50 to this prison, which it
was built to accommodate, but it welcomed 100 on opening day, double its intended
capacity.256 Interview subjects report that the prison was not yet ready to be inhabited,
which exacerbated the already awful conditions. Beyond the issue of overcrowding, the
place was not well-equipped: each room was approximately 20 feet long and 10 feet
wide, housing eight prisoners, with a toilet and shower nozzle in a partly closed booth at
one end.257 The only “furniture,” if you can call it that, consisted of thin mattresses and
woolen blankets on the concrete floor, as well as cubbyholes along the walls to store
limited personal belongings. The administration decided against issuing beds, to
circumvent the possibility of prisoners dismantling them and using the metal for
weapons.258 Given that this prison was intended to keep the leaders in check, the reports
of how poorly it was managed are surprising; the conditions gave the prisoners ample and
clear fodder for resistance. Former inmates report that the cells were poorly ventilated
with only air slits for windows and solid metal doors, that there were too many bodies
crammed into each cell necessitating that they sleep and eat on the floor, that they get
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only two hours of daily exercise outside cells, that food and medical care are poor, and
that they are subjected to frequent solitary confinement.259 Indeed, within three months of
its opening, activists and relatives of inmates loudly and publicly spoke out about the
conditions. In response, IPS authorities told the New York Times that this prison had more
space than others with 3.2 square yards per person compared to 2.8 or 3.0 in other
places.260 Given the appalling conditions and the support from the outside, the prisoners
launched a hunger strike within two months of opening.261
With the number of prisons intended for “security prisoners,” the IPS
experimented with different approaches to managing the population. Within a few years
of the Occupation, it was clear that one Israeli policy was to disorient and destabilize
individuals: prison assignments were far from permanent. Rather, the IPS regularly
moved individuals from one location to another, especially those who were known to be
politically active. The leadership of the prisons was especially subject to relocation since
the Israelis believed that they would be able to break up the structure if they moved
people around. As Chapter Three will illustrate, destabilization ultimately failed in the
face of the well-organized prison-wide political structures.

“Managing” Prisoners
During the 1970s, the conditions to which security prisoners were subjected
became a site of resistance, both inside and outside prison walls. As will be discussed at
length in the next chapter, prisoners regularly waged hunger strikes to gain what
259
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amounted to incremental improvements in their situation. Beyond prison walls, the press
and local officials increasingly spoke to the impoverished conditions in the second half of
the 1970s, based on prisoner and lawyer testimony. From an Israeli authorities’
perspective, it is clear that permitting international monitoring was to cover them from
international accusations of mistreatment.262 The reality, however, was quite different
from the attempted portrayal.
As evidenced by the number of reports cited in this chapter, human rights
organizations, as well as other NGOs, have been tracking aspects of the political
prisoner’s experience for decades. The Red Cross has the longest standing monitoring
relationship with the State of Israel, and in theory has been able to visit West Bank and
Gaza prisons since 1968 in order to assess their mental and physical health.263 In practice,
however, the authorities manage to circumvent exposure of some of the potentially
image-damaging prison practices. For starters, delay tactics for observations are common:
the Red Cross usually does not learn about arrests until the families or the prisoners’
lawyers attempt to enlist the organization’s help in establishing the prisoner’s precise
location. A major obstacle for Red Cross representatives is that they only have access to
prisons, but not to police stations, interrogation centers, or military camps.264 For
example, between 1967 and 1975, the organization was not allowed to visit detainees at
Moscobeyya even though that is repeatedly noted as a site of mistreatment. Even in
prisons to which the Red Cross has access, there are special cells that are neither visible
262
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nor accessible. In Nablus Central Prison, for example, these are referred to as “X-cells,”
located near the solitary confinement cells, to which the Red Cross has no access. Further
hindering the organization’s observational work is the prison administration’s clear
attempts at obstruction. According to the agreement, the organization must submit a list
of prisoners it wants to see 48 hours before the delegates arrive. According to reports, it
often happens that the prisoner is mysteriously “moved to another jail” upon their
arrival.265 Furthermore, to the detriment of researchers, access to Red Cross files is
extremely limited, as per the organization’s agreement with the State.
The prison system in which Palestinians lived was a curious combination of
mixing and separation. At the onset of the Occupation, prisons rooms were not assigned
according to political party. Although this altered by the late 1970s across the system,
with hunger strikes winning prisoners the right to separate into rooms according to their
factional affiliation,266 there was one key way in which all prisoners were grouped
together and thus shared in one narrative: Palestinian “security” prisoners were
completely segregated from Israeli criminals, imprisoned in separate wings of maximum
security prisons within Israel or within military facilities in the Territories.267 There was a
clear demarcation between Israeli criminals and their Palestinian neighbors, the latter for
whom any action or violation of the law was framed as a security breach or an act of
terrorism. What this meant in practice is that conditions were noticeably different within
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prisons that contained both Israeli criminals and “security prisoners,” differences that
sparked debate and resistance. For example, Ramle housed Israelis and Palestinians in
such close proximity to one another that interview subjects report interaction. The
disparity in accommodation and basic comforts, such as beds and access to books,
inspired acts of organized resistance and even won certain improvements earlier than in
other prisons.268
As this chapter has shown through the voices of ex-prisoners, NGO reports, and
newspaper accounts, the world of the political prisoner was indisputably physically and
psychologically traumatic. From the moment of accusation, when the period of
interrogation commences, through the trial, to internment in multiple prisons throughout
the system, prisoners faced improbably challenging circumstances. These circumstances
are part of the Occupation’s architecture and a way to reach beyond the individual in
question to the entire family. And yet, as this chapter has also shown, interview subjects
do not dwell on the harsh circumstances of their experience as a way to evoke sympathy.
Rather, they focus on their moments of victory against this punishing system. A
resounding commonality amongst interview subjects was a refusal to break and the belief
that others were participating in this steadfastness as well. As the remaining chapters will
illustrate, prisoners created a platform for community and individual growth, as well as
locally spun resistance, via hunger strikes and the evolution of political and educational
structures. The hunger strike as a unified act of change seeking, and what drove prisoners
to this life-threatening situation, will be the focus on the next chapter.
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“There is no such thing called ‘impossible’
in front of the faithful struggle by the heroes of the
prisoners’ movement, who had nothing but their
hunger weapon.”269

Chapter Two
Bodily Resistance: The Hunger Strike

From the beginning of the Occupation, Israel evolved a punishing and horrifying
system of incarceration for those who dared resist the establishment and growth of the
State. As discussed in the previous chapter, the network of prisons grew during the period
in question, as did the factors with which prisoners had to contend. Organized acts of
protest became a serious business inside political prisons between 1967 and the mid1980s, but prisoners were largely on their own when it came to executing such actions.
As discussed in Chapter One, NGO access was littered with stumbling blocks, and
prisons were “closed” so tightly that even “the Israeli media do not have access to the
prisons, and all information on them has to be obtained from secondary sources such as
ex-convicts, prisoners’ families and the lawyers who visit the prison. More than once we
have requested permission to visit one of the jails…our request is still under
consideration.”270 What was clear to prisoners, although partially hidden from the outside
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world, was that “the architecture of prisons…were made for one purpose: they were all
created for the sole purpose of prisoner torture and ways to make the prisoners’ lives a
living hell in every meaning of the word.”271 Given this reality, Palestinian prisoners had
to struggle for their own rights. Despite many miles between prison structures and gaping
chasms between political factions, the period between 1967 and 1985 witnessed the
coming together of prisoners through a particular mechanism of struggle: the hunger
strike. In part through this form of bodily protest, political prisoners overcame
interfactional differences and cultivated a sense of unity against the physical conditions in
which they found themselves, and thus against the prison administration. This locally
spun resistance represents a clear and repeated marker of a new form of political unity
based on locally situated common goals and actions rather than shared pasts.

The First Strikes
Within months of the Occupation’s inception, prisoners embarked on small-scale
hunger strikes. These strikes were usually short, often involved only a few people, and
were contained within one prison. Although they did not garner media or widespread
civilian attention, their occurrence was significant for three reasons: first, they established
the notion of a specific type of Palestinian resistance inside the jails, one that was
responding as much to the contemporary moment and their immediate surroundings as it
was to the larger issue of the Occupation; secondly, the hunger strike as a regular event
underscored a natural urge towards cooperation and the need for formal organization,
thus helping to enable the creation of structures in the late 1970s; and third, the
271
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occurrence of hunger strikes revealed knowledge gaps amongst the Israeli administration
regarding Occupation management and techniques for keeping the prisoners under
control. Given the lack of media attention, understanding the 1967-1970 period means
relying on oral sources to reconstruct what happened. From interviews with ex-prisoners,
one can begin to draw conclusions about what these actions meant for the development of
a wider prisoner movement and later evolution of systems and structures.
In the first place, some early strikes responded to Israeli physical mishandling of the
detainees’ bodies. As mentioned in Chapter One, mistreatment was especially
pronounced during periods of interrogation, out of the view of media attention and where
external and/or international monitoring was impossible.272 The very first strike
mentioned by ex-prisoners lasted just one day at Ramle in 1968, directed against
administrative detention as a general policy.273 The specifics of life during administrative
detention also became the target of bodily resistance. As discussed in detail in Chapter
One, detention could last from just several days to several months. Odeh aptly describes
this experience as having undergone “48 hours a day under interrogation,”274 during
which the interrogator tried to discern one’s political affiliation, names of other faction
members, and information about future operations. The seemingly interminable duration
was not the spark for the hunger strike, rather the severe methods of extraction led to
bodily protest. Israeli authorities would beat detainees, often using electric cables or other
implements. In Odeh’s case, he was beaten badly enough that he ended up with a head
wound so severe Ramle prison would not even accept him until it was healed. Inspired by
272
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the recent death of a Fatah member at Moscobeyya, Odeh says that he and his fellow
detainees waged a short hunger strike with the express goal of forcing the administration
to take him to the hospital.275 Radi Jara’ai remembers this strike as lasting 10 days, and
ending with an empty promise from the administration for humanitarian treatment.276
Another prisoner, Amal Awad Adi, imprisoned with Odeh in Ramle during this period,
recalls this strike as “a demonstration to protest the racist treatment from a Zionist officer
whose behavior is Nazi-like.”277
Violent treatment the hands of the prison guards was the order of the day. Jara’ai
remembers that “we were not allowed to talk freely in the yard, but we had to say “sir”
after each sentence (spoken to the prison authorities) and can’t look the Israelis in the
face” for fear of a beating. He says they would “beat them for any reason and send them
to individual cells (solitary confinement).278 Around the same time, a strike took place in
the interrogation wing of Ramallah prison against physical treatment, says Adel
Samara.279 He recounts that after just a “few hours,” the administration took most of them
to the hospital.280 While these early strikes were short and did not lead to permanent
changes, they did establish a mode of resistance particular to the prison.
Resisting physical violence was not the only – or frankly the primary – reason for
early hunger strikes, especially outside of detention centers. Living conditions were a
major factor. As mentioned in Chapter One, the surroundings in which prisoners found
themselves were abhorrent. During the early years of the Occupation, prisons were
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severely overcrowded, filthy, lacking air circulation and access to natural light, without
proper sanitation or access to personal hygiene products, and prisoners were not issued
seasonal-appropriate clothing. As one paper reported when describing the Asqalon riot of
1971, Palestinians in this prison were “like beasts in their cages… they are held in their
cells, as beasts in their cages, twenty-three hours a day, twenty or more to a cell.”281
When they were allowed fresh air, Radi Jara’ai says, it was only “a half an hour every 24
hours” and for the rest of the day “we can’t lie down on a blanket (in our cells). We can
only spread them at six pm and must pick them up and not touch them again at six
am.”282 With only blankets to sleep on, prisoners lacked proper bedding for tolerable
sleeping circumstances, and rooms were so brimming with breathing bodies that they
“had to sleep head to feet, or on one side for the entire night, in order to lay claim to a
very small amount of floor space.”283 Finally, the lack of medical treatment for prisoners
meant that daily life was plagued by perpetual illness and poorly healed injuries. As
Odeh, among others recount, from natural sickness to interrogation-inflicted wounds,
aspirin was the prison-issued panacea.284 Early resistance thus targeted the urgent need
for more humane – or simply even recognizably human – living conditions inside the
prisons.
Interestingly, however, former prisoners report that these near-criminal conditions
were not the chief target of ongoing resistance through hunger strike. Rather, they recall
an overwhelming desire for improved day-to-day conditions based on access to certain
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material resources namely books and radios. Material goods became the focus of the
struggle, the axis around which the factions came together. Abu Bakr from Fatah and Dr.
Adel Samara, one of the founders of the PFLP in the West Bank, both testify to this very
fact in separate interviews.285 Abu Bakr, arrested in 1967 for a military operation on the
Jordanian border that same year, asserted that the number one goal for his contemporaries
behind prison walls was access to aural and written information. He participated in the
1968 strike in Ramle, which had these demands as its mission.286 Occurring just one year
into the Occupation, the number of imprisoned was still very small, but Abu Bakr
remembers that approximately eight of them waged this strike in total unity of agenda
and purpose.287 Dr. Samara was involved in a similar action around the same time.
Arrested in December 1967 for leading a military operation against Ben Gurion airport,
Samara was sent to Beit Lyd prison after interrogation. He recalls one of the first strikes
in that prison, which he was involved in starting. The small group of prisoners there had
been meeting regularly to “discuss poetry and other intellectual issues.”288 During one of
these informal discussions, they decided they wanted to approach the administration with
a simple and direct message: “we want books.” At this time, there were no elected
leaders. Samara, an avid reader and aspiring intellectual, enthusiastically embraced his
role as one of the unofficial leaders. He recollects that with this strike “I got the first book
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after seven days,” which he says was about socialism and capitalism.289 According to
Samara’s analysis, it was this hunger strike that led to the eventual general admission of
books into security prisons. Indeed, we know from newspaper accounts that prison
libraries existed by 1973, however there is no clear evidence that this particular strike led
directly to their creation.290 While one cannot firmly establish a direct cause and effect
between this hunger strike and later widespread access to books, it is clear that the early
actions did establish access to cultural and intellectual resources as a priority. Rather than
resisting Occupation more broadly, or fighting against bodily treatment, the prisoners
clearly asserted a basic framework for inmate resistance, one which was rooted in
education, knowledge and thought as powerful tools.
Verifying the precise details of the first strikes and piecing together a timeline is
no easy task; without a plethora of source material, one must depend on cross-referencing
oral sources. There is a startling absence of newspaper sources recording the late 1960s
strikes, which reflects the wide array of other concerns following the Occupation’s
inception, as well as to the fact that the prisoner movement was in its infancy.291 In point
of fact, the near absence of written sources, creating a precise timeline or establishing a
list of outcomes is difficult. For example, Nashif’s work cites ex-prisoner Bashir al
Kahyri reminiscing about a Beit Lyd strike and placing it in 1969 rather than Samara’s
pinning it to 1968. Furthermore, in contrast with Samara, al Kahyri remembers the
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strike’s main issue as the oppressive living conditions rather than a demand for reading
material, perhaps a reflection on their own personal agendas during their internment.292
Also, while Samara recalls the success of obtaining the first book, al Khayri remembers
two less tangible successes: first, that the strike was “total;” and second, that it continued
in spite of the Israelis trying to break it up by dispersing the strikers to other prisons, also
confirmed by Samara who was one of the relocated prisoners. Nashif quotes al Khayri
noting that “the Israelis were surprised by our determination… then each prisoner was
thrown into a different prison… they kept moving me after each protest I participated
in.”293 In summation, al Khayri assesses the strike as having failed to achieve its goals, in
large part because the Israelis moved prisoners around in an attempt to break the spirit. A
point of agreement between the two men is that living conditions were far from improved
as a result of this short action.
Although the specifics of strikes are difficult to pin down in the late 1960s, the
value of looking at this period lies in the fact we can see that the hunger strike was
established as one of the primary tools of Palestinian political prisoners from the
Occupation’s very inception. Indeed, the prisoners realized as early as 1968 that the
hunger strike was a tactic of resistance they could hone, evident in the fact that former
prisoners refer to these early actions as “total” (i.e. full scale participation of all prisoners
within a given prison).294 This is a remarkable given that neither the prisons nor the
prisoners were organized in the late 60s, and thus lacked any kind of formal leadership.
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Such high rates of participation presents a noteworthy comparison with earlier strikes in
other locales where one notable striker would execute a highly symbolic act or a handful
of prisoners would cooperate for a similar end goal.295 In contrast, inside Israeli prisons,
participation was widespread from the beginning. At the time of the Beit Lyd strike, for
example, the prison was divided into three sections (A, B, and C) containing men from
across the political spectrum. With existing tensions between factions, one would expect
there to be impediments when it came to organizing prisoners to partake in a strike, since
in these mixed settings political arguments frequently erupted. Remarkably, in the case of
the 1968 strike, Samara reports that each section informally agreed within each section on
one leader who could inspire and motivate large-scale participation across party lines.296
Thus, the action of the hunger strike trumped political divisions and conflict. In this
initial period of Israeli political imprisonment, when a prisoner “movement” had not yet
formed, these early strikes reflect an unspoken unity of purpose amongst the prisoners
oriented towards locally situated common goals and actions.
While these strikes were small and were neither memorialized in the press nor
given much attention by the general public, they represented the cultivation of a
particular form of resistance possible only inside the prisons. This form of resistance was
spontaneous and driven not by ideology, but by strides towards material change. Early
strikes reflect an inherent urge to be part of and cultivate something larger, within the
prison walls. The second phase, 1970-1977, did just that.
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Making Resistance Tangible: The 1970s
From 1970, those participating in hunger strikes began to coherently articulate
their intentions, to outline increasingly well-defined and common goals. Like in the late
1960s, hunger strike resistance was not against the general concept or even the reality of
the Occupation more broadly, nor was it about defining or asserting a “Palestinian
identity.” Rather, these hunger strikes dealt in a currency of the tangible. As the strikers
organized, they moved towards a system of carefully recording in writing their demands
and physically circulating them within and between prisons, thereby creating a shared list
of goals that transcended prison walls. Thus, the hunger strike was one way in which
community was imagined between prisons and prisoners on both sides of the Green Line.
For starters, 1970 was the first year simultaneous strikes were called. On April 28,
1970, a strike began in Nablus, Tul Karam, Damun, Ramallah, Shatta, Kefar Yonah,
including thousands of convicted prisoners as well as many Administrative Detainees.297
Remarkably, these prisons were hundreds of kilometres apart, and yet their purpose was
not. According to Felicia Langer, who had many participating clients, the aim was twofold: “1) either the release or the trial of administrative detainees and 2) an end to torture
and the respect of the basic rights of political prisoners.”298 This strike ended after six
days with no administrative commitment to meeting the two key demands. However, the
strike had two important effects. First, it raised awareness “within the country and
abroad” of the horror of Palestinian imprisonment, before and after conviction.299 The
large numbers attracted attention from women’s and student organizations abroad, as well
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as a joint march of Jewish and Arab women in Haifa, demonstrations in Nazareth and Tel
Aviv, and a demonstration of young people outside Damun prison. The fact that the
prisons spanned both Israel and the Territories enabled this widespread attention; far
more eyes were on this strike than previous ones. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
it launched the era of multi-prison strikes with a critical mass of participants.
Just two months later, on July 15, 1970, the prisoners interned at Asqalon
launched the first open strike against the Israeli policy of multi-pronged violent attacks.
The prisoners interpreted violence in several ways, including general maltreatment,
torture, and also by being deprived of proper nutrition.300 According to one Israeli
newspaper, prisoners at Asqalon underwent regular beatings in isolated dungeons, where
they were then held for multiple days, sometimes more than two weeks, at a time.301
Unlike earlier strikes, this one took place in a large prison intended for those serving long
sentences. This fact raised the stakes significantly. If the strike failed, prisoners risked
retaliatory violence by the Israeli administration. But, if they waged no resistance, they
also risked many years – a lifetime in some cases – of deprivation and violence against
their persons. Either way, the choice was far from enticing. And yet, between 450 and
540 men reportedly took part in this action.302 In a prison full of men handed down
sentences of over five years, the impact of such mass participation within one single
prison is not to be underestimated.
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On one hand the strike failed. It was not the first time prisoners had waged an
attempt to stop the perpetuation of violence against them – the most recent one just three
months prior – nor would it be the last; even today prisoners continued to demand more
humane bodily treatment. Furthermore, this strike helped the Israeli Administration hone
its preparedness for managing this aspect of the Occupation. This is evident in their
attempts to stop such actions inside of their prisons. The primary tactic was to try to
break up the informal leadership. They took two approaches to this: first, they sometimes
placed the men in solitary confinement, and “completely ignored” them303; and second,
they would disperse the strikers to various prisons, sometimes moving an individual more
than once. In Samara’s case, they tried both tactics on him, hoping that the strike would
dissipate as the presumed leadership was dissolved they would be forgotten and rendered
irrelevant. Their second approach was to punish those involved in the strikes, either
physically or by increasing their sentences. With such mass participation, the Israeli
authorities had to react strongly to try to halt the repeated use of this tactic. According to
the widely read Palestinian paper, Fatah, this strike resulted in a “policy of bloody
terrorism” against those thought to be what it calls “strike instigators.”304 This report
describes the vengeful punishment as including: prisoners’ sentences being extended,
sometimes to life, while one individual was beaten so badly he ended up with a “severed
leg;” 305 Fatah, also viewed the Administration’s refusal to negotiate as a form of
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violence since it resulted in the death of Abd al-Qadar Abu Fahim. They refer to his death
by hunger as having been “assassinated” by the Administration.306
From another perspective, this strike can be seen as something of a success.
Although the authorities took steps to disempower those presumed to be guiding a strike
in the hopes that they could halt the collective action, the number of actions only
increased throughout the 1970s. So too, this particular strike gained its own momentum,
with the death of Abu Fahim sparking solidarity strikes in Ramle and Beer Saba’a.307
This latter prison, rivaling Asqalon in size, received some of the strikers thought to be
acting as leaders. When they arrived to their new “home,” the prison immediately went
on a work and hunger strike. Included in the list of relocated individuals who continued at
Beer Saba’ was Samara.308 This strike reached beyond Asqalon’s walls via the press as
well. In at least one instance, those who were tortured by the Israeli retaliation campaign
were listed in the paper by their full names and either their increased sentences or specific
injury. This, too, was a new move and highly symbolic: it marked individual prisoners
out as having a role in the resistance, even within their places of punishment.309
To contend with what was fast becoming a brand of resistance, the Israelis
developed clear policies for dealing with prisoners, as encapsulated in the 1971 Prison
Ordinance defining prisoners’ rights, or lack thereof.310 This ordinance responds to those
hunger strikes waged in the early years of the Occupation. It codified in law that one
could be punished for refusing to consume food daily, deliberately destroying food,
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introducing substances that might impair taste, and last but not least, for waging hunger
strikes.311 This Ordinance defines hunger strikes as constituted by law as disciplinary
offences. And yet, rather than stopping hunger striking, the frequency of strikes and
number of participants increased during the 1970s.
The 1970 Asqalon strike was a kind of turning point: such a large scale display of
unity of purpose among over 400 men identifying with different political factions helped
to inspire the emergence of a prisoner movement, as well as to launch conversations
about how to organize.312 This massive strike, accomplished by “screaming” its
announcement out of the windows since “there was no communication between the
prisoners,”313 was a “major success,” which ushered in a “new period in the jails.”314
Although self-appointed leaders were the instigators, it marked the beginning of the slow
process of formal organization, with the first open committee meeting being held in its
wake.315 The hunger strikes waged to date had revealed something to them about the
importance of working together and thus acted as a key impetus to cooperate in resisting
the administration’s punishing treatment. It demonstrated clearly to the prisoners the
importance of cultivating lateral power relations as a counterpoint to the vertical relations
with the Israelis.
In the year of the Asqalon strike, prisoners lived in mixed rooms, with constant
interactions between PFLP, Fatah, the Communists and the unaffiliated.316 Clashes were
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frequent, most often occurring between the two largest factions, Fatah and PFLP.317 In
Asqalon, however, the sheer volume of prisoners provided strong encouragement for the
prisoners to organize themselves in such a way that they could act in unison against the
Israeli Prison Administration, with one commonly supported list of demands. This was
the largest single prison strike to date and it leveled the playing field between the largest
faction, Fatah, and its peers. As Ghassan Khatib pointed out in an interview, relations
between the factions were very rocky in the early years of the Occupation, but “with
strikes and with confrontations with the administration, things improved, relatively
speaking.”318 Out of this collective action for defined and tangible ends came the urge to
work together rather than separately, to build bridges between the factions over certain
issues. This was done by establishing a group to oversee the staging of hunger strikes and
also by inscribing such an agreement onto paper. Through the early hunger strikes, it
became clear that leadership did not lie in one person, but in the strength of the prisoner
spirit. As individuals were transferred from one prison to the next it became clear to the
prisoners that the essence of the strike was not dependent on a particular leader. Rather, a
new leader would emerge in his place, evidence of a flexible system that was not
dependent on an individual, but was instead increasingly based on talent and skills that
any person could cultivate. The malleability of the unofficial hunger strike leadership
somehow foreshadows the way in which the general prison leadership would look by
1980: individuals were replaceable, while the structure survived. This was particularly
important for carrying out hunger strikes in the smaller prisons with frequent turnover,

317
318

This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three, which looks at the evolution of formal structures.
Ghassan Khatib interview.

108

since it was not an individual’s shoes into which a replacement was stepping, but a
position within a formal structure.
In tandem with evolving this structure to oversee and execute such events,
prisoners across Israel and the West Bank continued to wage strikes throughout the 1970s
when they thought it necessary to achieve substantive progress in their day-to-day
situation. These strikes took place against the backdrop of complex political activity
concerning the Territories. Between 1972 and 1978 there was a dramatic surge in
uprisings outside the prison walls, largely in response to the Yitzak Rabin and Menachem
Begin governments embarking on rapid schemes of colonization in the West Bank and
economic measures designed to cultivate economic dependency on Israel. Interestingly,
the hungers strikes did not necessarily reflect these escalating outside tensions in their
actions, focusing more on their day-to-day existence. As had been the case since the
beginning of the Occupation, and as the PLO’s weekly magazine pointed out, “it is
important to observe that most of the violent uprisings have started, in form at least, as
minor struggles for the improvement of prisoners’ conditions, and then developed into
violent confrontation with the occupation, terror, and fascist measures of Zionism.”319
One issue with which strikers continued to grapple was the inhumane circumstances in
which they lived, although the spark for taking action was usually in response to the way
in which prisoners were dehumanized in a particular location. For example, in July 1972,
a warden at Beer Saba’ badly beat an inmate, igniting a two-day hunger strike.320 While
violence was not at all unusual, this particular event acted like a tipping point for
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continuously endured unbearable living conditions. At first glance, a hunger strike that
was responding to a particular event was actually the result of months, or even years, of
pent up rage for the unimproved living conditions. Thus, the mid-1970s hunger strikes
were pointedly waged to meet a particular demand in a specific prison, even though the
demands unintentionally spoke to system-wide needs and challenges, as well as to the
Occupation more generally.
Hunger strike successes were far from linear and accomplishments were
frequently followed by setbacks. Sometimes the prison administration would suddenly
rescind existing privileges, as either a punishment or, arguably, a provocation. Several
strikes in 1973 illustrate this point, each of them targeting different kinds of access with
which the IPS tampered. In Hebron, inmates launched an action to protest the prison
having installed an additional barrier separating the inmates from visitors. This added
layer of “security” impeded communication with visitors, whether lawyers, friends or
family. A short hunger strike succeeded in getting this extra barrier removed.321 There are
three reasons why prisoners resisted this additional measure. First, the further physical
separation placed between the prisoners and their visitors translated into an emotional
barrier. Secondly, starting around this time, political messages started to be transported
out of prisons. These messages moved via kabsulih, messages inscribed in tiny
handwriting, illegible to the naked eye, folded, wrapped in plastic and swallowed; a
second barrier would certainly hinder this movement. Third, and most importantly,
imposing such restrictions was part of the Israeli attempt to control the prisoners by

321

Discussed in the news roundup, Journal of Palestine Studies, 3, no 3 (Spring 1974), 170.

110

alternately tightening restrictions and then loosening them as a negotiation strategy.322 A
slightly different case involved scaling back of a recently granted privilege in Ramle. The
prisoners went on strike after prison authorities stopped receipt of food baskets from
visiting family members. The deliveries were already tightly controlled, authorized to
carry only two kilograms of fruit, up to two packets of cookies, one chocolate bar and six
packs of Omar cigarettes.323 Intended to supplement their paltry diet, and to make up for
the fact that their in-prison labor wages were not enough to begin to satisfy their longcultivated nicotine habits, the prisoners revolted against these new measures of control
with their bodies.324 The justification was to prevent weapons and drugs smuggling,
although such products usually came via the warders, not family members.325 Finally, and
significantly, in January 1973, approximately two-thirds of a the 300-man prison in Kefar
Yonah went on strike when officials rejected “an attempt by influential prisoners to
establish facts about everything concerning the way of life there.”326 When a new Israeli
director was put in place, those who had emerged as unofficial leaders of the prisoners
tried to assert themselves with him. Not only did authorities reject this unsolicited advice
on prisoners’ needs, after the five-day strike ended they punished the prisoners via a
“deficiency of food.” According to their lawyer, they “did not receive their full portions”
of the already under nourishing amount of food they were allocated.327 The Israelis
refused to acknowledge the evolving structure inside the prisons, thus sparking an act of
full resistance. While these 1973 strikes were not successful in changing anything within
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the prisons, it is significant that the Israeli press began to feature prisoner struggles and
strikes within their pages.
Strikingly, interview subjects frequently talk about a given strike as a fait
accompli. Even when discussing one particular prison, the individuals tend to
universalize the failure or accomplishment. Given this, it is challenging to reconstruct
what hunger strikes actually accomplished. What is clear is that when allowances were
granted in one prison after a successful hunger strike, those accomplishments were often
localized. As mentioned earlier, Samara remembers his late ‘60s achievement of getting
the first book in the prison, but later press indicates that access to books continued to be
an issue throughout the 1970s.328 As late as 1973, Al Ittihad reports that Ramle and Shatta
prisoners were not allowed to receive any books that were not obtained via a formal
request to the prison administration.
Sometimes multiple hunger strikes were necessary to achieve a certain goal. Odeh
talks about a strike he helped wage in the late 1960s protesting forced labor in making
supplies for the Israeli military. The initial strike was unsuccessful and according to his
timeline it was not until 1973 that prisoners achieved such a stoppage.329

Impact of Hunger Strikes: The Trickle-Down Effect
The Palestinian hunger strike was a distinctly non-ideological act within the
context of the resistance to the Israeli Occupation. Such action, embraced widely and
across factional divides, represented the very best of the resistance movement, its ideal
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functioning. This was in stark contrast with, but also a budding solution to, the bubbling
tensions between the main political parties: Fatah, PFLP, DFLP and the Communists.
From 1969 when Fatah assumed leadership within the PLO, competition with the other
factions arose. In the early 1970s, Fatah had been at the forefront of terrorist activity and
thus seen as the leader of the armed struggle, while the smaller PFLP faction competed
for members. This began to shift in the second half of the 1970s, after Arafat’s 1974
United Nations speech, when the PLO – with Fatah at its helm – moved away from
armed struggle towards diplomacy. These strains and competitions were mapped onto
prisons, with factions competing for members even on the inside. As will be discussed in
the next chapter, written guidelines produced inside the prisons governed intra- and interfactional relationships by the late 1970s, key to which was planning for and executing
community actions. To that end, the hunger strike’s primary power lay not in its ability to
destabilize the Israeli position in the conflict, but rather in its ability to activate factional
and national cooperation. Thus, one can read the strikes of this period as having a
significant impact on the inner workings of the resistance movement. So too, by the late
1970s the hunger strike had become a site upon which resistance could be built across
broad and oft-divided swaths of the community. From this period forward, the hunger
striker was a symbol of unity, albeit just a glimmer, within the Palestinian resistance.
Two consecutive strikes in Asqalon, the first of which began in late 1976,
demonstrate the power of the prisoners’ emerging administrative structure. For the first
time, the action was highly coordinated by individuals who had been nominated to
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represent the rest of the prison population.330 According to Fatah’s “constitution,”
reportedly produced in Asqalon itself sometime in 1976, they were part of the “struggler
committee,” with representatives from each of the political factions.331 The committee
would meet together to discuss issues that affected the prison population at large,
regardless of political affiliation. As a group, the members were a kind of public relations
team, and thus could help frame and stage a hunger strike. According to the written
documentation, “leadership of the struggle committee in the prison is executive and
legislative and is considered at the stop of the leading national authority in the prison.”332
Thus, this committee had a great deal of decision making power for very critical, even
life threatening actions. Their work involved polling the prisoners and determining the
level of interest in and commitment to a potential strike. Once a strike was decided upon,
the members were responsible for drafting the list of demands and seeking the feedback
of their peers. They would then communicate these demands to the prison authorities in
the hopes of avoiding taking action. If and when a strike became an imperative, the
struggler committee would “advertise” to ensure total participation across all rooms
within the prison. While the 1970 strike had been announced via prisoners screaming to
each other out their windows, written announcements were circulated in 1976 to alert
participants of the coming strike. Being part of the struggler committee carried a great
deal of responsibility, too. The members did not take lightly other prisoners’ lives. As
one prisoner eloquently recounted, “I, as one with responsibilities, had to prepare them
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for protest… you know, I was like a father to them.” He emphasized repeatedly the need
for preparation, saying “when you start a hunger strike you want it to succeed, and all the
suffering to be worthwhile. So you take your time to prepare it and you don’t rush.”333 As
Odeh affirms, “Getting our demands met came at a high price for us and our friends.”334
Thus, strikes would often take months to prepare, to ensure that the proper rationale and
commitment were there. The close cooperation necessary to successfully wage a large
scale action produced a committee that is a remarkable representation of how prisoners
were able to move beyond factional divides, to traverse ideological boundaries.
On December 11, 1976, the struggler committee at Asqalon launched an open
strike that was to last for an unprecedented 45 days, followed in quick succession by a
well-reported 30-day strike that began right on its heels in February of 1977. In total, this
act of resistance spanned a noteworthy three months of time. Once again, these protests
were initially against maltreatment in the prisons, which, nearly a decade into the
Occupation, had not significantly improved. According to an investigation launched by
the Israeli paper Yehdiot Aharonot, Asqalon contained 830 prisoners, with 280 serving
life sentences and over half sentenced to hard labor.335 The inmates were protesting
overcrowding and a desire to be treated as well as the Israeli prisoners. After six weeks of
near starvation, the authorities promised to send an official delegation to meet with the
struggler committee if they prisoners agree to limited eating. Two weeks later, the
infamously harsh Chaim Levy brought an IPS delegation to Asqalon, distributing
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hairbrushes and offering permission to buy almonds and Turkish delight from the canteen
with their monthly allowance. Neither of these proposed privileges addressed the
prisoners’ declared needs, and indeed were received as a kind of taunting. Although the
strike halted completely at 45 days, promises to formally address prisoner grievances
never materialized into anything. In response, after just a short break, some 250 prisoners
re-embarked on yet another strike in an even more organized fashion the third week of
February; it was an open strike that would last until their demands were met.336
Mohammad Bsisu, allegedly the leader of the prisoners at Asqalon, was quoted in Al
Ittihad around the time of the beginning of the second part of the strike, outlining the
agreed upon list of demands for the public to see. They issued a substantial list of
material and lifestyle requirements, including: remedying overcrowded rooms in which
20 prisoners were crammed into spaces not able to accommodate even half that;
providing regular beds and mattresses instead of the one-cm thick rubber pads; offering
adequate clothing for each season; eating the same quality food as the Jewish prisoners;
visiting regulations and access similar to Jewish prisoners, meaning one visit a fortnight
and no restriction on the number of family members permitted; and last but not least, a
reading room filled with the books prisoners actually want, rather than only books that
were approved by the IPS.337 In other words, as lawyers Leah Tsemel and Felicia Langer
pointed out, the strikers in Asqalon were not struggling for “political recognition of their
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statues as prisoners of war at this stage, but only to reach equalization of their conditions
with that of criminal prisoners.”338
In addition to displaying an aspect of the careful organization and structure
building of the 1970s, these strikes also attracted a great deal of external attention,
ranging from solidarity activities to widespread press coverage. As Ghassan Khatib
rightly pointed out, the hunger strike was the national issue around which Palestinians
could rally. Indeed, such actions were something tangible against which one could
demonstrate; they had a beginning and end, unlike the general state of the Occupation. As
one foreign observer noted, this strike provided a “focus for political dissent.”339 For the
first time, solidarity marches became commonplace throughout Israel and the Territories.
Indeed, hunger strikes came to be seen as a kind of collective punishment; when
prisoners were moved from one prison to another in an attempt to break up a strike, this
affected families. As Samman Khoury noted, “if you take me from Ramallah to Nablus,
you’re not punishing me. It’s just more difficult for my wife and mother to visit me.
Collective punishment. Even in my first two years in prison, I was moved to Ramallah,
Hebron and Nablus. They thought they were punishing us.”340 Rather, for the prisoners,
this kind of movement helped foster connections, facilitate movement of political
materials through kabsulih, and thus contributed to the evolution of prisoner political
structures and organization.
In March, approximately 50 individuals, Arabs and leftist Jews, marched to
Asqalon from an unmentioned starting point in “sympathy for the security prisoners who
338
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are on hunger strike,” while calling for “the establishment of a secular, democratic
Palestine.”341 A few days later, a Palestinian paper reported on a demonstration in front of
the Knesset of representatives from the Jerusalem Arab Students Committee and mothers
of the striking prisoners. The latter group had marched there from the Red Cross
Headquarters, where they had submitted an official memorandum to the commissioner
demanding improved conditions for political prisoners.342 Students demonstrated in
Ramallah and at the Arab universities,343 while shopkeepers closed up shop in a solidarity
strike.344 Even further afield, the Arab students at Israeli Universities, as well as the Arab
University Students Committee at the Institute for Applied Engineering in Haifa, staged
demonstrations expressing solidarity with the prisoners. Having generated attention and
proclamations of support from Israeli Arabs and Jews, as well as residents of the
Territories, this hunger strike was a great mobilizer, traversing territory and crossing
boundaries between disparate groups of people.
This strike also generated a noticeable paper trail, Palestinians and Israeli
supporters as well as in the press. Women’s and other popular organizations in both the
Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as well as several mayors, sent memoranda and appeals to
international bodies to condemn the conditions under which the prisoners were forced to
live. Likewise, Al Ittihad reported that the Democratic Women’s Movement in Israel sent
a letter emphasizing two points: that the strikers were simply demanding the same
conditions as Jewish prisoners, and also the medical danger for those embarking on a
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second strike without having recovered from the first.345 From abroad, the French
Professional Unions Federation sent a cable to the Chairman of the UN Human Rights
Committee calling on him to “use his authority to exert pressure on the Israeli authorities
to respond to the just demands of the Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.”346 Beyond
institutional expressions of solidarity, foreign reporters covered it daily, as did the Arabic
and Israeli press.
The strongest show of solidarity, and also evidence of strong prisoner
organization, was displayed when about 200 prisoners in Jenin prison joined the strike in
early March. 347 This solidarity strike was well prepared. As early as January, during part
one of the Asqalon action, the struggler committee was discussing it and communicating
their points of major contention with the prison authorities. According to local press
coverage, the head of the Jenin municipality conveyed to the military governor ways in
which the prisons needed immediate improvement, including: “to permit scientific and
scholarly books, magazine, and local newspapers,” “to make the visit every 15 days
instead of 30 days, and to allow prisoners’ parents to bring in sweets, fruits and food,”
and “not to imprison the young youth.”348 These demands were reportedly accompanied
by a call for similar improvements in Asqalon and Ramle as well. In mid-March the
Arabic press reported that 200 security prisoners in Ramallah also followed Asqalon’s
lead, as did Hebron, Kfar Yonah, and Hebron.349
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The IPS did not reward the prisoners’ efforts with substantial changes. On the
contrary, they employed the same methods of punishment as those used in the early
1970s, adding new forms of torture. Widely dispersing participants to other prisons was
once again a tactic in attempting to halt the strike. Felicia Langer was granted access to
her client, the aforementioned Mohammad Bsisu, who reported that 176 strikers were
spread throughout the prison system, while members of the struggler committee were
thrown into a separate cell without any mattresses or coverings of any kind.350 Many
prisoners were moved to Kfar Yonah, where they were subjected to punishing conditions.
According to one report, the rooms were “unfit for human habitation” since the new
inmates “received few blankets, no change of clothing, no reading material, and no daily
exercise;” 55 out of 59 of the relocated prisoners continued to strike.351 Many of those
who remained on the strike in Asqalon were force-fed milk through tubes in their noses
and throats, arguably a form of torture. One effect, however, was it forced an Israeli
response. As one foreign news outlet reported, the prison administration conceded that
overcrowding was an issue, but denied that there was a difference in treatment between
Arab and Jewish prisoners when it came to food quantities and other material
necessities.352 The leaders planned for a tapering off of the strike, rather than stopping
completely with a decisive agreement. Although the IPS refused to have any contact with
the prisoners while they were striking, high level talks were held in mid-March between
the military authorities and IPS regarding the issue of overcrowding and improving
sleeping conditions.
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United by Protest
Coverage of prisons in the press is scant in between the 1977 strike and the next
major event in 1980, thus piecing together a timeline of the material improvements is
challenging.353 We can discern that prison conditions had not stabilized at an acceptable
level. For example, an Israeli paper reported in 1980 that Asqalon and Beer Saba’ were
“suffering from intolerable overcrowding. The space allotted to each prisoner is tiny. The
prisoners eat off the floor, and have neither underwear nor pajamas. There are no sheets
(unlike in Ramle), and some prisoners have complained about the relatively superficial
medical treatment given. According to them, a single tablet of aspirin is the only
medicine given for almost any illness. There is not even toilet paper.”354
It appears, however, that the State took note of the overcrowding issue, as
evidenced by the opening of Nafha in the Negev on May 2, 1980.355 As mentioned in the
previous chapter, this prison was intended to relieve some of the pressure on other
locations, as well as to serve as a high security establishment for approximately 50
hardened terrorists, otherwise known as leaders within the prisons or the “cream of the
Palestinian prisoners.”356 To that end, notes an Israeli paper, Nafha was an “exceptional
place, especially designed to break the spirit of prisoners thought to be leaders.”357 These
presumed leaders – more than half of them convicted for life or more – were removed
from their rooms in places like Asqalon, Beer Saba’, Ramle and Jenin and exiled to the
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desert to finish their sentences. In so doing, the authorities hoped to decapitate the
strengthening prisoner movement, or as Qaymery eloquently put it, to “subjugate” the
prisoners “to a liquidation process.”358 Part of this process included destroying all of the
papers of the prisoners upon their arrival, in an attempt to destroy a written record of the
movement. Qaymery recalls feeling “devastated,” that “I lost everything when I went to
Nafha.” Within a month of arriving, however, he reached the conclusion that his papers
could be recreated, that “they haven’t touched my mind, myself…I can rebirth all of the
ideas in a higher standard.”359 What the Israeli movement of individuals and
accompanying destruction of materials revealed was that leadership within the prisons
was not dependent on just one or two people or one set of documents; rather, a complex
vertical and lateral system had emerged by this point, one which could survive an
individual’s removal.360
According to interview subjects Yacoub Odeh, Radi Jara’ai, Ata Qaymery, Jabril
Rajoub, and Na’il Barghouti, who were among the first to be transferred to Nafha,361 they
decided immediately they would launch a hunger strike that very summer if ill treatment
came to be the norm at the prison. As one of the first to arrive reflected on that moment
of entry:
Since 1967 we have fought for improvements in
prison conditions. We have gone on strikes and
on hunger strikes, we have suffered punishment
and solitary confinement, suspensions of visits
and many other deprivations, until we bit by bit
gained certain basic rights. Now we are again
being deprived of them. At Nafha, we have to
358
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start all over again.362
It was clear to the prisoners upon arrival that all of the gains made through twelve years
of protest and hunger strikes had unravelled in the desert climate. They were “welcomed”
to the prison by being forced to strip down to their flesh; they were then hosed down with
DDT while they paraded around a room naked.363 As if this was not enough, living
conditions in this desert prison were atrocious. According to the oral accounts, it
appeared as though they were moved in before the prison the building was completed,
with unfinished barbed wire fences complemented by a team of loud and angry guard
dogs to fill in the gaps. Odeh vividly describes Nafha’s appearance and conditions:
Six meters by two and a half meters was the size of
the room with no windows and a thirteen meter high
ceiling. They were cement and iron rooms, not even
rooms but box containers. Since Nafha was located in
a desert atmosphere, the weather in the winter would
be freezing cold and in the summer time it would be
unbearably hot. In the winter it would be like living
inside of a freezer.364
The harsh climate, augmented by frequent sand storms, combined with strikingly
inadequate accommodations, was a disaster for the prisoners. In the two months
following their arrival, says Odeh, “our situation was getting worse and worse… and we
had to do something about it.”365 Exacerbating these conditions was severe
overcrowding. Within a couple of months, this prison, intended for just 50 hardened
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terrorists, was reportedly bursting at its seams.366 Attorneys Leah Tsemel and Walid alFahoum noted in an interview that each cell contained ten mattresses, taking up almost all
of the floor space, low ceilings, tiny windows, and a Turkish toilet with a shower above
it.367 Having to spend 23 hours a day inside these crammed cells, with all forms of sport
forbidden when they were allowed to venture outside, the prisoners believed that all of
their striving to date towards material and lifestyle improvements had been superseded by
this new establishment.
Given that by 1980 the prisoners were highly organized, and many of these men
had been leaders in their previous places of incarceration, strike planning began
immediately and was collective, measured and careful. Odeh emphasizes that due to the
risks involved in starving oneself, hunger strikes “were not done overnight, they were
planned. This protest was planned two months before it actually started.”368 On the first
day of Ramadan, July 14, 1980, the strike began. Initial demands included “beds, rather
than the thin mattresses that lie on the floor crawling with insects and reptiles…tables to
eat and write on, and an end to the terrible congestion inside the cells, which should
house four people instead of ten.”369 Then, as Odeh put it: “during the protest we just
started requesting it all, from medical treatment to books.”370 By August, prisoners
demanded “a sink for washing, a longer walk outside their cells, permission to exercise,
the provision of toilet paper, shaving equipment, a mirror, books, newspapers, a change
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of clothing, the right to buy staples at the canteen and to listen to the radio.”371
Additionally, they sought the right to work in the prison kitchen, longer visits with
relatives, the replacement of the welded steel doors with traditional bars, and better
ventilation.372 The prisoners had a motto for the 1980 strike: “sun, water, air.” According
to their collective agreement on the strike’s goals, access to all three of these basic
necessities was nonnegotiable.
This strike coincided with what ex-prisoners call the springtime period, or the
“Golden Years,” in Israeli jails: a period of complete unity, as evidenced by the rapidity
with which the strike spread.373 The prisoners in Nafha, although protesting certain
conditions, were also protesting the fact that the Israelis had overturned many of the gains
made inside prisons over twelve years of struggle. This was not the first time, nor the first
prison, in which access to materials or certain privileges had been revoked. Thus, Odeh
argues, “this protest was not just for us, but for everyone…. The prison, its rules and
regulations, was the reason why we even protested.”374 Further evidence of prisoner unity
was the fact that within three weeks, close to 600 prisoners were striking in solidarity, in
Ramle, Shatta, Asqalon and Beer Saba’.375 News of the strike spread in several ways,
according to Odeh: “by the different prisoners, when some went to the hospital, visits
from parents who told other parents, who told their sons and other inmates, from the
lawyers that were going to the different prisons for cases.”376 Moreover, organization was
so strong inside the jails, that there were also clearly established lines of communication
371
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open with the outside. As ex-prisoners recount, the movement on the outside, as well as
the media, knew in advance that the strike was going to happen. By 1980, coordination
was tight and effective.
The prison administration employed various tactics in attempting to break up the
strike. As Odeh says, “the prison started forcing harsh consequences on us after they
noticed our protest.”377 First, they tried to circumvent the established power structure in
the prison by going straight to the top. Rather than speaking with Nafha’s appointed
representative for communicating with the administration, Radi Jara’ai says the
administration approached him. As the head of Fatah’s Central Committee inside Nafha,
he was the highest ranking in the faction, and arguably the most powerful in the prison
full stop, given that he represented the largest faction within the resistance movement.
Radi recollects that they tried to enlist his help in halting the strike, claiming they would
negotiate with him if it stopped, to which he says he responded: “don’t talk to me about
this issue, you have the special representative of the jail to speak to.”378 The fact that the
administration took this approach is significant: it suggests an awareness of the power
structure and simultaneously a desire to break it. By circumventing the individual
appointed to speak on behalf of his comrades, the administration actively resisted the
existence of the complex prisoners organization, attempting to reject it by going straight
to the top.
Secondly, forced feeding was employed with great enthusiasm. Odeh’s vivid
description captures what this was like for his colleagues:
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The interrogators got tubes and tried to insert
them in different entry ways to their bodies,
through the prisoners’ noses, and other sensitive
areas of their bodies. They inserted tubes that
contained certain formulas and chemical mixtures
into the body until it reached the stomach. When it
reached the stomach it would affect it so badly they
kept taking it out and putting it back in, hitting and
damaging the stomach.379
As a result of this harsh method, the Israelis killed two prisoners at Nafha within the first
month of the strike.380
And finally, the Israelis tried the by-now-standard tactic of dispersing the
perceived leadership of the strike amongst other prisons in the Territories and Israel.
After seven days of striking, reportedly 27 of the protesters were moved to other
prisons.381 Odeh himself was moved to Ramle. He recalls the treatment accompanying
the relocation. Already weakened by seven food-free days, they were:
beaten unmercifully, and were cuffed from their hands
and legs. When they got there [to the new prison], they
were welcomed by the dogs [the Israelis], sticks and more
torture methods were applied to their bodies. Each one was
placed in solitary confinement, the interrogators wanted to
break their hunger strike in any way. So they tried to force
them to eat in any way they could, but the prisoners refused.382
When Odeh arrived in Ramle, a solidarity strike was gearing up to begin, and he stepped
right into a leadership role in that prison. Both of these cases demonstrate a clear unity of
purpose and mission, as well as agreed up on approach to running the strike. Neither of
these efforts made a dent in the progress of the strike. In fact, they had no impact at all.
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Instead, the cohort of imprisoned leaders in Nafha had already smuggled out a formal
appeal to the international community the week before the strike began, a message that
was presented to the UN. They asked for a neutral party to evaluate their conditions and
to intercede on their behalf. In so doing, they took moved their resistance beyond their
own material conditions, and beyond prison walls, inserting themselves into an
international discourse on liberation and resistance.
This strike is symbolic for two key reasons: first, it continued to evolve outside
attention to and local participation in prisoner issues; second, it gained the prisoners
widespread recognition of their internal organization. Not even two weeks into the strike
a group of Arab women, many of whom had sons confined to Nafha, launched their own
hunger strike in solidarity.383 Basing their demands on reports from the inside, they
contended that conditions were untenable, with very little ventilation, hardly any
exercise, frequent solitary confinement and too many bodies in one building. With a great
deal of media attention from the Arabic, Israeli and foreign press, Chaim Levy, the head
of the IPS, allowed reporters into the prison to observe. The New York Times observed
the following conditions: each cell for eight prisoners was only about 20 feet long and 10
feet wide, with a toilet and shower nozzle in a partly closed booth at one end; the only
furniture was a thin mattress for each prisoner on a concrete floor, and small cubbyholes
for personal belongings. There were no table or chairs for eating meals, and very poor
lighting.384 Widespread press on the mothers’ solidarity strike, as well as reports on
Nafha’s living conditions meant that the IPS had to answer to the public. More
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significant, however, is the attention that the prisoner movement gained through this
strike. In the same New York Times article, Chaim Levy admitted to knowing that the
prisons “have become dominated by an inmate hierarchy with rival loyalties to the Fatah
guerrilla group or the most radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.”385 After
two deaths caused by force-feeding,386 33 days of hunger, and local press, the strike
accomplished something profound: the government agreed to meet with the Struggler
Committee.387 Consisting of representatives from all of the factions, and responsible for
organizing the launch, continuation and stoppage of the strike, the fact that the authorities
agreed to meet with them speaks to a significant success of the Prisoner Movement.
According to interview subjects, although they lost two compatriots to the strike, the
gains were critical to the prisoner movement, which resulted in an improvement in their
day-to-day circumstances.
The strikes that followed during the first half of the 1980s continued to
demonstrate the strength of prisoner unity, as well as their committees and structures.
Strikes were carefully planned and well executed, always with massive participation. In
1984, 800 prisoners went on a 10-day hunger strike, once again to improve quantity and
quality of food, and to get more time outside in the fresh air. Although the requests were
often the same, the resolutions of the 1980s featured a process of negotiation between the
prisoners and the administration.388 In this case, the minister of police, Haim Bar-Lev,
reportedly met with the struggler committee to hear their complaints, after which he
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circulated a letter throughout the prisons in Arabic addressing the issues.389 This
constituted a kind of success, as one ex-prisoner asserts, “we forced our new life on the
prison guards” by “retaliating with our protests in different forms. It was not just about
hunger strikes. There were other ways, like refusing to shave, refusing to out to the
courtyard for inspection, or refusing to take a certain order as attend our family visits.”390
By the time of the Intifada, prisoners had achieved many goals, including more family
visits, but more significantly the right to hold classes, read books and newspapers, as will
be discussed in subsequent chapters. As one scholar succinctly pointed out in his work on
the First Intifada, the main achievement “centered on their right to use their time as they
pleased.”391 How prisoners filled this hard earned time is the subject of the next two
chapters.

Conclusion
Prisoners waged tens of hunger strikes between 1967 and the early 1980s, some of
them lasting just a few hours and others months. From the beginning of the Occupation,
the prisoners resisted poor treatment while also asserting their right to proper material
conditions. What is clear is that every time there was a step forward in the struggle, every
time an allowance made or a privilege granted, there was no guarantee that it would
remain. Family visits were lengthened, shortened, and lengthened again. Access to
education was granted – even access to the Open University’s degree program – and then
rescinded. Thus, one cannot look to Palestinian hunger strikes for evidence of a linear
389
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trajectory of success in improving prison conditions. Rather, one can look to them for
evidence of prisoner steadfastness, a refusal to be broken. As Odeh asserts, “we forced
our new life on the prison guards” by “retaliating with our protests in different forms. It
was not just about hunger strikes. There were other ways, like refusing to shave, refusing
to out to the courtyard for inspection, or refusing to take a certain order as attend our
family visits.”392
So too, Palestinian hunger strikes in the pre-Oslo period are interesting because
they represent a moment in resistance and liberation politics when ideological boundaries
dissipate, moments when each person’s action matters. No matter how much
disagreement might have plagued the main factions inside and outside of prisons, during
a hunger strike unity prevailed. Moreover, as one ex-prison leader emphasized, “hunger
strikes were often for little things – refusing food because we wanted a spoon to eat with.
There is a struggle, there are negotiations, then you get something. You learn the politics
of life in prison. You don’t allow them to break you and you don’t break them. You learn
the importance of negotiation.”393 Hunger strikes helped drive the systematization and
organization of prison life; they formed a key axis around which political unity and
locally situated resistance revolved. The ways in which prisoners organized is the subject
of the next chapter.
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“Fatah had and has the honour of
national leadership and the
honour of carrying national
historical responsibility”394

Chapter Three
Forging Local Actors:
The Creation of Fatah’s Political Structures inside Prisons

Shared struggle drove prisoners to a sense of belonging to something that
extended beyond the confines of their cells and sites of incarceration. As Chapter Two
argued, hunger strikes were key to producing unity within and between political factions.
Indeed, many of the individuals cited in Chapter Two, who spoke to their experience of
bodily struggle, agree that something resembling a formal National Prisoners’ Movement
dates to 1980 when prisoners were successful in getting the bulk of their demands met
through such struggles. The tangible manifestation of this movement is the
professionalization and resulting codification of prison leadership, which went through
various permutations between 1967 and the First Intifada. From the beginning of the
Occupation, one can see an ongoing dialectic, as well as manifestations of divergence,
between the Fatah leadership in the Diaspora and the affiliated cells inside Israel and the
Territories. Thus, those striving towards organization inside political prisons had to
engage in this balancing act, as there existed a tension between looking to the outside
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leadership for ideological and structural guidance and fine-tuning a locally appropriate
detailed political structure for preparing future political leaders. To understand how
political structures represent both exchange with the outside and the forging of a new
way, the opening of this chapter looks at the creation and building of Fatah and the PLO
in order to contextualize how the prisoners both drew on the example of and veered from
Diaspora organization. This chapter argues that the resistance movement most relevant to
local Palestinians’ day-to-day existence was built inside the prisons, as well as by
released prisoners who joined Shabiba or grassroots organizations;395 that structures with
the potential capability of governing396 a Palestinian population were locally cultivated
rather than shaped by the internationally recognized Fatah movement, whose leadership
and political activities were situated in the Diaspora. In particular, it was within political
prisons and at the hands of ex-prisoners that the real work of building nascent
governmental structures took place. As this chapter will show, the existing literature on
formal Palestinian politics in the 1970s and 1980s examines its evolution in the Diaspora,
including how factions survived without a territorial base, the personalities and whims of
the leaders, and the tactics organizations used in resistance politics. This chapter asserts
an alterative reading, tracing the emergence of prisoner-created political structures; it will
highlight prison leaders who were absorbed into the formal political structure in the postOslo period, as well as those who rejected the direction of the Palestinian Authority. In so
doing, this chapter complicates the portrait of resistance politics as Diaspora-based.
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Fatah’s Repositioning: The PLO Years
As discussed at length in the introduction, Fatah was founded in 1956 as a small, secret
group in the Diaspora, made up of refugees and dependent on the good graces of host
counties for staging grounds and operational facilities. Initially formed in Cairo, grown in
Kuwait, with headquarters at various times in Jordan, Damascus, Beirut, Tunisia, and
Algeria, Fatah was firmly a Diaspora-rooted organization. Thus, planning and execution
of Fatah’s strategy and major operations occurred outside historic Palestine, including
setting up the structure of the organization through general assembly-style meetings. The
first large-scale gathering was convened in Kuwait in 1962, during which Fatah’s
strategic vision, goals and organizing structure were determined, yielding the
establishment of a Central Committee of ten members in 1963.397 Scholars emphasize the
role Diaspora Palestinians and non-Palestinians played in Fatah, such as Helga
Baumgarten who argues “it is difficult to overestimate the extent to which the Diaspora
experience shaped the formation and ultimate success of Fatah.”398 The refugee status of
Palestinians in exile was the key point around which political groups rallied. As a
resistance group in exile, from the beginning they had to weigh opinions external to “the
cause,” arguably as heavily as Palestinian concerns. Indeed, as Helena Cobban asserts,
the roots of the Fatah movement was “firmly dug into the communities of the Palestinian
exile, as opposed to those Palestinian communities which remained on their ancestral soil
in the West Bank and Gaza, even inside 1948 Israel.”399 A Palestinian graduate student at
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American University of Beirut noted the complexity of Diaspora-rooted resistance in a
1975 article; he says, “the different areas in which Palestinians were located had a
different effect on their freedom to conduct nationalist activities. In the case of Jordan,
Palestinian aspirations were discouraged by the Hashemite regime, whose dynastic
territorial interests in the West Bank clearly ran counter to aspirations for the recovery of
all of Palestine, followed by its establishment as an independent state.”400 Having evolved
out of a refugee community “Fatah networks had woven through and between
communities of the Palestinian Diaspora in all the Arab countries and beyond.”401 They
recruited heavily in Cairo and Beirut, with posters plastering walls around the city and
actual recruiting centers open in most Arab countries. Furthermore, the 1967 defeat of the
Arab states raised the profile of guerrilla action as a solution to Middle East tensions. As
Yezid Sayigh has pointed out, their successful operations gained enough notoriety that
“armed struggle provided the central theme and practice around which Palestinian nation
building took place, and laid the basis for state-building by driving elite formation and
militarization and allowing political legitimation.”402 As one commentator noted just two
years after the war, they “attained a degree of political legitimacy and popularity
throughout the Arab states whether “conservative” or “radical” – a fact significant for the
future internal political development in the Arab world.”403 From its early days, the
faction also realized the importance of international support for their cause, actively
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seeking it.404 By 1969, they had won recognition by USSR, North Vietnam, North Korea,
Cuba, and China.405 A gaze diverted from historic Palestine was not without impact:
Arafat’s failure to set up offices in Ramallah in 1967 has been attributed to Fatah not
having built strong networks – or any at all – in the Territories. Rather, from 1948 to
1967 and even after, “its ideological base and organizational impetus were still directed
towards the Palestinians in exile rather than towards the Palestinians who still, in the
West Bank and Gaza, remained in their own homes.”406
The creation of the PLO in 1964 and Fatah’s eventual rise to the top in 1969 only
further underscored the key role of the Diaspora in Fatah’s politics. By the time Arafat
became the chairman of the umbrella organization, the beginnings of a bureaucracy had
been written into place with input from non-Palestinian stakeholders. These documents
ranged from the Palestinian National Charter adopted on May 28, 1964, which
established the PLO, to the Basic Constitution outlining the organization’s structures and
procedures; nowhere do the National Charter or the PLO statues refer to territorial
sovereignty for a Palestinian state. Indeed, from its inception, the PLO was duty bound to
powers beyond the Palestinian people. As a result, Fatah had to shift from a guerrilla
organization with little accountability, to one that had to maintain public credibility in the
interest of the PLO’s reputation, political relationships, and funding. As Alain Gresh has
argued, the Palestinians became a “trump card in the hands of Arab leaders, in their
struggle to extend their regional influence.”407 Arab states meddled from the beginning,
trying to shape the organization they desired, rather than the organization necessary to
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attain liberation. According to Gresh’s assessment, it was not primarily Palestinian
suffering that led to the formation of the PLO; rather, it was a rivalry between Nasser and
Qassim that drove the organization’s formation. It was from Nasser and the United Arab
Republic that main governmental support came for the PLO, they had to humor these
states. Much of the organization’s funding came from non-Palestinian Arabs, and
individuals (Palestinian and non-Palestinian alike) residing in oil-producing countries.
Given that these established countries were entrenched in regional and Cold War politics,
they had interests beyond the welfare of the Palestinian refugees, notably containing antiIsraeli sentiment. The 1967 defeat discredited the PLO, opening up a space for Fatah to
take the lion’s share of control and restore legitimacy to the group, as well as to improve
military cooperation amongst the guerrilla groups. Winning control of the Cairo-based
Palestine National Assembly in February 1969 cemented Fatah’s need to heed regional
politics and interests.
Exacerbating this already palpable level of outside involvement in the Palestinian
issue was the 1974 declaration by the Arab League and the United Nations recognizing
the PLO as the “sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” From this
moment forward, Fatah, as the head of the PLO, would be in the international spotlight.
Rashid Khalidi argues that Arafat became the head of a “para-state,” rather than guiding a
“humble revolutionary movement.”408 Thus, public relations and marketing became
increasingly important, including Fatah and PLO publications that targeted the
international community and the Palestinian Diaspora, including: Fatah’s widely read
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Filastinunua (Our Palestine, published in Beiru), Al-Thawra Al-Filistiniyya (The
Palestinian Revolution) and the PLO’s Sawt Filistiniyya (Voice of Palestine); Shu’un
Filastiniyya was published by the PLO research centre from 1971-1993.409 Such
publications represent a shift in the Palestinian approach to liberation, away from Arab
unity as a prerequisite to promoting the idea that Palestinians could rebel “successfully
against foreign settlers by relying mainly on its own resources.”410 And yet, although
these publications were intended to promote the Palestinian cause and discuss the history
of the Palestine question amongst a wide audience, they were still external to the reality
of life in the Territories. By the beginning of the 1980s, the Fatah bureaucratic apparatus
in the Diaspora was overseeing all activity connected to the resistance, including:
military, political, social, information distribution, economic issues, and relations with
the resistance movement inside historic Palestine. At the same time, however, parallel
institutions to manage all aspects of local life were growing up in the West Bank and
Gaza, including societies, clubs, and other politically-affiliated organizations.
Thus, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, when the leadership was in exile, one can
see how the relationship between the constituency within the Territories and the
leadership was unsteady for two reasons: first, because this period of exile was meant to
be transitional, and thus Fatah did not have a reliably fixed base of operations; and
second, because they never came face to face with Palestinian people on their own soil.411
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The return of the leadership after Oslo presented many challenges – it was a painful shift
– which are beyond the scope of this work.412

Fatah on the Inside: Building Prison Resistance Politics
As illustrated above, Fatah’s macro-focus between 1967 and the early 1980s was
largely directed away from the day-to-day of historic Palestine, in spite of the growing
number of cells. This started to shift in the years immediately preceding the lead up to the
Intifada, when the “outside” leadership began to pay more attention to “inside”
developments.413 As Graham Usher points out, the 1980s witnessed a stoking of the Fatah
cadre under the guidance of Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir); in the lead up to the Intifada
they “cut their teeth in the youth, social and armed organizations.”414 The “inside”
leadership, however, extended beyond those identified by Fatah in the Diaspora as
possible leaders. Rather, residents had evolved their own system of identifying leaders,
many of whom participated in choreographing the Intifada. The Fatah leadership and its
accompanying political organization that developed inside the prisons present a
particularly interesting alternative to that in the Diaspora.
The site of the prison offered several key attributes when it came to Fatah
cultivating complex political structures and associated processes. First, inmates and their
leaders did not encounter the same kind of geographical flux as the Diaspora leadership.
Many prisoners spent a half-decade or more in the same prison, some living out several
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decades in the incarceration system. By the late 1970s, even when the Israeli authorities
moved prisoners from one location to another in an attempt to destabilize relationships
and to interrupt ongoing dialogue and planning, political structures were not disrupted.
Rather, prisoner movements enabled precise replication of structures from one prison to
the next. Second, Fatah-affiliated prisoners who became leaders did not have to contend
with the Diaspora-related pressures and necessary framing discussed above, but were
focused almost entirely on their own context. Finally, given the constraints of prison,
cells carrying out armed insurgency was not an option, thus a kind of nascent state
building replaced those actions as legitimizing tools for leaders. Thus, the prison’s
distinctiveness opened up a space for intriguing political developments
The initial example for Fatah prisoners seeking to organize was that which had
evolved outside the prison walls in the Diaspora, both within Fatah and the PLO. Fatah’s
published writings emphasized a formal, administrative infrastructure with a transparent
chain of command, a structure with which educated prisoners were familiar. On the
surface, it was quite simple and organized, and even relatively democratic: the
organizations in each country had their own budget and internal organizational structure,
with a direct reporting line only to Fatah’s Central Committee. The widely discussed
assumption was that these quasi-governmental structures would eventually be the basis
upon which a Palestinian state would be built.415 Thus, it is not surprising that Fatah’s
tripartite organization was the loose basis for the prisoners’ movement: Fatah’s General
Conference, which was supposed to meet every five years, was reflected in each Fatah415
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affiliated prisoner having voting privileges in the prison which he inhabited; Fatah’s
elected Central Committee, which functioned as a collective leadership, was replicated
inside the prisons; and Fatah’s Revolutionary Council, which decided policy in the
Diaspora when the General Conference was not in session, was reinterpreted to work in a
prison context. With all the infighting and the Diaspora-focus of Fatah’s formal
hierarchy, and given the number of ex-prisoners who joined the Palestinian Authority, the
administrative system developed in the prisons represented an ideal that could have – and
should have been – transferred to the outside.
Understanding how the system evolved, both in dialogue with Fatah in Diaspora
and also by plotting a separate course, requires relying heavily on interview material. The
lengthy, multiyear conversations and negotiations that went into creating an organized
and well-oiled structure were not recorded in writing. Thus, the next section of this
chapter will draw heavily on oral sources to help contextualize the written material that is
discussed in the final two sections. To do so, I will highlight four Fatah leaders in
particular who played an important role in the formulation, development and maintenance
of the political structures described in the documents: Ahmad Shirin, Yacoub Odeh, Radi
Jara’ai, and Ibrahim Khrishi. Shirin was arrested at the age of 20, having just finished
high school. At the time if his arrest, he was a member of a Fatah military cell and was
active in operations within the 1948 borders. As mentioned in the introduction, and
quoted in Chapter One, Odeh first entered prison in 1969 and spent 17 years in Israeli
custody. As an early prisoner with a long sentence, he can help us understand what drove
the creation of formal structures and the role prisoners played. Another voice already
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present in the opening chapters of this work is that of Radi Jara’ai’s. As mentioned,
Jara’ai was arrested in 1976 and was a leader in creating one of the prison movement’s
key structural markers: the Prisoners’ Constitution. An educated high school teacher from
Jerusalem, his was well suited to take a leading role in translating on going internal
conversations into agreed upon and written processes and procedures. Jara’ai is important
to understanding how prison politics evolved, as his narrative helps fill in the gaps on
both the process and the final product. Ibrahim Khrishi presents a different, but equally
interesting, portrait of the changing times. As discussed in Chapter One, Khrishi was
enrolled in Bir Zeit University when the soldiers came to search for him at his family’s
home. He was not, however, involved in the Fatah movement or involved in formal
resistance activities prior to his 1982 arrest, but was focused on his studies. Rather, he is
an ideal example of someone who was politicized inside the prisons. By the time of his
conviction, clear structures were in place inside the prisons, outlining democratic
elections and offering a path towards leadership. Khrishi represents one of the individuals
who traversed this path within the prison, and upon his release he returned to Bir Zeit as
an active member and leader of Shabiba, the student arm of Fatah. Today, thirty years
later, Khrishi remains an active member of the faction, holding a position of power within
the Palestinian Legislative Council. Taken together, these four individuals will help shed
light on the conversations, struggles, and accomplishments of those involved in
establishing a clear political organization that came to define the prisoner’s movement.

Putting the House in Order: The “Individual Leadership” Stage
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As mentioned, the post-1967 period witnessed a sizable influx of prisoners –
thousands – into Israeli jails, many serving sentences of 10 years or more. Neither the
Ottoman and British structures nor the prisons built by the Israelis themselves were
equipped for such numbers. Between serious overcrowding, atrocious conditions, and
inhumane treatment by the guards, the prisoners had many complaints, all of which
inspired some of them to consider secretly organizing. Former prisoners recall conditions
in minute detail that led to the rise of individual leaders and the “individual leadership”
stage of the movement inside the prisons. For example, in Tul Karem, Ahmed Shirin
describes the situation when he arrived in 1969 as completely lacking in even an inch of
extra space or a modicum of privacy. He was in a room intended only for about onequarter of the number of bodies inhabiting it. When night fell, he recollects that “in order
to sleep in these rooms, we had to use all the available space, so we had to sleep on our
sides.”416 As another interviewee eloquently put it, sleeping arrangements often
resembled that of “sardines in a tin, with one man’s feet next to his neighbor’s head, and
his feet brushing up against the head of the person on his other side.417 Space was so
coveted that if one rose to use the bathroom in the middle of the night, he would come
back to where he was sleeping and “won’t find a space because somebody will take it.”418
Even worse was the complete absence of privacy. The “bathroom” consisted of a bucket
in the corner of the room, without any kind of curtain or divider marking it off as a
private space. Such severe overcrowding was not particular to Tul Karem, but was a
challenge across the prison system from the Occupation’s inception. As discussed in
416
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Chapter Two, it was a contributing factor to Ramle’s first hunger strike in 1968.419 Thus,
as many ex-prisoners recollected, it was clear some kind of leadership was needed to
communicate and negotiate with the prison administration, as well as to coordinate and
guide resistance efforts, that the evolution of a leadership would be key to any
improvement at all in conditions.
Endowing an individual with permission to lead presented its own challenges in
the early years of the Occupation, given that prisoners were not distributed into rooms
according to their political affiliation, as would be the case by the late 1970s. What this
meant was that those who aligned with Fatah, the PFLP or the Communist movement
lived side by side in these horrid conditions, in spite of deeply felt ideological and
political differences. Thus, choosing a leader came with its own political obstacle: how
would a Fatah member trust a PFLP leader to represent his interests, or vice versa? The
situation was urgent by the early 1970s: with such uncomfortably close quarters as a way
of existence, it is not surprising that interpersonal temperatures rose and sometimes
erupted into physical violence. Density led to conflict and competition, to inter- and intrafaction flair ups, often pitting the prisoners against one another rather than unifying them
against their common enemies, the Israeli prison system and the military administration
writ large. With a lack of outlets for release of such strain, tensions were frequently
mapped onto factional divides and resulted in inter-faction clashes. Ghassan Khatib spoke
in great detail over several interviews about the violence between factions even in the
mid- to late-1970s. When asked how relations were between groups, his answer was in
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direct contrast with those of many of his compatriots, saying they were “very bad,” and
that the prisoners of various factions would “compete on many things.”420 Asqalon,
among the most crowded and politicized of the prisons inside Israel, was a site of
frequent clashes. An oft-recounted quarrel erupted in the early 1970s between Fatah and
PFLP members, resulting in a member of the latter attacking a Fatah member’s face with
a razor.421 Abu Ali Shaheen, the informal “boss” of Fatah in that prison at the time, not
only demanded an apology from the PFLP, but also organized a counter attack against the
presumed leaders of that faction.
In spite of reports of such violence between the groups, the vast majority of
interview subjects insisted that the relationship between various movements was good. In
fact, the language used to describe these relationships was always positive, including:
“perfect,” “excellent, perfect”422 “very good,” “we were all friends,” and everyone was
always “laughing and talking.”423 While the common adage says that a common enemy
temporarily unites the usually ideologically divided, it is clear that this bright picture is
not without blemishes. First, written documentation suggests that violence was indeed a
pressing problem. As the next section of this chapter will discuss, material from the 80s
and 90s include parameters for dealing with tensions between individuals. Secondly,
when pressed, ex-prisoners would hesitantly, or even unintentionally, reveal that the
situation was far more complicated, and that such positive framing was just that: framing.
For example, Abu Mohammad’s immediate response to my query was “excellent,
perfect,” but when pressed, he conceded, “there were problems, small problems that
420
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would be solved at the moment.”424 Abu Bakr, Fatah’s self-described “first prisoner,”
emphasized several times during our three interviews “we were like one hand, in one
prison everyone was equal. There was no Fatah, no Jabha, we were all one”425 or
“everybody’s together.”426 Then, every time this subject arose, a few sentences later, his
language hinted at more complexity, for example: “there was division, but I was against
it”427 or “I didn’t want to separate from my neighbors, I want them to live another way, to
be one family together.”428 Such admissions were common across interviews, and
required probing and usually more than one meeting. Khatib directly addressed exprisoner reluctance to dwell on the underbelly of the experience, emphasizing that they
had no interest in revealing the dark side. By emphasizing inter-faction cooperation,
former prisoners reclaimed these lost years. The positive spin allows for them to have a
space in which they maintained control, which they mediated in the face of crushing
oppression. Only rarely was an ex-prisoner as open as Khatib about the prevalence of
inter-personal violence. He described the viciousness that occasionally coursed through
the population, with razors as the weapons of choice, employed frequently in PFLP and
Fatah fights. He recounted close to ten occasions during his imprisonment when the
violence was so extreme, when prisoners were beating each other so severely that the
guards had to intervene with tear gas to break up it up violence and to prevent the
prisoners from killing or maiming each other.429 Khatib is in a special place in terms of
speaking out: he was a member of the very small Communist Party in the 1970s and
424
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today claims to be unaligned in his senior administrative position at Bir Zeit. Not having
to protect or shape the narrative of Fatah in the still Fatah-dominated West Bank gives
him a degree of verbal freedom. For an ex-prisoner who identifies, or identified, with
Fatah, recalling violent relations is far more complicated. Indeed, one common response
to a question about violence between factions is that Fatah members refused to respond to
incitement or attacks from the PFLP because there was no reason for them to feel
threatened.
That said, it was in large part these divisions and tensions that invited, albeit out
of necessity, the evolution of an informal leadership, which is now know as the
Individual Leadership Stage inside the prisons. As Jara’ai argued, organization was
initially sparked by the urgency of the terrible prison situation, which infighting only
compounded. The physical manifestation of tensions persuaded certain educated and
astute individuals that their differences would be better resolved by talking than through
violent skirmishes; they understood that the administration of the jail could use such
inter-factional disputes to escalate violence and further divide people.430 In the late 1960s
and early 1970s, initial conversations about how to collectively seek improved conditions
were muted, as the prisoners had to avoid the watchful eye of the Israeli prison
administration.431 Living in factionally mixed rooms, self-identified prisoners took the
lead in these conversations, which usually consisted of one or two people discussing the
issues and then connecting with individuals from other rooms during times when they
were allowed to move about. Such discussions were quiet and entirely informal. Those
430
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who assumed the role of leaders tended to be well connected, educated individuals, since
the social life inside the prisons at this time closely resembled that of the outside;
neighborhood disputes as well as family tensions and/or alliances were mapped onto
prison life. This reflects the traditional emphasis on cultivating trust through social
networks rather than through accomplishments. Individuals like Shirin and Odeh came to
occupy early leadership positions because of their outside reputations, their relative
education levels, and the length of time for which they were sentenced. Since rooms were
not divided out according to faction, and thus sustained conversations amongst, say,
Fatah members was next to impossible, the need and general desire for a calm collectivity
had to be the driving force for organization. During this Individual Leadership Stage, the
leaders were informally appointed—without any rules or regulations defining the
selection process – to organize the lives of the prisoners and maintain a certain calm.
Other leaders had held positions with Fatah outside the prison and thus were
naturally looked to as leaders once they were on the other side of the wall. The vast
majority of those arrested in the first decade after the Occupation were under 20 and thus
had little life experience, not to mention the limited education with which many began
their internment.432 Thus, individuals such as Abu Bakr and Abu Ali Shaheen were
respected Fatah military officers prior to their arrests and knew something about the
principles of the political movement from their work outside. As Shirin recollects,
Shaheen was an important leader in early 1970s Asqalon. Given his importance to the
movement prior to his arrest, messages from political leaders outside were transferred to
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him during family visits.433 Individuals who received such messages were suited to act as
prison leaders and negotiators during the individual leadership stage.
For the men acting as an informal leadership, the list of complaints and issues
emanating from each room was so long that they primarily acted as liaisons with the
administration. One ex-prisoner reflected on his unofficial appointment as the top leader
in Ramallah in 1971. A key concern was food, which required a well-honed negotiator to
campaign for improvements. As he recollected, his leadership role included many
discussions with the administration about “the amount and type of food, how much fruit
and how much meat.”434 An ongoing debate concerned whether prisoners would eat
according to weight or amount, with the Ramallah guards offering two grams of apple
that would result in each prisoner only getting half of an apple rather than a full apple.
After weeks of discussion, they agreed to feed the prisoners according to unit, until the
issue of the watermelon came up, at which point they reverted to feeding in grams rather
than units. As he recalled, these negotiations went on and on, resulting in one apple, but
then only “five grams of banana and five grams of watermelon.”435 In negotiations over
bodily issues, the room or section leader, the manager and often the Red Cross would be
present.
The “Individual Leadership” approach to managing inter- and intra-faction
relationships was not practicable when it came to overseeing and guiding a rapidly
expanding prison population with many stress factors with which to contend. Those who
gained the trust of compatriots acted on their behalf during the early 1970s by trying to
433
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force the administration to improve living and material conditions, as well as to ease
relations between hundreds of inmates. More significantly, they became the locus of
intense and quiet planning conversations, which grappled with ways of managing the
large population and the accompanying difficulties. The result of these conversations was
a movement away from this so-called “individual leader” period towards a more
institutionalized and – notably – documented approach to organizing the masses. This
urge to write one’s way through political conflict and towards a form of resistance was
not without precedent in the Diaspora, a fact that was not lost on the first leaders and
which will be discussed in the following sections.

Written Precursors: Fatah’s 1964 Constitution
Starting around 1973 or 1974, the planning conversations to which ex-prisoners
allude focused on how to develop a clear administrative structure with established
guidelines and rules necessary to support it, all in the interest of improving the safety and
security of the inmates, as well as improving living conditions. At first, before hunger
strikes won inmates access to writing implements, they recorded nascent regulations
using smuggled pens and cardboard from cigarette packets or cooking margarine.436
Then, beginning in the second half of the 1970s through the early 1980s, prisoners put
pens to paper, hard won through hunger strikes, and began to carefully inscribe their
activities into Israeli copybooks that were provided to them by the prison authorities.437
The surviving documentation of the eventually agreed upon formal rules and regulations
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consists of tidy penmanship on the pages of small Israeli exam notebooks intended for
schoolchildren. It cannot have been lost on the prisoners that they were inscribing their
guidelines for their existence and political resistance into booklets with Hebrew letters
adorning the covers. Rather than subverting the system, the prisoners were creating
documents that were somehow made permissible by the Israelis, and perhaps even
desired since it allowed for the production of material for monitoring.
Although Fatah was established as a highly secretive organization in the 1950s,
and continued as such through the 1960s, 1970s and into the 1980s, the faction also
recorded its history, messaging, and regulations in writing. These documents served as
bases from which prisoners could draw as they conceptualized their own structures. The
group’s 1956 founding was accomplished through two such documents: Haykal al Bina
al Thawri (Structure of Revolutionary Construction) and the movement’s Manifesto.438
The drafters of these documents were clearly well read in resistance literature, as they
seem to draw on guerrilla writings, such as those by individuals like Franz Fanon who
emphasizes the purifying effect of violence. From the start, writing also played an
important role for the faction’s supporters, a highly literate Palestinian population and
other Arabs, who regularly read the mouthpiece Nida’ al Hayat Filistinuna (The Call to
Life, Our Palestine). As evidenced in the prison documents, which will be discussed in
detail in the following section, Fatah’s 1964 Constitution had the most significant
influence on the evolving structures.
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Prisoner access to Fatah’s official documentation was a considerable challenge in
the 1970s and 1980s, since Palestinian political documents were not technically allowed
on the inside. However, published Fatah documents, as well as statements issued by the
movement’s main governing body, the General Conference, did manage to make it into
circulation via an unusual and circuitous path. In a strange twist, copies of these
documents, translated into Hebrew, were often shelved in Ramle’s library for Israeli
criminal prisoners’ use. Hebrew-literate Palestinian prisoners gained access to these
documents and translated them back into Arabic for general reading consumption.439 By
the mid-1970s, prisoners had developed various conduits for transporting materials from
one site to another. In some cases, material would be secretly passed to a family member
with a particular addressee in mind at another prison.440 Lawyers are also said to have
carried written material on occasion. As multiple interviewees confirmed, prisoners’
bodies were the most innovative transport vehical and reportedly the most widely used.
As briefly mentioned in Chapter Two, documents would be transcribed in chunks in near
microscopic handwriting onto very small pieces of paper, called kabsulih, as shown
below.
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These papers would then be neatly folded, wrapped in plastic, swallowed, and moved to
another location via the below kabsulih.

441

The most common site of document exchange was Ramle hospital, where prisoners from
all over Israel and the West Bank were transferred for treatment.442 Accounts of the
amount of material transported this way are startling. As will be discussed in the next
section, interview subjects report that entire documents capturing the planned political
structure moved from one prison to the next via individual bodies. Scraps of kabsulih
show, and interview subjects confirm, that the prisoners’ constitution traveled throughout
the prison system via this method.443 So too, popular books employed in educational
programming moved from one prison to another via prisoners’ bodies, as will be
discussed in Chapter Four. Once the kabsulih were retrieved from the human mule, they
information would be copied out in larger handwriting, eventually into the very
copybooks we now rely on to understand these prisoners’ experiences.444
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In prisons to which Fatah’s official political material did not make it via these
kabsulih, prisoners relied on the knowledge of those who had held some kind of
leadership position in the West Bank or Jerusalem prior to imprisonment. As mentioned
earlier, those involved in the structural planning conversations were highly educated, and
many had been in leadership positions, even just of individual cells, and thus were
ideologically and intellectually prepared to guide the evolution of the prison
organization.445 One characteristic of some individual leaders in the prisons is that they
remained linked to the outside movement during their imprisonment and thus could draw
on established external examples as guidance.446 When moved to a new prison, these
individuals were tasked with reproducing the documentation begun in other prisons.
One can detect the influence of the principles enshrined in Fatah’s 1964
Constitution on prisoner-produced organizational documents. First, the faction’s armed
struggle is framed as a “public revolution, and not one of a distinguished class.”447
Further to that, the Constitution claims to value the public as the “sole source of authority
and the sole, honest guardian of the Movement” since it is the “only party authorized to
take decisive decisions, and to elect the leadership at all levels.”448 Secondly, this
“public” participation lends itself to the Constitution’s emphasis on “collective
leadership,” in which “democracy is the basis of discussion, investigation and decision-
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taking at all organizational levels.”449 These three principles speak to the Movement’s
stated democratic inclinations; they intend for participation to be wide and for members
to believe that their voice is one of many driving the movement’s engine. They also invite
faction members to be the protectors of their revolutionary organization, to be completely
invested in the struggle. However, implementation would have required regular meetings
of the General Conference, since public input is conveyed through voting.450 These
meetings did not happen regularly enough to support the realization of such intentions.
Even though the Constitution calls for an official General Conference every five years,
with hundreds, if not thousands, of participants from all over the Diaspora and the
Territories, only seven have taken place since 1964.451 In addition to electing members of
the top tier leadership, the Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council, the General
Conference was intended to determine the faction’s strategic vision. General Conference
scheduling was delayed for a variety of reason, including the faction’s geographical
instability, as well as infighting amongst the leadership. Prison politics drew on these
values, while also being a more suitable venue to bring them to life.
The leadership structure outlined in the Constitution is highly organized and
served as a model for the prisoners; it has also “become the more or less standard model
for other commando groups, whose own organizational features replicate those of
Fatah.”452 As mentioned, the General Conference is the largest body and is also meant to
be the highest authority, given that it theoretically elects the executive branch of the
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leadership, the Central Committee.453 This powerful group was made up of 21 members,
with 18 elected via secret ballot during General Conferences and three appointed by those
who were elected.454 According to the Constitution, they were supposed to hold monthly
meetings to review departmental/committee performance and to issue decisions and
recommendations.455 Just below the Central Committee is the Revolutionary Council,
which is supposed to act as a policymaking group, contending with issues put forth by the
Central Committee. Indeed, the Revolutionary Council consists of members of the
Central Committee, the heads of the financial and membership protection committees, 50
representatives from the General Conference, 20 members selected to represent Fatah’s
military wing, 15 highly skilled individuals selected by 2/3 of the Central Committee
members, as well as a number of leaders from the Territories who were nominated by the
council itself.456 Within the Revolutionary Council, members were supposed to elect a
secretary and two deputies by secret ballot, to act as guides for the larger group.457
Because the General Conference met so rarely, this meant that leaders were not easily
unseated, which led to disappointment amongst the ranks, and even violent infighting. As
will be discussed in the next section of this chapter, the prison allowed for these intended
democratic leanings to come to fruition, as well as the proper functioning of checks and
balances.
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Due to physical distance between different Fatah cells, as well as the necessity of
operating undetected, the Constitution regulated trust and secrecy.458 For starters, the
document outlines the steps towards membership in the Movement, including: 1) a
minimum age of at least 17 years; 2) recommendations from two individuals who had
been members for at least two years. More striking, however, are the subjective
membership qualifications, including the following: having a “good reputation and
national credibility… [he must] respect the people and their traditions, serve them and
protect their interests and security…he must be independent, not committed to any other
organization or party…he must have leading qualifications and demonstrate a reasonable
amount of awareness and ability to assume responsibility, and have an amicable
personality… he must have sufficient readiness to sacrifice, self-denial and altruism.”459
Such vague markers of suitability allow for the movement to both exercise control and
also to attract widely, from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds and geographical
locations.
To ensure that a member meets these qualifications, Fatah’s documentation
outlined two methods: observation and punishment. Every candidate had to undergo a
six-month probationary period in which he is required to “grasp the theoretical principles
of the Movement” and “enthusiastically perform his assignments.”460 During these
months, the candidate is vetted and observed by senior compatriots, in line with a
structure laid out in the Constitution. According to article 105, the Movement’s “Base
Operations” were highly stratified and included the following: the smallest unit of
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organization was the “Cell,” each with three to five members; the “Chain” consisted of
two to five cells; the “Wing,” two to five Chains; the “Branch,” two to five Wings; and
the Area included at least four Branches.461 Thus, Fatah’s system of checks and balances
was organized. It was intended to both provide monitoring and also prevent individuals
from knowing too many other operatives. A safety mechanism of this type is critical in an
environment rife with detention and interrogation; structure of this sort ensures that one
can only be certain of a handful of members at any given time. Furthermore, unity is
critical, which is why discipline and abiding by all of Fatah’s regulations at all times, is
an organizational rule. Indeed, one can only express disagreement or dissent during an
official session.462 Walking a line between monitoring and punishment, the Constitution
highlights the importance of “self-criticism.”463 A cornerstone of Fatah’s practices, this
process asks members to reflect on their “revolutionary practices” and to evaluate them
according to “their positives results and circumvent the negative effects.”464 Selfcriticism is a particularly profound activity for those occupying leadership positions, 465
the idea being that it holds them publicly accountable while also underscoring the
importance of personal investment and commitment. Finally, the Constitution permits
outright punishment for violators, in the following order: drawing attention to one’s
wrongdoings, public rebuke, issuing a warning, freezing one’s rank, demotion, firing
from a position and firing with slander.466
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As Fatah’s primary regulatory document, the 1964 Constitution outlined
constraints for a geographically dispersed, and sometimes culturally diffuse, membership.
The degree to which monitoring and punishment were activated is harder to trace, given
the secrecy shrouding the faction. That said, one can say with certainty that the absence
of General Conferences undermined the Constitution’s power. As the next section will
illustrate, the Fatah’s Prisoner constitution, albeit influenced by this one, exercised far
greater power over individuals’ lives.

The Formation of the “Group Leadership” Stage
The Prisoners’ transition from relying on spoken agreements and informal
regulations to creating written records of rules did not happen simultaneously across the
prison system, but was initially more pointed inside larger prisons.467 The relative
stability of Fatah’s inmate population in prisons such as Beer Saba’ and Asqalon enabled
them to become the primary sites of production for foundational political documents. As
previously mentioned, hundreds of inmates served there at a given time, with Beer Saba’
reaching 900 individuals at different points. Such numbers meant that simple
practicalities inspired organization: density led to conflict and competition, pitting the
prisoners against one another rather than unifying them against their common enemy, the
Israeli system. Although the “individual leadership” was born in an attempt to tackle this
challenge, it proved to be merely a starting point in the process of organization. Secondly,
as Beer Saba’ and Asqalon were located inside the state of Israel, these institutions, and
later Nafha, were intended for those serving long-term sentences of more than seven
467
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years.468 Those convicted of shorter sentences were sent to prisons inside the West Bank
and frequently moved from one site to another during their internment, including
sometimes to inside the 1948 Israeli borders.469 Such extended periods of time in
captivity yielded unexpected fruits: time for inmates to sit idly in close quarters, discuss
the challenges of being in prison, to determine the need for organization, and to begin
planning a process of organizational and political institution building. With little to do in
regards to daily work for the prison administration, the daily rhythm was largely
determined by the prisoners themselves. Hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of days of
geographical stasis transformed these prisons into highly productive spaces. The initial
organizational efforts were decentralized and driven by quiet but regular meetings
amongst the individual leaders discussed in the previous section.470
Over the course of the 1970s, these conversations focused on how to develop a
clearly stratified administrative structure, while balancing a cultivation of the rules and
enthusiasm necessary to support it. Given that both Fatah and the PLO had a history of
codifying their political agendas and rules in writing, the prisoners had a basis from
which to work.471 One can see clear points of convergence between Fatah’s Constitution
and that which the prisoners drafted during this decade. In part, such planning was in the
interest of improving the safety and security of inmates within and across faction lines.
Significantly, in moving towards what came to be known as the Group Leadership Stage,
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those involved in the planning sought to encourage, or even cultivate, continued
commitment to the Palestinian resistance. This goal is obvious in the revolutionary
rhetoric peppering the opening of documents. One pamphlet, representative of others in
the archive, encourages prisoners to remember that “we in the prisons of Zionism, we
represent an objective, natural extension of the struggle movement of our people,”
language that fosters a continuation of prisoner connection to resistance, even whilst
behind bars.472 This same text goes on to further encourage prisoners by saying “we are
in the grip of a ruthless enemy, which admits no human or moral values, all what it cares
about is to kill us politically and nationally, to kill our revolutionary existence, and even
eradicate us from existence if possible.”473 To support the initiatives of maintaining
prisoner safety, while also encouraging revolutionary engagement, the texts speak to a
unified mission.
Indeed, these writings drove the establishment of the Group Leadership.474 As
will be discussed in the next section, agreed up and widely circulated documents spoke to
a major transition: leaders would no longer be unofficially or self-appointed based only
on personal connections or former roles outside the prison. Rather, a transparent process
was established, with clear guidelines for the election of individuals to various oversight
committees. This process emphasized “collective leadership [as] the only base for
organizational work” which meant “democracy [was the] reference in all discussions,
investigations and decision making,” as well as “the base for practicing…
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responsibilities.475 In the next section I will examine the documents that codified the
Group Leadership stage through detailed rules and regulations.

Regulating Prisoners Lives Through Written Text
Jara’ai, and others, affirm that the written records of organizational principles
were first “published” in copybooks in the late 1970s, although reportedly parts had
already been drafted onto other bits of paper and circulated via the aforementioned
kabsulih prior to the formal codification.476 This section will focus on two documents
which elaborate on Fatah prisoners’ political structure: what is known as the Prisoner’s
Constitution, entitled “What is Fatah and What Are its Features,” reportedly drafted in
Asqalon towards the end of the 1970s, and the internal regulations from Jneid prison,
seemingly first published around the beginning of the First Intifada, but reflecting a
decade of discussion and work to hammer them out. The use of documents finalized in
years beyond this project’s cut off date of 1985, such as Jneid’s regulations, are useful in
that they clearly reveal the ideal functioning to which the prisoners aspired.477 As the
writer(s) of the Jneid document points out, “these regulations are one of the most
comprehensive regulations recapping eighteen years of struggle in various sites and
stages.”478 Thus, a careful look at two documents from two different prisons, one from
within Israel and one from the West Bank, reveals a clear picture of prisoner
organizational intentions and structural planning.
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Prison documents were anonymous and almost always lacked a date, thus oral
sources are important for contextualization. The obvious explanation for such anonymity
and lacking context is to avoid immediate identification by the Israelis as leaders inside
the prisons and after one’s release. Prisoners who took leading roles in creating the
internal political structure often remained connected to Fatah for at least a time, and some
for many decades, after their release. For example, Ibrahim Khrishi became the head of
the student Fatah movement, Shabiba, within a month after his release in 1991 and would
not have wanted any writings traceable back to him.479 During the 1970s and 1980s, and
even to this day, once an individual was arrested, they became part of the Israeli prison
system; avoiding re-arrest was a feat rarely accomplished. Almost every person I
interviewed went to prison at least two times, if not more. Thus, avoiding the limelight of
a publicly declared leadership role via anonymous documentation was one small way that
prisoners could moderate Israeli knowledge and observation of them, in spite of near
constant monitoring and close scrutiny. There are less obvious reasons for this as well.
The lack of dates on much of the political material suggests a certain timelessness to the
written records; that these documents are not intended to reflect a specific historical
moment, but to govern the prison organization until amended at some undetermined point
in the future. Intentional anonymity can be read yet another way: the documents were not
only the instructional record for how to govern Fatah prisoners, but also a clear reflection
of the democratic, participatory intentions of the prisoners.
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As mentioned earlier, the prisoners’ starting point for designing an internal
political system was to look to Fatah in the Diaspora, which had created something of a
state-in-waiting, as a model upon which to build. At first glance, the hierarchy inside
resembles a scaled down version of what was outlined for the Movement outside.480
However, the way in which the prisoners’ structure played out was far from a reflection
of Fatah in the Diaspora’s top down and static leadership. The reality of Fatah’s
organization on the outside is that its stratification and structure did not amount to much
in the end; as mentioned, the General Conference rarely met, in spite of the regulations
calling for meetings every five years and the fact that it was responsible for electing the
members of the Central Committee by secret ballot. Thus, the checks and balances,
although detailed, were largely theoretical. As is well known, the membership of Fatah’s
Central Committee remained in power for decades.481 In contrast, the leadership laid out
a structure that invited the participation of all Fatah members in a given jail, and even
across the network of prisons with the evolution of the system for secretly moving
materials.482 As the drafting and approval of regulations occurred with the input of
hundreds of prisoners, anonymity also reflects an environment in which nobody would be
singled out as the supreme leader; it speaks to a collective desire to allow everyone equal
participation in decisions about prison life and politics. A radical departure from Fatah’s
operations in the Diaspora, this represented a situation-appropriate and local form of
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political organization, as well as a truly locally generated structure for organizing the
resistance.
Equal participation did not, however, mean there was a lack of centralization. On
the contrary, the most important thing these documents accomplished was the written
codification of an elected and strong leadership for the prisoners. By 1977, which oral
sources cite as the first year of general elections for leaders inside the prisons, various
written sources laid out a clearly delineated hierarchy with specific tasks assigned to each
position.483 Like in the Diaspora, the baseline of the prison’s formal structure was a
General Conference, with tens of members in larger prisons. Also similar to Fatah on the
outside, the Central Committee was the highest governing body of the prisoners. Inside,
however, it was smaller, usually consisting of between five and ten members, 484 one of
whom was appointed as the “secretary” to “preserve the archive” of the group and to “be
the connection between it and the Revolutionary Council.485 Under that was the
Revolutionary Council, with membership size determined within each prison.486
Modeling itself on that in the Diaspora, which appointed this group the “highest authority
in the movement”487 in between General Conferences, the Revolutionary Council
occupied the key leadership role inside the prisons.488 Its responsibilities were wide
ranging, appointing committee members,489 discussing and “framing” Central Committee
decisions and activities, “carrying out emergency meetings in case of challenges…or
483
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upon the request of the central committee,” providing the central committee “with
directions and notes,” and “settling the issues of punishments and applying
punishments.”490
Documents and interview subjects alike reveal that the most striking characteristic
of the governing structures was the emphasis on process, notably one that was democratic
and strove to be open and fair. From 1977 onwards, even in the largest prisons with
hundreds of Fatah members, democratic elections became the norm, scheduled between
every eight and twelve months depending on the prison and determined primarily by the
frequency of prisoner movement.491 As the written documents and interview subjects
recount, candidacy was open to everyone who met certain qualifications, as outlined in
“terms of reference” for each level of leadership. Qualifications were strictest for the
upper tier of leadership, the Revolutionary Council and the Central Committee, with the
length of arrest determining how high one could climb. In Jneid, to run for election to the
“general conference,” the prisoner must have been a prisoner for at least one year and
have spent a minimum of four months in Jneid.492 Standing for the Revolutionary Council
required having served more time: a minimum of three years, with a whole year in
Jneid.493 In outlining the terms of reference, the prisoners took the frequency of prisoner
relocation into account, in this case allowing those who spent a full year in Jneid, but then
moved to another prison, “to be treated as any regular prisoner that spent a year in al
Jneid if they came back within one year.”494 Finally, election to the Central Committee
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necessitated the same requirements for time spent on the inside as that of the
Revolutionary Council, but the elections were handled differently. Rather than being
open to the entire Fatah prisoner population in a given prison, the Revolutionary Council
elected the Central Committee members according to secret ballot.495 All names of those
who were eligible would appear on a roster to be circulated. One copy of each roster
would be sent to each room and the prisoners would vote secretly, with the election
committee counting the votes at the end. These elections presented a stark contrast with
those that occurred for Fatah’s formal “outside” leadership. An interesting example of
how the process outside yielded something quite different from that which the prisoners
evolved is represented by the General Conference election in the spring of 1980. In spite
of wide participation, all fifteen members who were elected had been active in the
movement since before it had launched its armed struggle in 1965.496
Multiple committees were established to support the work of the senior,
centralized leadership, formed according to set processes. Although the idea of a strong
committee network was also borrowed from Fatah’s Constitution,497 the roster inside the
prisons represents adjustments made to accommodate the realities of incarceration and
include, but are not limited to: Administrative, Education, Security, Cultural,
Revolutionary, and Foreign Relations.498 Inside the prison, the Central Committee elected
a head of each of the main committees who would in turn select several other members –
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usually three – to manage the workload.499 Each committee had clearly outlined tasks
resembling job descriptions. For example, the “foreign relations” committee, in Jneid
known as “the committee for relationships with other factions,” was responsible for
“organizing the relationships with other factions based on the critical role of Fatah and
the national unity.”500 Another group, the Cultural Committee, which will be discussed at
length in Chapter Four, addressed the issue of unity via fostering intellectual investment.
Members of this committee had the pleasure of “determining the cultural program and
submitting it to the Central Committee based on the essence of the movement and its
political, national and humanitarian goals.”501 A key part of this included overseeing the
creation of books lists for the educational program, as well as the promotion of prisoners
from one “grade level” to the next. Arguably a less pleasant job, but critical to prisoner
wellbeing, was that of members of the “security committee.” Appointed by the Central
Committee, it “has its own regulations, which should be kept secret between the security
committee and the Central Committee.”502 Secrecy was key because of the sensitive
nature of their work, the main agenda being to preserve the “security and safety of Fatah
inside and outside.”503 Among other tasks, they are said to have monitored the plans and
movements of the Israeli occupation authority in the jail, followed the movements of
possible spies or informers and meted out punishment, and tried to protect prisoners from
being co-opted by the Israelis to work as spies. They also oversaw the “security status for
the other factions, because of the controversial relationship between Fatah and the other
499
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factions.”504 Because the Central Committee was “considered the higher security
committee,”505 an important part of the work included “providing periodic reports”
through the representative, who was himself a member of the Central Committee.506
The hierarchy was further stratified to include room and section representatives as
well. Each committee was responsible for appointing an individual to oversee its work
and activities within a room or section; recommendations were then made to the Central
Committee, which had the power to approve or deny. These representatives reported to
the sub-committees (cultural, security, foreign relations, administrative) and they in turn
had a direct reporting line to the Central Committee.
This structure, clearly delineated in ink and inscribed into copybooks intended for
circulation, assigned specific tasks to each position. Thus, centralization was not
concentrated in one, or even a few, individuals; rather, it was broadly maintained across a
wide swath of committees. The elected body, the Central Committee, maintained a great
deal of authority, acting as a clearinghouse for other appointments, but was not
omnipotent in that the Revolutionary Council was technically the senior body. As a result
of this clear organization, ex-prisoners refer to this period as the Group Leadership stage:
an era which promoted an organized, institutionalized, and, very importantly,
documented, approach to organizing large groups of prisoners. This committee-based
structure was intended to provide layers of checks and balances, while also helping to
monitor prison life and provide for prisoner needs. Moreover, structures established
inside large prisons established a replicable model. By the turn of the 1980s, even the
504
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smaller prisons such as Beit Lyd, intended for people awaiting trials and housing only
about 50 prisoners at a time, had a small cohort of leaders overseeing the daily life of the
inmates.507

Divided or Unified? Cultivating a Prisoners’ Movement
The apparent emphasis on formulating well organized structures that underscore
cooperation and democratic decision-making practices extended outwards towards other
factions as well. Unlike Fatah in the Diaspora, prisoner writings concerning other factions
emphasized unity rather than competition as a guiding principle.508 One notebook full of
writing, which, according to interview subjects was widely circulated from one prison to
another, set out to answer the question “What is Fatah and what are its features?,”509
According to Jara’ai, who counts himself among this work’s authors, this text served as
the by-laws for Fatah prisoners and is commonly referred to as the “prisoners’
Constitution.”510 Although it lacks any marker to identify its point of origin, he says it
was written in Asqalon and then formed the basis for Fatah’s by-laws across West Bank
and Israeli prisons.511 He recounts the drafting of this document as involving many sets of
eyes and multiple revisions. While members of the Central Committee were ultimately in
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charge of transcribing the Constitution into a copybook, Fatah members in each cell
reviewed it and provided feedback, including proposed revisions.512
“What is Fatah and what are its features” accomplishes a dual purpose: it
establishes the ideological underpinnings of the faction and it serves as a prescription for
how to form and run certain internal committees. The document’s framing and phrasing
reflect a clear position. From the very first sentence, under the subheading “introduction,”
language of unity and inter-faction cohesion is employed. The phrase “national unity” is
repeated throughout, and is said to be “the common denominator” of all public interests
and of Palestinian nationalism itself.513 Representing a striving towards good relations
within this enclosed space, Fatah’s by-laws go so far as to equate the concept of
nationalism with unity. They do not privilege Fatah’s resistance know-how, nor do they
speak of Fatah in a way that highlights the faction’s successes and offerings as superior to
its contemporaries; it does not read like Fatah propaganda, per se. Instead, the document
nearly harps on the idyllic harmony amongst the factions, and Fatah’s support for and
place within it. A reader of this document can presume that factionalism is equal to a kind
of anti-nationalism; that “polarization” can negatively impact the struggler and thus the
national struggle itself.
This inclination towards unity is evident in the rhetoric of ex-prisoners as well.
When asked about the relationships between members of the various factions, both
Jara’ai and Khrishi emphasized the cooperative spirit that developed alongside the
political structures. In describing interactions with, say, PFLP members, ex-prisoners
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spoke in glowing terms about the warm spirit that developed across faction lines, often
emphasizing that prison was the only space they experienced such tensionless politics.514
Interview subjects have often repeated that there were no tensions between factions and
that prison was the best time of their lives. Likewise, both Jara’ai and Khrishi emphasized
that factions strove to support one another, rather than attempting to undermine each
other by poaching members or other devious schemes. This verbal framing can be read as
representing the deep influence of the texts on shaping prisoners’ beliefs and
understanding.515
To that end, prisoners established general “detainee institutions,” committees that
cut across party lines. For example, there is a detailed explanation of a general
“struggler” committee formed from “representatives of the Palestinian factions under a
Palestinian framework its basic program for the detainee.”516 According to Fatah’s
account of this committee, it consists of three Palestinian National Liberation
representatives, a member of the PLA, a representative from the Palestinian Democratic
Front, as well as representatives from each faction. This committee is responsible for
anything connected to how the national struggle puts on a public face, a kind of public
relations group. The document discusses how the committee is responsible for
“establishing collective appearances,” by putting together sporting and cultural
competitions.517 Moreover, as mentioned in the previous chapter, this committee decides
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when to launch a hunger strike.518 Another is the “Reception committee,” which
welcomed each prisoner to his new home, oriented him to the prison, and invited him to
choose a political faction with which to align. This committee was critical to the smooth
functioning of the prison since very few prisoners remained unaligned once they were
sentenced to a prison. Individuals who actively chose not to commit to a faction were in
the minority. Ex-prisoners have suggested that the gap between the politically committed
and uncommitted was so wide that one could count the latter on one hand – and that one
hand representing the unaligned throughout the entire system at any one time, not just
within the confines of one prison.519 Joining a faction, and thus the work of the
welcoming committee, was an important part of becoming a political prisoner. One’s
faction became his family for the period of internment, or as one prisoner eloquently put
it: “the sense of affiliation, belonging, caring is very deep” amongst the prisoners.520
Given the importance of unity, when a prisoner violated his commitment to his
brothers, punishment was harsh. All prisoners were subject to consequences if they
violated the established rules. Even the members of the Central Committee and the
Revolutionary Council were “subjected to the same punishment law decided by the
internal system and the internal regulations which apply to all members.”521 Throughout
the prison system, spies were a pressing issue. These were individuals who had been coopted by the Israeli administration, either in exchange for shorter sentences, or in
response to threats of harm coming to one’s family outside of the prison. Spies were
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planted amongst political prisoners from the very beginning, including within centers of
interrogation. Spies were often discovered during night watches; ex-prisoners report that
every night a member of Fatah’s intelligence committee would stay awake and observe
the room in which he lived, as a way to ensure that everyone stayed in line. When there
were, say, 50 people in a room, this was no easy task.522 Prisoners saw spying as a deep
betrayal, given the closeness of prisoner relationships within confined spaces. Khatib
stressed that they “worried” about spies amongst them because they talked “frankly” with
each other about “things that might be dangerous, or about the organizational aspects of
the prison.”523 Thus, they were concerned that spies might not only convey information
about the prisoners themselves, but also about cells’ plans or Fatah’s organization beyond
prison walls. Inside the prisons, Fatah established harsh guidelines for dealing with such
traitors.524 Once an individual fell under suspicion, he would be interrogated in an
extremely violent way. Many ex-prisoners described these interrogations as akin to what
they had undergone at the hands of the Israelis during their initial detention. In many
cases, a confirmed spy would be killed.525 According to Fatah’s internal regulations,
“eliminating spies” was the responsibility of the security committee, which would work
closely with the Central Committee to “determine the place and time.”526 Besides, spying,
sexual encounters were also seen as a violation of Fatah’s principles and rules. A
sensitive subject, only a few prisoners spoke to this, stressing that the accused would

522

Khatib and Jara’ai spoke in detail about these night watches.
Khatib Interview.
524
Each faction dealt with his own spies, since it was related to the faction’s personal business.
525
Abu Mohammed recalls this happening during his time at Beer Saba’ and Jara’ai mentions it happening in Asqalon.
526
AG 13-3-1-3, 16.
523

175

appear after their punishment with clear marks on their face.527 This physical marring of
one’s face, not unlike a kind of scarlet letter, made public the strong suspicion of and/or
the act itself. In both cases, spying and sexual cases, a suspect was permanently marked,
even if he was cleared. This mark complicates the so-called democratic notion of
innocent until proven guilty; in this case, one is somehow guilty even if proven innocent.
According to the prisoners’ thinking, there must be a reason why one fell under suspicion
in the first place, which somehow permanently erodes his trustworthiness and renders
him somewhat irrelevant in terms of participating in the prison political organization.
As the largest faction inside the prisons, Fatah’s support for inter-faction
cooperation was critical. The fact that ex-prisoners refer to this document emphasizing
unity as their Constitution speaks to the importance placed on the cultivation of a tangible
and homegrown national struggle. The local contribution to the wider national movement
was this spirit of unity, which did not always emanate from Fatah in the Diaspora. Rather,
one can argue that a locally rooted alternative to Fatah-in-the-Diaspora emerged out of
prisoner efforts: strong links emerged between those involved in the prison movement
and Shabiba at the universities, with the prison acting as a sort of feeder school. Written
documentation suggests that there was at the very least a desire to cooperate on issues
related to the general prison experience, rather than focusing on the ideological
differences between the factions. This inclination towards unity is confirmed in the
rhetoric of ex-prisoners as well, reflecting the language of the documents.
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Furthermore, there is something aspirational about this focus on unity. Jara’ai
refers to this booklet as both “by-laws” and “the constitution,” using the terms
interchangeably. When shown this document, other interview subjects also employed the
term constitution to describe it, a usage that is neither unintentional nor insignificant. The
word itself, in English, is commonly defined as the established and accepted principles
for running a state. In Arabic “constitution” also refers to a basic or foundational law by
which societies abide. In employing this term, the ex-prisoners convey the seriousness
they attach to their internal project of developing state-like structures to regulate their
spaces. The formulation of legalistic principles was critical to supporting this effort. As in
English, the Arabic word for constitution also carries a connotation that deserves
attention: a lofty ideal to which one can aspire. There is something high-minded and
celebratory about the notion of a constitution; it can represent the best and brightest
expressions of thought and action of which a place and people are capable.
While the emergent structure enabled previously unconnected prisoners to climb
the political ladder, to establish leadership roles within the prisoner and also the
resistance movement writ large, it was not without challenges or failings. For starters,
elections had the potential to pose problems for prisoners: Jara’ai recalled the 1984
elections in Beer Saba’ when “collaborators became leaders in the prison.”528 Although
this accusation is not recorded in writing, it certainly speaks to one of the challenges of
democracy: ceding of a certain degree of control over outcomes.
The production and circulation of these documents were remarkable feats within
the strictly monitored spaces of prisons intended for prisoners seen as security risks. As
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mentioned earlier in the chapter, initial conversations in the early 1970s about organizing
were muted, nearly whispered amongst those men who were involved in the planning.
Rooms were mixed faction-wise, but Fatah members worked with their compatriots on
figuring out how to create something akin to a management structure for bettering their
lives during internment. Through repeated hunger strikes across the prison system during
the 1970s, prisoners won more access to the courtyard and somewhat freer movement
when inside the building. By the late 1970s, this limited mobility gave them more access
to each other and time to deliberate before returning to their cells to write, the implements
for which they had also won through hunger striking. By the late 1970s, written material
was moving from room to room and from prison to prison, quietly passing from one hand
to another within an individual prison or smuggled out via kabsulih to a different locale.
It is not clear to what degree the Israelis were closely monitoring these exchanges, as
these are sources to which I do not presently have access.529 According to the exprisoners with whom I spoke, there is a general agreement that the prison administration
had a sense of what was happening and let it happen, given that these prisoner actions
served at least some of their ends as well: the establishment of an uneasy peace and quiet
between the factions.

Written Sources: The Impact
According to the Director of the Abu Jihad archives, Abu el Haj, the Prisoners’
Constitution –filling about half of an Israeli exam notebook – and others like it, were
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widely circulated amongst prisoners in the late 1970s and into the 1980s. As a result,
even the smaller prisons housing only 50 -100 prisoners (Beit Lyd, for example),
mimicked the leadership structure and spirit established in places like Asqalon and Beer
Saba’. The relocation of the prisoners themselves further supported consistency within
Fatah politics. During turbulent times, such as when large hunger strikes occurred, the
Israelis would move those who were thought to be leaders within a particular prison. The
authorities’ plan was to destabilize the faction, but the effect was not commensurate with
the goal. Instead, the established hierarchy demonstrated a degree of unflappability and
the relocated leader often assumed another top position in his next prison residence.530
Indeed, the wide circulation of such documents facilitated the evolution of a common
political language and agreed upon understanding of political approach.
In stark contrast with Israeli intentions, this movement enabled remarkable
commonalities between Fatah’s structures from one prison to the next, sometimes
separated by hundreds of miles, where implementation was not forced but desired. Prior
to the late 1970s, the prison experience was contained in the oral reports and stories. The
transition to written documentation and the resulting replication of organizational
structures across the system created a shared sense of belonging to something larger; the
circulation of written and reproducible rules, regulations and ideology bound together
seemingly disparate and discrete spaces. Out of this circulation and widespread adoption
came the birth of a formal political organization inside the prisons. It was from this point
forward that one could truly talk about “the prison experience” and “the prisoners’
movement.”
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The most significant impact of written documentation in the prisons is that it led
to more diversity in political participation inside, and eventually outside. Khrishi is an
excellent illustration of someone who had next to no political interest, and certainly no
experience, prior to prison, but who now plays a significant role in the Palestinian
Authority. Transitions like Khrishi’s were made possible by written materials, which
served as tools for obtaining a political education. At the beginning of his decade-long
sentence in 1982, he was not a politically active individual. During his interrogation
period in Jenin he remained largely uninterested, in large part because the organization
was not as strong in this smaller prison. Upon his December 1986 arrival in Jneid jail in
Nablus, he was welcomed by the “Reception Committee” and joined Fatah. This move
was not out of any particular urge to be part of a faction; rather, he asserts, “less than 1 in
100 remained unaffiliated.”531 Many interviewees have cited this majority participation
rate, with Jara’ai claiming that only the religiously observant remained unaffiliated.532
Having joined Fatah, he was immediately included in their structured educational
programming, much of which dealt with the Palestinian issue and the national movement.
Khrishi is not someone who could have risen to the top in the late 1960s or early
1970s. After all, he was not politically connected before his imprisonment and, although
he was a university student at the time of his arrest, he was not educated in the ways of
resistance. He fell in love with the written word and vowed to read everything available
to him in the prison, from social and cultural works, to novels and poems. It was through
text that Khrishi was drawn into the history, politics, and policies of Fatah; it was through
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study that Khrishi rose to the top of the political command chain by the time of his
release. Through his educational encounters inside the prisons, and through these texts
codifying Fatah, Khrishi was able to develop and stoke the flames of a political career;
the system inside the prisons invited individuals to political participation and into quite a
different version of political resistance from that in the Diaspora. It changed the course of
his life and now, thirty years later, Khrishi continues his political involvement by sitting
on the Legislative Council.
Another significant impact of such writing documentation is the way in which it
enabled the solidifying of a particular kind of protest: one that was organized, structured,
and planned. In speaking about the Nafha strike of 1980, discussed in detail in Chapter
Two, Odeh emphasizes that the planning of the system-wide strike was made possible
because of the internal political organization. By passing messages from prison to prison,
this strike was able to involve hundreds of prisoners, all striking in support of the Nafha
motto, “sun, water, air.”533
By the mid-1980s, these documents were well established as key signposts for the
Fatah movement’s political structure inside the prisons. Today, looking back on their
experience, many of the prisoners who experienced the production of these documents, as
well as those who entered prison during the early years of the structure’s operation,
remember and refer to that period as the “Golden Years” – as the time when a spirit of
democracy and cooperation prevailed in the written word and beyond.
The creation of written records was not premeditated, but their value was quickly
embraced as a way to inspire participation, unity, and support for the Fatah movement.
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Indeed, recording in writing how a system and its participants should behave is a process
newly emerging or changing states undergo. Written sources outlining rules and
regulations served as a kind of contract between the leaders and the participants, as well
as a standard against which to judge success and failure. So too, written documentation
gave the prisoners a basis from which to work, a starting point from which they could
continuously pursue political development. The creation and circulation of written
sources had profound implications for the political organization amongst prisoners:
thousands of men were transformed into politicized beings, a kind of citizenry. Through
these sources they learned the craft of politics and they participated in shaping the Fatah
faction inside the prisons into a well-oiled machine. Thus, these places intended as sites
of punishment allowed for the production of streamlined and efficient operational
structures. Even more significantly, the introduction of accessible written sources meant
that individuals could develop political careers while still in prison by participating in a
systematic educational system, rather than by simply tapping into connections. Within the
Israeli prisons of the 1970s and 1980s grew what can be seen as an ideal political
structure that had the potential to serve as the basis for a future state.534 The true power of
these records is that they were key to establishing a prisoner’s movement. Inscribing
beliefs, practices, and codes in ink ensured that the system would survive beyond a
particular leader’s release; it guaranteed something greater, movement that was bigger,
than the imprisonment experience itself.
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“...All Members should commit to
the program for their benefit
and for the sake of the
organization.”535
Chapter Four
From Fellahin to Fatah:
Schooling Inside the Prisons

Today, Palestinians are amongst the most educated in the region, with figures
from 2005 demonstrating that the population maintains the highest literacy rate in the
Arab world.536 With a plethora of post-Oslo reports assessing the challenges of access to
education, most of which are linked to occupation, as well as educational achievements,
one can see that education in Palestine represents a developmental marker.537 Indeed, a
major Oslo-era initiative was the establishment of the Ministry of Education and Higher
Education, an oversight body that took a rigid approach to education, using the end of
high school exam, Tawjihi, as the ultimate determiner of a student’s success. And yet, the
field of education is also highly contested within Palestinian society, a site where politics,
resistance, and the domestic converge and sometimes compete. Unlike other parts of the
Arab world with which Palestine is compared in NGO reports, Palestinian education
carries the burden of nation building from scratch, the conceptualization of what it might
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mean to be a citizen, and a lingering hope for a solution to the conflict. Over the past six
decades, since the creation of the state of Israel, the educational system has continued to
reflect something of the many generations of external control, resembling a hodgepodge
of influences.538 In fact, even today, in spite of an influential Ministry of Education, one
cannot look to the Palestinian education and speak of just one system, but must think in
terms of four different systems: UNRWA, the Jordanian system in the West Bank, the
Israeli school system teaching to the Tawjihi in East Jerusalem, and the Israeli system
which Arab-Israelis attend. Beyond the official system, scholarly literature has largely
neglected a major site of educational advancement and intellectual engagement in the
pre-Oslo period: the Israeli prison intended for political prisoners. The evolution of
formally structured, yet unaccredited and thus largely unrecognized, educational
programs inside the prisons during the 1970s and 1980s benefited thousands of
undereducated individuals, as well those whose formal education had been interrupted by
imprisonment. Indeed, education inside the prisons served a dual function: first, it
contributed to the development of a Fatah identity; and second, it was formulated to serve
the resistance movement and to shore up the struggle. As this chapter will elucidate, the
confinement and relative stability of the prison population produced near ideal
circumstances for education, one in which learning was neither disrupted by the
Occupation nor outside pedagogical influences. Within Israeli prisons, Palestinian
inmates were free from these constraints to fashion and supervise their own educational
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system, one that would support their evolving democratic state-like structures and thus
their institution building, while also creating and sustaining resistance ideology.

Educating a People without a Place
Like many aspects of Palestinian life, access to education and pedagogical
approaches are subject to many external influences, including the Ottomans, the French,
the British, and the Jordanians. One cannot understand the state of Palestinian education
without reflecting on these influences. With the foundation of the Israeli state and then
the onset of the Occupation, the educational picture was made even more complex, with
schools in the Territories continuing to use the existing curricula, but with Israeli
oversight.539 Literature dealing with Palestinian education tends to take one of three
approaches: first, how education was influenced or determined by external powers;
second, education as a charity effort; and third, the ways in which education sites,
especially universities, were sites of Palestinian nation building and sometimes cauldrons
in which resistance ideology and practice were formulated.
The period of British involvement, both unofficial and during the Mandate era,
receives some attention in the existing literature. Scholars focus on British intent and
approach, as well as Palestinian responses to it, tending to agree that British educational
efforts had a two-fold purpose: to civilize the natives, reconciling them to their colonial
situation, and to pave the way towards establishing a Jewish nation. During the last
quarter of the nineteenth century, Palestinians woke up to the fact that Jewish schools
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outnumbered those intended for Arabs, taking into account both Muslim and Missionary
schools, 43 to 8:17 respectively. As one recent scholar pointed out, the 1930s witnessed
an educational vacuum. Mandate Palestine contained only six government schools
offering lower secondary education and only two secondary schools.540 In response,
Palestinian leaders pushed for the establishment of more private schools, with the number
of schools skyrocketing from a total of 308 schools in 1931 to 478 government, 135
Muslim, and 182 Christian.541 The British did not see education of Arabs as a priority. A
full decade into Britain’s civil administration of Palestine, a report states “no complete
new school have been erected from general revenues since the occupation.”542
The British established an approach replicated by the Israelis post-1948: rather
than re-envisioning the educational system, they maintained much of the existing
structure, only tweaking aspects that would serve their agenda. In practice, this meant that
many educational structures remained untouched, and continued to focus either on
training administrative and military personnel, as established by Ottoman colonial
predecessors, or centered on religious instruction. The schools where the British exerted
the most control was within the walls of those run by Christian missionaries, while the
third school system during this time, the Hebrew system, remained largely untouched.
Among the earliest scholars to write about Palestinian education, Khalil Totah (1937),
then headmaster of the Friends Boys’ School in Ramallah, outlines the available
educational system at the time. He emphasizes the excessive British control maintained
over Arab Government schools through the Government Department of Education,
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whose role it was to inspect, schools, distribute grants, collect statistical information,
supervise examinations, and to employ teachers.543 This was in stark contrast, he points
out, to the role of this agency in the Jewish public system; interaction was limited, with
schools undergoing only occasional inspection in exchange for receiving a modest public
grant. When it came to Arab schools during the Mandate period, Totah clearly states that
“the control of the policy is in British hands.”544 This was critical since the British
believed that the administration of Palestine necessitated British-trained individuals (i.e.
loyal subjects of the empire).545
After the foundation of the state of Israel, those who remained within 1948
borders attended state schools in Hebrew or missionary-run or other private schools in
French, German, English, and Arabic. Other Palestinians requiring access to the
educational system lived as refugees in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, or in the Diaspora.
The literature reflects the large number of these individuals, considering questions about
curriculum, educational leadership and control, as well as the role of NGOs and
UNRWA. Given that the bulk of the literature is interested in internationally funded and
controlled projects, many writers are NGO/UN workers, political commentators, or
journalists, with texts tracing the impact of external structures and funding on
Palestinians. There are many considerations for a population in exile. The question of
what it means to educate extends beyond reading, writing and arithmetic and means that
education also grapples with educating towards a goal of national liberation.
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Analyses of Diaspora education focused on its striking social and cultural impacts
on the various Palestinian communities. One common approach is to examine the
restorative power of education. An early article by Kent Pillsbury and Abdul Malik
Nashef argues that the UNRWA school system “unobtrusively” played its part in the
“Arab world’s socio-economic revolution… by contributing to the social reconstruction
of a disturbed people who have not lost confidence in their inherent potentialities.”546
Likewise, researcher Sarah Graham-Brown also shows how education contributed to the
shifting social structures that resulted from Palestinian dispersion. With the 1948 rupture
in a social order attached to land ownership, she argues that education became a “lifeline”
amongst the refugee populations, where unemployment was very high.547 Within this
literature lies another approach: an analysis of education’s limited power. Stressing the
Palestinian education’s “unusual development” inside host countries Ibrahim AbuLughod argues that social and economic mobility via education in the Diaspora meant a
loss of traditions and cultural trappings that often accompany the educational process.
Graham-Brown also notes education’s failing by pointing out that it did not significantly
shift the situation for refugees; most remained socially and economically marginalized
within their host countries. Rather, the significance of education was that it was a
“battleground with the Israelis over cultural identity, socio-economic discrimination and
political oppression.”548
In the post-1967 period, the Palestinian university occupies no small place in the
literature. Many scholars examine the university as a site of the cultivation of a “national”
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identity and conceptualization of resistance. At the time of the 1967 Occupation, only
junior colleges and teacher training institutions existed as Palestinian institutions.549 Bir
Zeit, al Najah, Beit Lehem, Gaza and other universities were established after 1967. As
two scholars point out, Israel permitted the creation of Palestinian universities because
they would support the Israeli strategy of forced emigration: a highly-educated
population with no access to work, combined with Israel’s strong grip on the economy so
as to ensure that the Palestinian population was an outlet for products rather than
innovators, would mean that this population would have to go abroad in order to find
work.550 Other scholars focus on the struggle of creating and maintaining these
educational institutions, as well as the benefits they offer. In the 1980s, Gabi Baramki,
former president and scholar at Bit Zeit University, traces the rapid expansion of higher
education in the wake of increasing impediments to Palestinians studying abroad. His
argument revolves around the fact that educational efforts are proof that “Palestinians in
the Territories have been preparing for peace and independence over the last two
decades.”551 Likewise, Penny Johnson, focusing on the slightly later Intifada period,
emphasizes Palestinian commitment and flexibility in the “context of sustained rebellion
crisis.”552 As she points out, education was so important that entire communities launched
grassroots efforts to organize classes in the wake of closures. So, too, Andrew Rigby’s
1995 report portrays education as reflective of the “collective struggle” of Palestinians, as
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evidenced by the neighborhood school systems put in place. His argument, however, is
that the struggle to maintain some educational continuity also helped to “crystallize their
concerns about the nature of schooling in the Territories,” establishing the reform
agenda.553 Ted Swedenburg and Christa Bruhn both emphasize the importance of
Palestinian universities as sites of cultural and revolutionary imagination. Swedenburg
examines universities’ symbols, such as Bir Zeit’s use of the olive tree as a logo, as a way
to show that institutions promoted the local “attachment to the land and a timeless
indigenous culture.”554 More recently, Christa Bruhn (2006) argued that the Palestinian
university was a “vehicle of community empowerment” for social and political change.555
The first third of her article deals with the period in question in this project, 1967-1986,
during which period she says that the early university was the “bearer of national
consciousness.”556 She suggests that the university was part of the post-Occupation trend
of establishing new educational, research, charitable and human rights organizations to
“provide badly needed services to Palestinian communities.”557
Ironically, the Israeli prison can be seen as the answer to several of the
educational challenges Palestinians faced with the Occupation’s onset. First, because the
large Diaspora population meant that Palestinian education became “an essentially
expatriate phenomenon” of individuals who in large numbers continued to identify as
Palestinian refugees, education outside historic Palestine came to be inseparable from the
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implied goal of returning to and building an independent nation.558 Diverse educational
systems in the Diaspora, however, led to an absence of the “imperative” for nation
building, a unified cultural base.559 The prison as educational locale disrupted this
dispersion, providing the missing “base” and centralizing the educational process within
confined sites. Second, these prisons provided a central site for concentrated learning,
both self-directed and instructor led, and was exempt from Jordanian, Egyptian and
Israeli curricular influence. Rather, inside prison walls was the only place where a
curriculum was under the complete supervision of educated Palestinians, without
ministry, board, or governmental considerations. Finally, prison education was
uninterrupted by political events. As mentioned earlier, UNRWA schools and universities
faced the threat of closure when political tensions mounted.560 Educational efforts inside
the prisons were continuous and uninterrupted.
Given the potential and real significance of education of Palestinians prisoners,
these efforts have been largely neglected by scholarship. And yet, the ways in which
prisoners access educational material and what kind of impact such learning has is not a
new topic beyond Palestine. From the inception of the penitentiary in the eighteenth
century, prison administrators and reformers alike have considered how education could
help them reform convicts by inducing “ethical and moral change” in them.561 Focusing
on the eighteenth century, Jodi Schorb argues that “literacy remained a minor refrain in
reformist discourse and the public debates over the purposes, best practices, and social
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good that might come out of the prison,” while many reformers grappled with prison
corruption and excessive filth.562 She says the century witnessed increased interest in and
emphasis on the literate prisoner, albeit with questions surrounding the importance of
literacy education. In his volume Libraries in Prisons, William Coyle argues that what he
calls “bibliotherapy” was key to the penitentiary’s operation from its inception.
According to his analysis, the nineteenth century reformer carefully selected nonsectarian texts, in order to emphasize general moral improvement rather than religious
indoctrination, and intentionally developed controlled reading environments: the prison
library. In the twentieth century, non-western penitentiaries also engaged in attempted
indoctrination of prisoners via reading material.563 For example, in the case of American
POWs captured by Chinese Communists during the Korean War, material included
statistical analyses of their positive economic growth, or tales such as Black Beauty,
which prisoners reportedly realized the Communists included in order to demonstrate
exploitation in other cultures.564 By the second half of the twentieth century, access to
reading material during incarceration was something of a “norm” in places modeled after
the western penitentiary system. Prisoners came to expect basic access to newspapers and
books, with expectations evolving to include the space to organize lessons, and even to
enroll in accredited distance learning programs. In the United States today, prison literacy
programs strive for rehabilitation through books and writing,565 while other programs in
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the United States, United Kingdom and across Europe grant university degrees.566
Notable former prisoners have made their educational journey a theme in their postprison autobiographies.567
This chapter will build on recent scholarship that focuses on the “prison as
university” in colonial and occupation environments. To date, most texts focus on
political prisoners in South Africa, especially Robben Island during Mandela’s time. Fran
Lisa Buntman describes the reading programs prisoners designed to educate their peers
for political resistance. She says “the determination with which prisoners forged and
fought for meaning in their lives in prison was a remarkable act of resistance,” adding
that education symbolized “a refusal to let the state destroy their minds, bodies or
spirits.”568 According to her assessment, Robben Island prisoners were part of a “positive
act of remaking and reconstructing the dominant world.”569 Likewise, Jonathan CharterisBlack also asserts that the prison education was “a way of usurping and challenging the
state’s intention that it should be a place of confinement.”570Aaron Bady shows how
Robben Island University,”571 with prisoners allowed to take correspondence courses
across the disciplines and at multiple universities,572 became something of a prerequisite
for holding a political role post-imprisonment. All three of these scholars emphasize the
transformative impact of education on political prisoners, especially in emphasizing
lifelong learning. Charteris-Black quotes one former inmate eloquently capturing this
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commitment: “they can take us out of Robben Island, but they can’t take Robben Island
out of us.”573
As this chapter will show, what emerged inside Israeli prisons intended for
political prisoners was unprecedented in other contexts, going far beyond that which
grew in places like South Africa. In the remaining pages, I will trace how an educational
system and specific pedagogy evolved on the inside, describing how individual efforts
during the 1970s unfolded an organized, productive, and intellectually inspired system
and curriculum that was codified on paper in the 1980s.

“Faculty Development:” The Birth of a Prison School
The educational program that evolved inside Israeli prisons amongst political
prisoners was a remarkable achievement. By the mid-1980s, clear programs with
established but ever-evolving curricula, a daily structure, and a defined vision, existed
across the prison system as well as across the full spectrum of factions. Given the
complex history of education in Palestine, with multiple stakeholders determining goals
and outcomes, what is most remarkable about the story of how this system came to be is
the way in which it was entirely driven by the prisoners themselves; they were the
impetus behind the concept and its development, thus endowing the imprisoned with a
real sense of autonomy. Intellectual interest and critical engagement were widely
encouraged via private and group study, as well as guided dialogue and debate. With
written documentation not available until the turn of the 1980s, understanding how these
initiatives unfolded necessitates relying on the oral testimony of former prisoners. The
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first half of this section will draw on that of Abu Bakr, Ata Qaymery, Ghassan Khatib,
and Yacoub Odeh, chosen because they speak to the educational experience across
faction lines.574 Not only are these individuals interesting for their role in helping to
formulate educational programming, they also enable a conversation about how the
educational experience inside the prison was a key contributing factor to post-prison
employment and political views. Their testimonies, corroborated by other oral accounts,
help fill a gap in the history of the Palestinian prisoner movement: how the educational
structures inside the prisons evolved and what drove the creation of such expertly
structured, non-degree granting academic programs.
The prison experience, albeit offering a full complement of trying and torturous
treatment, featured two advantages for embarking on educational endeavors: space and
time. As referenced in earlier chapters, the confined space of the prison allowed members
of the highly secretive underground political movements a certain degree of freedom
when it came to revealing their identities. The prison allowed them to know individuals
from beyond their pre-prison locales and to engage in sustained conversation. Thus, these
spaces of constraint and punishment were transformed into places for remarkably open
discussions and debate, which in turn led to a systematization of conversations into
formal lessons. The prisons also offered the highly coveted luxury of time. As referenced
in earlier chapters, the political prisoner’s day required the fulfillment of very few tasks.
Required working hours were short, and by the early 1980s acts of resistance, particularly
hunger strikes, had resulted in prisoners’ control over their own tasks and schedule. The
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combination of these two factors meant that from the very beginning of the Occupation,
with the immediate uptick in the number of prisoners interned in Israeli jails, these open
conversations eventually translated into informally organized educational sessions.
Prisoners had to overcome a host of challenges in order to build the highly
structured educational model in place by the 1980s.575 Interview subjects speak to these
challenges and how the desire to overcome them propelled the prisoners towards
formalizing the curricula, a process inextricably linked to the evolution of general
political structures. In the first years of the Occupation, political prisoners did not have
regular access to books, paper or writing implements.576 Also, illiteracy was rampant,
with many not having reached 12 years of schooling prior to their arrest, an unsurprising
fact given the state of education beyond prison walls discussed earlier in this chapter.577
According to testimony, the high rate of illiteracy was augmented by a profound cultural
knowledge vacuum, with an almost complete absence of understanding of history,
literature, and most significantly, given their political prisoner status, politics.578
Furthermore, especially in the first years of the Occupation, many were still in school at
the time of their arrest and had not yet completed their secondary education. Khatib
recollects that in 1974, his cell consisted almost entirely of high school students, who had
not yet matured intellectually or socially.579
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In these early years, the educated amongst the scores of prisoners quickly realized
that they had something to offer the less scholastically attuned prisoners. The same
individuals who constituted the “individual leadership” discussed in Chapter Three also
took charge of encouraging self-improvement through reading and discussion. Thus,
those who were the “most educated outside,”580 such as Jara’ai and Odeh, were key to
encouraging inmates to embark on self-study.581 The absence of actual materials with
which to work meant the leaders who had something beyond a basic education had to
figure out a way to share their knowledge with their comrades. The first efforts were
unofficial, not framed as “study,” but as a way to bring individuals together to share
ideas, as something to do with one’s abundance of down time. Ex-prisoners report that
the informal lectures and discussions began to take shape within months of the
Occupation, reflecting both need and interest. Palestinian history and politics, as well as
conflict itself were the primary subjects of discussion, with educated prisoners facilitating
and providing context. In these early years, prisoners were not strictly divided according
to factions since this privilege had not been won via hunger striking. Moreover, these
early discussions were entirely secret, often conducted in hushed whispers, shielding the
prisoners’ voices from the prison administration.582 This urge to exchange information
and learn from each other was so strong that it overshadowed the threat of punishment
associated with discovery.
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From the very beginning of the Occupation, learning was embraced as a form of
active resistance.583 An interesting example of this lies in the linguistic dexterity
prisoners cultivated on their own as a way to access the limited material allowed in by the
Israeli administration. Before repeated hunger strikes secured the admittance of reading
material in Arabic, only Hebrew language materials were permitted, intended as a way to
hinder prisoner access to the subject matter. Remarkably, ex-prisoners report that the
administration’s intentions had an effect opposite to that which was intended: they were
inspired to gain new knowledge and skills in the form of language acquisition rather than
being rendered helpless in the face of linguistic opacity. The year 1973 was a turning
point in terms of an influx of information from the outside world, which in turn served as
a spark for widespread language study. It was in this year, with the onset of the Yom
Kippur War in October, that television news was allowed inside many of the prisons.
Inmates were allowed to gather three or four times a day in “a central location,”584 with
the administration’s likely goal to put on display Israel’s successes and power, perhaps
even as an intimidation tactic. Given that the only available news coverage was in
Hebrew, there was a clear impetus for individuals to develop translation skills. According
to Qaymery’s account, the one individual in Ramle prison in 1973 who was capable of
such translation refused to be part of the process, thus compelling him to prepare himself
for that role.585 Without any existing Hebrew language skills, he had to learn the language
from scratch, a task made just slightly easier by the similar root systems of Arabic and
Hebrew. This required a great deal of diligence and self-motivation on the part of those
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who undertook such self-study. Qaymery describes the process as laborious, moving
from translating short articles from the Hebrew newspapers.586 At first, he recalls, it
would take him over two hours to translate a few paragraphs, but within two months he
was issuing a daily news bulletin and was also proficient enough to verbally translate the
gist of television news.
In addition to limited access to media, around this same time the Red Cross
negotiated permission for political prisoners to have books. Not unlike news
programming, prisoners did not get a say in the initial influx of books, the end result of
which was that most were not in Arabic. What this meant is that if they wanted to read,
they had to expand their language capabilities. Rather than being discouraged by this
impediment, many prisoners have reported learning the available texts’ languages, with
the urge to know propelling them through this challenging process of self-education.587 In
Qaymery’s case, in addition to Hebrew, he reminisces about studying French “by my
own for eleven months,” while also attaining a level of reading proficiency in Spanish
and Russian, since he wanted to cultivate a “diversity” of his own “awareness.”588 Those
who had or developed the necessary linguistic skills translated available reading material
into Arabic for the widest possible access. As Qaymery recollects, he “became a
publishing center” of sorts, claiming to have translated thousands of pages of text during
his imprisonment. In the years before the evolution of formal political organization inside
the prisons, people like Qaymery, who were responsible for translating and sharing
information, did not discriminate according to political faction. Without formal programs
586

As will be discussed later, Ramle had a plethora of Hebrew sources, given the mixed prison population, Israelis criminals and
Palestinian political prisoners.
587
Ghassan Khatib, Jabril Rajoub, Ata Qaymery , Adel Samara, and others all learned Hebrew and English inside prison.
588
Qaymery interview.

200

in place designed by political factions, material was shared and actively circulated across
faction lines. As these two examples show, political prisoners undermined Israeli
attempts to control their access to knowledge. Learning languages was one act of
resistance couched in an educational frame.
Beyond training themselves to comprehend and learn from permitted materials,
prisoners also resisted Israeli mind control by undermining the rules and regulations for
accessing reading material. Even with Red Cross-assisted access to books and
newspapers, the Israelis invoked strict censorship rules. Texts perceived as politically
incendiary were blocked from official entry and required smuggling. When Arabic
newspapers were allowed in, they, too, were censored. Odeh recalls that even when a
prisoner managed to get a hold of copies, entire articles were excised, leaving gaping
holes.589 During the 1970s, prisoners devised clever ways of getting access to the written
material they most desired. One method was seemingly above board: prisoners would
provide lists to their family and friends of books that they wanted delivered to the Red
Cross, since the organization was the only official channel for moving intellectual
materials; then, prior to drop off, book covers that might invite censorship would be
carefully and expertly swapped out for less inflammatory covers. According to prisoner
accounts, the Israelis did not even bother opening Arabic books, paying attention only to
the cover.590 As Jara’ai reminisced, it was through this method that they managed to bring
in a book entitled “Palestinian without an Identity Card,” by a well-known Fatah leader
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who was later assassinated in Tunis. Had the Israelis paid attention, they would have
found the text incendiary, he said. Another way around censorship was via Ramle, key to
the effort of moving intellectual material, representing a kind of book laundering site.
Because Ramle housed Israeli criminal prisoners in the same complex as Palestinian
“security” prisoners, two systems of treatment operated simultaneously, but not
impenetrably. As Qaymery noted in one conversation, “Ramle was 10 years advanced in
everything” because of this fact.591 The presence of the criminal prisoners meant that
Ramle had an Israeli Cultural Officer, who was the point of contact for books requests
and was responsible for stocking the library intended for the criminals’ use. Although
unintentional, this access benefited the Palestinian detainees as well. As mentioned
earlier, Ramle was also a “transit prison,” through which every political prisoner passed
either en route to the prison to which he was sentenced or when transferred to the hospital
for medical treatment. According to prisoner testimony, the more sneaky and convincing
amongst them sometimes managed to smuggle books out intact: those who were sent to
the hospital at Ramle would convince the guards they had brought a particular book with
them, and would then take it back to their point of origin after being discharged.
According to Jara’ai, so long as the books were not related to security or political
nationalism, the authorities tended to turn the other cheek. A more reliable method of
transport, as discussed at length in Chapter Three, was via kabsulih. With Ramle’s
diverse collection, Palestinian prisoners copied out entire books in microscopic
handwriting, tightly wrapped individual pages in plastic and swallowed them to be
transported via bodies leaving the hospital bound for other prisons. Books by notable
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political prisoners, such as Twelve Years in Prison by William Naguib Nassar, were
smuggled out piecemeal in this way.592
Prisoners’ ultimate act of resistance was not allowing the Israelis to break their
spirits; education was key to this effort. From the moment reading and writing materials
began to appear, intellectual preoccupations became the saving grace of the prison
experience. For starters, books were a means of escape. Many prisoners embraced
knowledge acquisition as a distraction from the miserable circumstances of the prison,
and as a way to, even fleetingly, undermine the deprivation that comes with curtailed
freedom of movement, severely limited rights, and regular physical suffering. In
Qaymery’s case, language learning was a salve. Reflecting back on the process of
learning Hebrew, French, English, Spanish, and Russian, he asserts: “every language I
learn will add another Ata, so I can live more and be happier.” Although a simple
statement, when I probed him on this, it was clear that Qaymery sought something more
than escape through this linguistic layering. Hebrew, for example, allowed him to “see”
the Occupier more clearly. Reading has a similar effect on him. Qaymery recalls Alex
Haley’s novel Roots: the Saga of an American Family as particularly poignant. He says
this book “so affected and enchanted” him that he felt he was a part of this slave drama,
living the experience. Through language study and enthusiastic and constant reading,
Qaymery says he was “re-educated” to have “no hatred towards the occupier because [he]
can put [himself] in his shoes.”593 Likewise, Jabril Rajoub, now a member of Fatah’s
Central Committee, a PA minister, and faculty at Al Quds University, studied Israeli
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politics through an in-prison degree program as a way to “know” his enemy.594 Qaymery
addressed the complications afoot when study breeds understanding of something
seemingly foreign and even evil, such as the Occupation. He notes that such learning
leads to one’s own evolution and change. Although some might mourn the loss of their
own “identity,” he convincingly argues that by cultivating empathy “you double your
humanity.” He believes that by learning the language of the occupier, he learned to
understand more about Israel and what it represents, relieving him of many of his own
oppressive feelings: “if you understand your enemy, you can’t hate.” From Qaymery’s
perspective, this gift of comprehension, given to him by the prison system is
unprecedented, unrivaled and precious. Not only was his spirit unbroken, he grew as an
individual.
As the 1970s wore on and the individual leadership was replaced by an organized
and elected group leadership, educational programming also came to be more formal,
structured, and widespread. It morphed from an individually motivated mission to learn,
such as we saw with Qaymery’s acquisition of multiple languages, into agreed upon
faction-specific programs in which all members were expected to participate. The
physical isolation from the outside Fatah movement, among other influences, led to
relative intellectual freedom for those who designed and oversaw the educational
program; factors influencing and politicizing education, discussed in the previous section,
were rendered irrelevant inside the prisons. Thus, the prison as an educational site
allowed for clear definition and easy oversight of the evolving written curricula. The next
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section will analyze in detail the curriculum and the committee behind it, both of which
speak to remarkable prisoner innovation and agency.

The Cultural Committees’ Guidelines: Shaping Political Actors
By the early 1980s, formal educational programs were in place in many prisons
across Israel and the West Bank, having evolved in tandem with the defined political
hierarchies for each faction discussed in Chapter Three. Fatah, the PFLP, and the
Communists oversaw their own programs, educating members according to their own
principles and agendas.595 Fatah members actively inscribed clear curricular guidelines
and participation expectations into available copybooks, intended for circulation amongst
all members. Surviving documents, many of which were products of prison Cultural
Committees and date to around the First Intifada, illuminate codified cultural-educational
structures that emerged over the course of two decades. Although this project’s cut-off
date of 1985 precedes some of these writings, the material is valuable for understanding
the scope of the system the prisoners were able to create. This chapter will examine three
of Fatah’s Cultural Committee documents in detail, while referencing other documents as
well as interviews to corroborate the writings’ assertions. Of the three documents under
consideration, their points of origin are not attributable to a particular prison or person,
and only two out of the three can be dated. However, all three represent a culmination of
over a decade of cooperative work and planning conversations. Similar to the documents
concerning political structures discussed in Chapter Three, anonymity and obscured
595

Built alongside the unfolding political organization, educational programs were also formalized in the large prisons intended for
long sentences, especially Beer Saba’ and Asqalon. After its 1980 inauguration, Nafha became a key site of educational advancement,
especially since the initial cohort of prisoners consisted of those who had become powerful leaders inside the prisons during the
1970s. Ata Qaymery, Sami al Jundi, and Radi Jara’ai all speak to this.

205

publication dates hint at a kind of timelessness and the intention to frame these writings
as active and in continuous use. A textured reading reveals the following about the
prisoners belonging to the Fatah movement inside the prisons: a deep commitment to
education as a form of resistance inside the prisons; a desire to cultivate and propagate a
Fatah world view amongst members, which was centered on resistance; and an urge to
produce a generation of revolutionaries deeply and broadly educated in politics, history,
culture, economics, among other subjects, who would continue Fatah’s mission after their
release. In examining these sources, it is also clear that education was a site of control
and self-preservation for the prisoners. The resulting curriculum and cultural programs
were intellectually rigorous, physically and mentally intense, and highly regimented. By
the 1980s, the system answered the call of Fatah’s Central Committee for imprisoned
brothers to “drink out of the glass of education.”596
The importance prisoners placed on knowledge acquisition is evident in the
defined structures they advanced to support education, as reflected in Cultural
Committees’ publications, including “Fatah, The Palestinian National Liberation
Movement: The General Cultural System” (GCS) and an untitled pamphlet addressed to
“Revolutionary Brothers” (RB).597 Both of these texts speak to a clearly outlined
leadership structure overseeing educational programming. As briefly discussed in
Chapter Three, RB confirmed that the Cultural Committee, a sub-committee of the
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Central Committee, was responsible for administering educational endeavors.598 Headed
by a designated member of the Central Committee, he would in turn propose a list of
three to five individuals with whom he would like to cooperate on executing the group’s
tasks, selected according to skill sets and individual strengths. The head of the
committee’s role was to act as a kind of stage manager of sorts; to oversee the continuous
development of the curriculum and to maintain general participation in what emerged as
a complex system geared towards a broad education and cultural engagement inside each
prison. This list would be submitted to the Central Committee for approval.599 Within the
Cultural Committee, each member occupied a particular sub-post, which included the
following positions: one person coordinated issuing the monthly magazine, including
calling for articles, selecting the most fitting proposals, inviting individuals to help edit,
and ensuring the production of two to three copies that are then distributed to each
section of the jail; a second coordinated the classes and the teaching in the cells; a third
selected the pamphlets for the curriculum and oversaw the drafting of new curricular
materials for inclusion; and a fourth individual was responsible for “keeping up with
daily political events, extracting them, and rephrasing them with the right, beneficial
form,” including translating from Hebrew and English language newspapers and books
admitted to the prison via the Red Cross.600 Because each of the individuals in these subcommittees must coordinate with others in the prison in order to carry out their jobs, this
pyramid-style organization invites both formal and informal participation, and thus the
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buy-in, of a large number of prisoners. The writers asked that “our brothers who are
responsible in the program to look over the details of the program and its mechanisms, so
they can understand the bigger picture” and act accordingly.601 Thus, it is clear that these
documents were not merely for historical record. Rather, they were intended to be an
instructional guide for those who would lead and participate in the educational program.
Documents unmistakably suggest that partaking in the various in-prison
educational offerings was not optional; rather it was key to being a member of the
resistance and the Fatah movement inside the prisons. As the General Cultural Plan
(GCP) says: “working on the cultural awareness of the prisoner is an essential part of the
prisoner’s life; it is the spiritual supplement, and the essence of our daily life inside these
closed doors.”602 All Fatah members were expected to participate fully in the lessons as a
way to demonstrate commitment to self-improvement. The language of the Cultural
Committee’s writings is both invitational and insistent, underscoring the importance, or
even the necessity, of active and mindful involvement. To that end, the opening passage
asserts the group’s commitment to “integrating the biggest number of brothers…within
different and various programs.”603 There is a performative flair to the writing style of
many of the documents: long sentences, language that is imbued with invitations to
greatness, references to something far larger than that which is contained within prison
walls. For example, RB opens by addressing Fatah’s “glorified” and “revolutionist
brothers” as “knights of generosity and sacrifice” for the “revolution” writ large.604 It is
clear from the beginning of the text that the reader is directly invoked and expected to be
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working towards and sacrificing for “great victory” within the frame of the revolution.
The pamphlet’s motivation seems to be to explain the evolution and purpose of the
system, but more significantly and urgently to compel participation. When it describes
the importance of the educational program, the writer(s) directly address the reader: “we
see you as the cornerstone” of the “project” and “its success.” It goes on to say that
through “your creative response and constructive commitment” the project will be a
success.605 One can read this use of language as setting up an expectation of participation
as key to the success of creating a prisoner movement inside the jails. Full participation
means being able to “give back” to the Fatah movement by being part of the “ongoing
development” of the movement’s organization, as well as supporting the maintenance of
order inside the prisons.606 The educational program and a Fatah member’s participation
in it is “a service,” says the document. The pressure is on the individual to make a
“conscious commitment” to the educational program with the intention of leaving
“positive traces” on the organization by contributing to the faction’s political evolution.
Such assumed participation of everyone in the prison was one of the strengths of the
movement in the first two decades after the beginning of the Occupation.
Former members of Cultural Committees stress that as leaders they believed
rigorous education was the only way to ensure meaningful participation of their peers in
the highly organized political system, and thus was essential to maintaining inter-faction
calm in the face of prison administrators and the Zionist government. Like the documents
discussed in Chapter Three, these, too, emphasize unity as key to Fatah’s worldview and
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agenda. Anonymity, for example, speaks to the prisoners striving for unity. Also, these
writers employ the collective plural, “our” and “we,” also a nod towards collectivity and
shared responsibility for the program. Indeed, the document emphasizes “we decided
within the framework of the Central Committee to begin the process of planning and
setting up a tactical cultural program.”607 In defense of the programming, and of the
Central Committee’s need to walk a very fine line between leading and inviting wide
participation, the pamphlet’s drafters emphasize that the plans come from a deep seated
belief in the “the importance of managing our time, studies, and being consciously
invested” in Fatah. Thus, they say, the Central Committee’s urge to establish an
educational plan allowed all staff to work together to cultivate an “atmosphere filled with
productive vividness and energy,” moving prisoners “away from an atmosphere of
laziness.”608 The educational program is thus framed as having been developed by
consensus, and also overseen by those chosen by the majority.
Beyond emphasizing inter- and intra-faction unity, the Cultural Committee
propounded to be a key player in “construct(ing) the Fatawi character,” which in turn
would have an impact on individuals beyond prison walls.609 The documents describe the
Fatawi and his mission in general terms: he should be “capable of getting into the forms
of united struggle with a distinguished, confident and clear way” including tackling “any
circumstances, conditions or obstacles that might come up through the path of
struggle.”610 In short, he should be a revolutionary, committed to the resistance and to
fighting the Occupation and the Israeli state. In order to fight against this oppression, the
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individual required education/cultural awareness, which led to what the writers call
“revolutionary awareness,” the “strongest weapon to face the enemy” since it is “very
essential and it is a basic weapon for the fighters outside the prison in their battles.”611
Being a good Fatah member inside the prison also meant building one’s character in
preparation for post-prison existence. Thus, a primary goal of the Cultural Committee
was to prepare men to “carry the great Fatah message…and to lead the Palestinian public
by the struggle experience and the consciousness that [they] accumulate through long
years of struggle.”612 Educational efforts should “build cadre of qualified fighters who
have the energy and the capability to fight and survive in any confrontation.”
Interestingly, however, since “fighters” are studying behind prison walls, this power
comes not from military training, but from knowledge acquisition. Documents clearly
indicate that building a fighter’s character includes cultivating some of the following
characteristics through education:
1) A deep understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict, “[reinforcing] the revolutionary
culture by learning from the experiences of the Palestinian people in all levels and
all times, and the experiences of other struggling nations,” and “[applying] the
Fatah mentality to treat and analyze all of the Arab and Palestinian developments
and issues;”613
2) To “solidify and reinforce the politically committee participation to our
organization with what agrees with the political movement’s positions;”614
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3) “The organizational, political, mental, and cultural nature of the organizational
base, based on the rule of total commitment to the movement and its regulations
and laws based on total respect and discipline to achieve a united body that can
represent and serve all the members of the movement.”
The goal of this “cultural revolution” was to “construct the Fatawi Struggler into an
individual who was constantly able to give back, supported by his practical and solid
experience” and based on “the well built foundation that is framed within specific
standards and conditions that the nature of Fatah’s organizing and practical work
demands.”615 And thus, the major aims of education were “to immunize the fighters in the
revolutionary movement with the beliefs and principles of Fatah,” and to prepare
prisoners to be productive community members in their lives outside prison, as well as to
understand proper resistance and how to build it.616
According to these documents, shaping Fatah prisoners into political actors and
resistance fighters meant having a solid leadership structure in place, which could
establish markers of intellectual and cultural achievement. Creating revolutionary cadres
resembling those to which the documents referred required a great deal of commitment
on the part of the leadership and the prisoners alike. This commitment manifested itself
in the complex and multi-faceted educational system that emerged by the 1980s, the
subject of the next section.

The Prison as School House
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Most prisoners entered the system without a working knowledge of Fatah, its
history, belief system and outlined goals. Moreover, the average understanding of an
individual proclaiming to be a member of the faction did not go beyond the very surface
understanding of a desire to fight Israel as part of the resistance.617 Without deep
knowledge of the faction, how could individuals truly be part of a resistance movement?
And with what, precisely, were they identifying, if anything at all? To make matters
worse, as mentioned earlier, many came in with only the most basic education, while
reportedly a significant number were even illiterate. Given the ambitious goals discussed
in the previous section, of building a cadre of intellectually and culturally prepared
fighters, those individuals who did have a strong educational background believed that
systematically acquiring knowledge was urgent to Fatah’s mission, but also to
maintaining calm within the prisons by keeping prisoners’ time occupied. To achieve the
aforementioned goals, those spearheading the making of an educational system had their
work cut out for them. Thus, a pressing desire to politically and intellectually prepare
Fatah members was a primary driving force for the evolution of the faction’s formalized
educational program inside prisons.618
To support the construction of solid Fatah members, the Cultural Committee
formalized a complex, detailed, multi-level curriculum. They created courses that lasted
six months each, with accompanying book lists.619 The first level, the starting point for
the prisoner’s education, was a delicate balance of general historical background on
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Palestine and “great books” with a razor sharp focus on the particularities of Fatah’s
movement (see photo on page 206).620 Indeed, Sami al Jundi recalls in his biography that
Fatah leaders would first assign something tedious and demanding followed by poetry or
a novel as a reward.621 One Fatah document lists the curricular topics in the following
order: internal prison regulations and Fatah’s regulations;622 the Fatah movement’s
pamphlets, as well as related ideological, political and regulatory pamphlets; “useful
security materials;” cultural, literary, ideological, and political publications chosen by the
cultural committee; and “a collection of valuable and books deemed purposeful on many
levels.”623 Another document, likely from a different prison, speaks to a similar
breakdown, noting that the materials included in the first level should address the
following topics:
1) The origin of the movement
2) The internal system
3) The Fatah revolutionary theory
4) The fifth movement conference
5) The Revolution path roles
6) Palestine throughout history
7) Palestinian geography
8) The security of the Intifada624
Notably, these two lists of topics from different documents, likely taken from
different prisons, allowed for a great deal of curricular flexibility. There are several
reasons for several this: first, the lists gave space for the curriculum to evolve based
upon the production of new political materials in the Diaspora and inside the prisons;
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secondly, they permitted the shaping of the curriculum based on what was accessible
via smuggling, the Red Cross, and book requests; third, categories such as “books
deemed purposeful” allowed for adjustment according to the evolving political
situation, in terms of the conflict, the eruption of wars, and even the ever changing
international context especially in relation to Third World movements. Fatah’s
regulations are also broadly mentioned, in large part because resolutions from the
outside took a circuitous path to the prisoners. The main point of entry for these
formal Fatah publications was the Ramle prison library. Interestingly, the documents
were admitted to the stacks in Hebrew, having been translated from the Arabic
outside prison walls. Once inside, political prisoners literate in Hebrew gained access
and translated them back into Arabic, after which other prisoners copied them in near
microscopic handwriting onto flimsy paper that was then folded and transported via
kabsulih to other prisons. The aforementioned William Nassar was key to this
translation project in the first part of the 1970s.625
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Selection from a book list dating to around the First Intifada626

Once prisoners were “qualified enough culturally and politically” to join the
second level, the curriculum expanded beyond Fatah and its features, while continuing to
emphasize the importance of keeping up with the movement.627 As the below list of
topics shows, prisoners were expected to delve deeper into topics, and also to think
beyond Palestine. Materials are divided into three categories: “Movement materials,”
“Zionism materials,” “A group of books about Arabic nationalism and other topics,” and
“Revolutionary experiences and movements.”628 With a solid base in the Fatah movement
as well as Palestinian history, prisoners had to expand their study into lesser-known
areas. Beyond the prescribed topics, both the first and second levels list book titles
available for self-study. These lists are lengthy, with the second level alone featuring 63
titles, ranging from The Democratic Yemen to “The Geneva Agreements.”629
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The Second Level list of “movement materials”630
Several prisoners spoke to the breakdown of the curriculum in terms that
complement the available documentation. Some reflected that the reading list was
grouped into regional concerns and issues, with Palestinian history and politics being the
first focus.631 Jara’ai described the educational program to me using visuals; he drew a
series of “circles.” According to his description, the prisoners studied texts that were
grouped according to the following breakdown: the Palestinian circle, the Arab circle, the
international circle (focused on international revolutions) and the Israeli circle.632 All
prisoners reportedly began with months of texts, questions, and discussions related to the
Palestinian circle. Within Fatah’s rooms, this also included studying the movement’s
beliefs, structures, and ideological underpinnings in detail. Then they moved onto the
wider Arab circle, which invited discussions of topics such as Baathism, Nasserism, the
nation state, among other topics related to the Arab world. According to Jara’ai, these
circles featured defined goals, which included theoretical background and enough
630
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evidence and other material to “enable one to be able to defend his thoughts to other
groups.”633 Ultimately, framing the curriculum as circles allowed for the Cultural
Committee to select from the material available at the time. These circles also allowed for
an interesting intellectual innovation. According to one Cultural Committee’s “work
plans,” by beginning with the Palestinian circle and Fatah’s ideology, the intention was to
“employ the movement’s literature in analyzing the political oscillations that are going on
in the region in particular, and in the world generally.”634
Curricula extended beyond political and historical texts to include books dealing
with a wide range of subjects, from sociology and psychology to prose and poetry. The
above image shows a selection of texts and is followed by additional pages that include
texts ranging from The Prince, The Iliad, Crime and Punishment to Descartes and
Introduction to Sociology.635 Many texts on the extensive reading list reflect a respect for
cultural production beyond the Arab world, an interest in places that will provide a view
into worlds that don’t face comparable challenges of occupation.636 The entire curricula is
divided into three sections: first, fifty-two “Pamphlets” composed by prisoners and
widely circulated, with some even making it to other prisons. Some of the titles include:
“The Fifth General Conference and the Committee’s Work,” focused on the 1989 Fatah
gathering; “The Zionist’s Media,” “Palestinian-Jordanian Relations,” “Palestine and
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Europe,” and “This is How the Vietcong Prevailed.” The second group of texts included
eight notebooks of Regulations, with which prisoners must familiarize themselves as part
of their education. These include “Jneid Prison’s Internal Regulations,” “Other Prisons’
Internal Regulations,” and Constitutions for the Cultural, Struggle and Security
Committees. The educational system encouraged the development of rule abiding
prisoners who were committed to the agreed upon and politically motivated prison
regulations, as opposed to familiarizing themselves with outside rules. The full book list,
which follows the lists of pamphlets and regulations, includes 100 books, drawn from a
variety of disciplines. Although undoubtedly shaped by the availability of titles, book
requests were frequently honored by the late 1980s.637 This list reflects an internationally
minded prisoner mindset, with a hunger for both comparative contexts as well as cultural
experience.638
The formal educational program has been described verbally and in writing as
highly organized and scheduled; one plan opens with the claim that the it is “a
comprehensive cultural program that consists of a group of aims, tools and mechanisms
in order to organize the prisoners’ lives in detention by programming and organizing their
daily lives in the prison…”639 Within a given curriculum, prisoners had six months to
complete each level, before moving onto the next, with each level beginning on a sixmonth rotation.640 According to surviving documentation, as well as interviews, the
decision to operate according to semesters was intentional and well thought through. A
document circulated amongst the prisoners from 1992 explained the importance of
637
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sticking to this schedule that had evolved since the late 1970s “so we won’t be standing
still without feeling the clear outcomes of every program, activity, or any course that we
do.”641 In the case of this particular year, the semester dates are set: “the first course starts
1-7-1992 and ends 1-1-1993. At the end of it we will graduate all brothers who
participated in the program…the break between the two courses will be 15 days for the
brothers to catch their breath and to be mentally prepared for the new course that will
start 15-1-1994 and end 15-6-1993.”642 Not only does this offer consistency to the
prisoners, the writers also emphasized that clear semesters allowed the teachers and the
Cultural Committee a sense of “where to begin and where to end” with the material, as
well as to later reflect on the course’s obstacles, how to overcome them, and how the
course can be expanded in the future.643 Because neither the Cultural Committee nor
instructors could account for when new prisoners would enter a given prison, one could
join the appropriate level even in its midst.644 In order to pass onto the next, however, the
individual had to compensate for what had already been covered through individual study
and additional writing assignments, or else repeat the level when the next round began.
According to Sami Al Jundi, in the 1980s it took about three years to complete the entire
curriculum, a short amount of time in comparison with most prison sentences of that era.
Discipline was critical to building good Fatah revolutionaries, emphasized via
defined curricula and segmented days. In one prison, prisoners published a “weekly table
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for the session and the suggested material” for each curricular level.645 For the first level,
the six-day per week schedule fore grounded sessions on the Fatah movement, with two
sessions per day, three days per week. On the other three days, prisoners participated in
“an administration or struggle session,” a Palestinian history/geography class, and one
open session during which prisoners lead the discussion on what they had read during the
week.646

Upon reaching the second level, sessions were only once per day, five days per week,
allowing for more time for individual and self-guided study.
After an individual finished with the formal courses, he could read whatever he
wanted.647 In Sami’s case, he chose to read about Vietnam, studying its history and
revolutionary movement.648 Alongside formal courses, there was space in the day for
guided “self-education.” According to interview subjects, the Cultural Committee would
solicit from the prisoners what they wanted to learn. They capitalized on the voracious
reading habits of many of their comrades. Qaymery’s habit to “read 12 hours every day,
from 6 am until 10 pm” was not unusual, and was reiterated by many interview subjects,
645
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although perhaps with less flourish. With grand sweeping hand gestures, he reported to
me that he read every single book and newspaper the Red Cross brought in, “one by one,
hundreds and hundreds of books.” Al Jundi also declared that he always had a book in his
hand. During an interview he reeled off a diverse and extensive list of challenging texts
he read in prison, many of which he recreates at the back of his co-authored book, The
Hour of Sunlight. Once there were five or so prisoners interested in a subject, the head of
the Cultural Committee would find a lecturer capable of overseeing the reading and
guiding the discussion. The Committee also needed to bring books in related to the
subject so that the lecturer could prepare. For example, Jara’ai recalls that when he was
head of the Cultural Committee, many prisoners were interested in economics as well as
psychology; he helped create daily study groups for both topics.649 Even after completing
the formal curriculum, ex-prisoners report reading hundreds of pages per day, devouring
books as quickly as they entered the prison. This is a testament to the Cultural
Committee’s success in developing a program that not only established a baseline
education, but also sparked genuine interest in and enthusiasm for knowledge acquisition.
A remarkable aspect of this education in contrast with that outside the prisons is the very
text-based approach. Palestinian high schools and universities are not known for
cultivating a love of reading, and certainly not for stimulating individually driven study.
The establishment of a structured educational plan meant that the instructor’s role
was also defined in writing. Guidelines encouraged careful observation and tracking, as
well as a more nuanced advising role. On one hand, he is required to proctor exams,
gather, edit and submit to the Cultural Committee all newly written material produced by
649
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his “students,” and put in place “self-study materials,”650 walking a line between
oversight and flexibility.651 On the other hand, instructors supervise the course and the
“productivity of the brothers’ work,” “offer advice and help in supporting the success of
the course, and take initiative for any creative step that would help,” to look for ways to
“serve the process of education in a more positive context,” to “benefit as much as
possible from the first experiment,” and to “employ any and every potential energy to
serve the course and its members.”652 Documents indicate that oversight was needed to
encourage a commitment to reading and study. Cell supervisors, reporting to the Cultural
Committee, played key roles in encouragement: they worked to create a “quiet and
competitive atmosphere to encourage the members to read and participate more in the
cultural activities.”653 Furthermore, Cultural Committee plans make it abundantly clear
that education was not a choice. As one document emphasizes:
The morning reading time starts after the end of
the counting process. The last prisoner wakes up at
8:00 in the morning and then the self-reading time
starts without laziness. No excuses are acceptable.
Breakfast and sports times are all independent from
the reading time and no one can skip this reading time.
The process should go smoothly without creating tension
or disruption in the cell.654
Scholarly and cultural engagement was framed as a prisoner obligation, as part of the
resistance. Indeed, the leadership, and the drafters of the documents, argued that “the
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time spent in prison is not considered an excuse to ignore the cultural activities or to
exclude oneself from the daily readings.”655
Beyond general education to which the entire prison population had access, Fatah
also organized courses to better prepare their “brothers” to take on committee tasks. By
the 1980s, the “political education section” of the Cultural Committee oversaw the
preparation of Fatah members for political leadership within the prisons. Like other Fatah
endeavors, this, too, is highly structured and well documented in writing. Prison writings
point to expectations for both instructors and participants, outlining the tasks for both in a
way that balances between clearly defined markers of achievement and enough
vagueness and flexibility to allow for changes according to access to texts, as well as for
individual influence and shaping. In particular, this “section” oversaw what Fatah calls
the “political cadre course.” This course, and others like it, was advanced, intended for
those who passed all of the general education courses. In documentation referencing this
course, it explains how it worked in a particular prison in 1992. The course consistsed of
15 brothers, five from each of the “three wings in the eastern hall,” undergoing education
towards “specific political qualification.”656 Mimicking a university, there is a prerequisite for this course; a footnote in the document states that all of the participants must
have graduated from the “pedagogical cadre course.”657 What this indicates is that they
must have prepared to be instructors, to be capable of being a functioning member of the
Cultural Committee, before moving onto formal political training. As part of this
program, Fatah members also had to brush up on their formal Arabic language skills.
655
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Interestingly, the explicit emphasis in this course is on “quality, not quantity;” although
participants “will be taking regular exams,” a greater emphasis is placed on participants
being capable of “literary invention” than on only being able “to understand the
knowledge of the course.”658
Similar to other prison courses, this, too, necessitates a great deal of motivation
and individual study, including: keeping up with political events “on every level and
through all the available resources;” rephrasing in writing the week’s main events;
written summaries of published political materials and the main ideas of past and present
circulated political pamphlets; and producing regular written commentary, editorial in
nature, on political topics selected by the instructors.659 Although these requirements are
fulfilled through self-study, they are also monitored by instructors and accompanied by
regular deadlines, established in the written guidelines. For example, in the prison
referenced in this document the overview of the week’s main events was due at the end of
each week, while the summaries of published political materials were due within the first
three days of each week. Like an independent study course in a contemporary university
setting, these deadlines ensure regular check-ins with a leader from the political
education section. Furthermore, the course sets regular exams, which the prisoners must
pass in order to continue their study. A third component of monitoring was the major
milestone for the advanced level: the production of a lengthy “written project” that was
“examined by a special committee to grade it and to graduate the member of the
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course.”660 This research project was framed as similar to a Masters thesis in that
participants would write about subjects that were not yet studied, as identified by the
“section,” and must include as thorough of a review of outside sources and opinions that
was possible within the constrains of the prison.661 Indeed, the guidelines suggest that a
comparison between authors would be an appropriate framework for the project, hinting
at a kind of literature review or historiography.
As with the foundational curricula, these Fatah guidelines balance between
directed study and a degree of flexibility. Unlike a MA thesis, the political awareness
section would identify the gaps about which advanced prisoners should write, limiting
choice and the freedom to explore. In part, this is because a key requirement was that the
research must be a “conscious representation of the movement’s perspective of a certain
subject.” Thus, this advanced research was not solely for individual development, but for
a purpose beyond the self, that of the movement.662 Also, regulation of the project was
important because this written material, once evaluated, became part of the library,
putting it into circulation, possibly across the prison system. Given the eventual public
nature of this material, the political awareness section edited and “certified” the final
product, underscoring the group dynamic of the process. Significantly, this project was
intended to go beyond an exercise in demonstrating research and writing skills to
innovation and a contribution to the ongoing dialogue inside the prison. After finishing
this course, a Fatah member would be fully prepared to engage with complicated political
material for the purposes of analysis and commentary.
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To advance the general mission, the Cultural Committee’s sub-committee
“political awareness section,” a “specialized team within the field of political education”
was critical to cultivating a Fatah vision and view.663 This group consists of “three
brothers who are politically qualified with the ability of keeping up with the daily
political events,” including the news in multiple languages. They were chosen according
to their ability to extract and rephrase the political materials without “exaggeration,
emotions, or condescension,” and to do so by “ignor(ing) the influence of the media’s
war against political distortion by rephrasing the material, filtering it and including it
within the context of the general national struggle or the Fatah movement’s struggle.”664
This analysis was used in several ways: for the circulated weekly new analysis, to
formulate and edit articles on political questions for the monthly magazine, Fajr al
Asefah (The Dawn of the Storm), and to write articles on political issues to include in
courses. In addition, these individuals helped oversee the political cadre course, including
following up on the proper use of materials to ensure the course’s success. Finally, this
team was responsible for ensuring that all official material coming from Fatah’s
institutions was properly incorporated into their analysis, articles, seminars, and
lectures.665 Thus, those involved in issues surrounding political awareness had a great
deal of power.
By the late 1970s, in addition to implementing a structured plan for completing
the “courses,” the day itself was also high regimented and dominated by educational
endeavors. Each block of time was intended for different activities. Mornings were spent
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in “classes,” with prisoners moving between different rooms within their section
according to the class they were attending. By the 1980s, prisoners had won the right
through hunger strikes to move between rooms within prisons. Former prisoners give
different accounts of the amount of time spent in these classes, with some indicating that
there were two three hour classes per day and others indicating that the classes were
around two hours each.666 The specifics are less important than the fact that multiple
hours per day were spent in deep and engaged discussion amongst the prisoners over a
particular text and topic. Even outside teaching hours, education and cultural
improvement was woven into the fabric of the prisoner’s life. Prisoners across the system
had been granted an hour of Arabic language news and the radio’s daily Um Kulthum
hour of song, broadcast over a prison intercom system of sorts, and to which rooms
would listen together as a group. Many days concluded with an evening lecture on a
subject determined by the cell leader. According to oral accounts, Palestinian resistance
and cultural questions were the most popular topics, with the political awareness section
organizing seminars about “the most distinguished political events that are happening on
the local, Arab world or international levels.”667 Apart from this, there were weekly news
analysis meetings, based on the summaries and commentaries prepared by the political
awareness section. In addition, the prisoners engaged in what was called the “weekly
criticism circle.” This activity took place within each room, the smallest unit in the
prison. As interview subjects described it, each person would publicly reflect on their
general performance, behavior, and actions that week, pointing to weaknesses and areas
666

Sami Al Jundi, Radi Jara’ai and Ata Qaymery all speak to the number of hours in class.
AG 13-3-1-133, section 3. In the prison under discussion in this document, this political discussion was scheduled for every
Saturday.
667

228

in need of improvement. Once an individual had engaged in the process of self-reflection,
the others would contribute by pointing to the individual’s positive character
developments over the course of the week, as well as places in need of improvement. For
example, the group might note that the prisoner engaged in self-reflection was not
attentive to his studies during the week. Alternately, they might comment on how the
person in question did not do a good job of cleaning the room or did not wake early
enough to make the tea.668 This activity often served as a jumping off point for wider
discussion about how the prisoners could continue to cultivate positive personality traits,
dedication to educational achievement, and proper treatment of their cell and section
mates in the spirit of unity.
Over the course of the decade and a half during which prisoners were actively
building the prison organization and developing their educational system, they wrote
hundreds of pamphlets intended to supplement the books allowed or smuggled into the
prisons. They built their own library of prisoner produced materials, focusing on
historical, political and cultural topics. Like other prison documents, the majority of these
educational texts are undated and anonymous, keeping the authors safe, but also
underscoring the fact that content rather than authorship was the determining factor. This
system was meant to be faceless, to locate success broadly in rooms and cells, in the
movement rather than individuals. According to interview subjects, many educated
prisoners wrote material about the political context of Palestine, which was then used in
the general education courses. One surviving document recaps the political context in
Palestine between 1848 and 1967, with an emphasis on the relationship between Palestine
668
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and the rest of the Arab world. The pamphlet asserts that the “Arabic military” – or the
entire Arab world – failed the Palestinians. To expound upon this point, the pamphlet
gives an overview of the formation of the PLO and the Arab world’s part in that, the Suez
crisis, and the relationship between Ahmad al Shaqairy and Egypt’s Nassar.669
Supplementing writings on the Palestinian context and history were pamphlets intended
to teach prisoners about Fatah’s history, goals, and approach to executing the revolution.
One such pamphlet gives a detailed account of the “rules of the revolutionary path,”
emphasizing Fatah’s conviction that “faith in victory and a willingness to sacrifice” are
among the most important.670 This text also touches on the public aspect of the
revolution, reminding prisoners that their movement was not, and should not, remain
isolated within prisons, but should be in dialogue with the outside movement ensuring
that those beyond prison; it was the prisoners’ responsibility to communicate this, since
“the weapon of the revolution is humans themselves.”671 Likewise, the prisoners
regularly produced and circulated “magazines.” One such magazine, dating to the First
Intifada, commemorates the anniversary of the founding of the Fatah movement, through
prose, poems, and an interview with a Fatah prisoner who participated in the Intifada.672
This particular magazine also addresses the relationships forged between Fatah prisoners
with newly acquired access to television.673 Other pamphlets still summarized
complicated texts, serving as a kind of cliff notes version of them. For example, one
pamphlet recaps a book written about Mossad by Victor Ostovsky. The writer gives an
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overview of how Mossad recruits, trains, and executes its plans by stationing agents
around the world and operating according to the motto “shoot first, ask questions later.”
The writer also emphasizes the agency’s academic preparation, which includes studying
Islamic theology and reading the Arabic press. The pamphlet is intended to give prisoners
insight into the enemy intelligence organization, which they are up against outside the
prison.674

Educational Programs: Impact and Response
The educational endeavors of Palestinian prisoners during the 1970s and 1980s
made a significant impact on the inmates, as well as a somewhat complicated impact on
Palestinian society writ large. Gaining access to cultural and intellectual materials and
developing curricula were hands down the most all-consuming activities of the prisoners
during these two decades. As demonstrated, learning from morning to night was all in a
day’s work.
Criticism of the prison’s informal school by interview subjects was completely
absent. Rather, ex-prisoners recall engagement with ideas, texts, and each other via
conversation about various topics with an emotional outpouring of pure pleasure.
Moreover, Prisoners were so absorbed by what they were studying and mulling that it
often appeared in their letters home.675 Not one interview subject spoke negatively about
the ways in which prisoners helped each other gain access to ideas, and supported one
another in acquisition of new knowledge. In contrast, many prisoners referred to the
674
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prison experience as the “best time” in their lives when the topic of education came up.676
Given the challenges Palestinians faced obtaining education across the West Bank, Gaza,
and within the 1948 borders, it is not entirely surprising to hear such positive reviews.
Qaymery, who was 20 years old in 1971 when he was sentenced to 14 years in Ramle,
beamed when asked about prison, nearly gushing: “You can’t imagine how rich my
experience was in prison…I was happier then than I am now. I indulged in cultural and
educational experiences that shape me now.”677 Prisoners lobbed critiques against Israeli
censorship of books, as well as lack of access to degree-granting programs for political
prisoners, but never did they criticize the informal system.
Education inside the prisons transformed the prisoners and in many cases
determined what they would do in the wake of imprisonment. Today, Qaymery is a
professional translator, moving between Arabic, English, Hebrew and French, having
taught himself these languages during his confinement. As he proudly recounted, “my
profession came from prison.”678 Qaymery also continues to exercise the skill he learned
during his prison education: he still issues a regular news bulletin with translated Hebrew
language news for Arabic readers.
Thus, prison education allowed for social mobility in a way that outside education
did not. As mentioned earlier, many individuals entered prison illiterate, having had very
limited access to primary or secondary education, and were released having achieved a
high level of intellectual engagement with ideas and texts. In some cases the educational
achievements of prison translated into outside professions. Qaymery’s inmate-cultivated
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language skills led to robust Jerusalem-based translation business, still in operation in
2015. Other individuals who “graduated” from the prison curricula moved into political
appointments. Interview subjects Jabril Rajoub, Ahmed Shirin, Rabiha Diab, and Ibrahim
Khrishi are today all active members of Fatah and the Palestinian Authority. Rajoub and
Diab hold ministry posts, Sports and Women respectively, while all of them are members
of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). The education received in prison was the
key factor contributing to their election to the PLC. These individuals brought with them
the political lessons learned in prison, as well as deep cultural preparation, positioning
them as potential well-prepared contributors to the creation of a functioning Palestinian
state.
All that said, however, for the vast majority of prisoners, educational
accomplishments within prison did not translate to the outside. For starters, when the
PLO returned to the West Bank after the Oslo Accords, the new governing body of the
Palestinian Authority did not absorb these highly educated prisoners into the upper
echelons of leadership, although as I have shown they joined the middling ranks.679
Secondly, the West Bank and East Jerusalem economy was not equipped to absorb large
numbers of educated ex-prisoners. Just like education in the Diaspora meant that postsecondary education was oriented to satisfy non-Palestinian job market requirements, the
prison also prepared Palestinians for a particular kind of engagement with the world: one
which was almost entirely political. Jobs outside of the Palestinian Authority were few
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return to this briefly in my concluding remarks.

233

and far between, with ex-prisoners discriminated against. Jundi, for example, currently
works at a supermarket in the Old City.

The Israeli Administration’s Response to Prisoner Education
As mentioned earlier, in the first years of the Occupation, prisoners conducted
their discussions in whispers, out of earshot of the administration. With time, however,
prisoner organization was impossible to hide, and education was conducted with the full
knowledge of the administration. Given the supposed threat level of these individuals,
why would the administration have allowed such highly structured and organized
educational programs to develop and persist? Why, for example, did they not more
frequently employ techniques of solitary confinement to keep potential leaders out of the
fray?
Since the foundation of the state of Israel, the authorities have employed
techniques that dehumanize Palestinians and widen the cultural gulf between Israelis and
Palestinians.680 Israel employed Palestinian “spies” inside the prisons, who, when it came
educational programming, could relay information about the political lectures and
discussions. Prison authorities also sought to circumscribe intellectual autonomy at
various times during the 1970s and 1980s. During the early years of the Occupation,
before the Red Cross starting carrying in books, prisoners report that the Israelis used
reading materials as a way to cultivate conflict between prisoners by only allowing books
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on religious subjects or Marxism. Thus, one way of seeing the prison “school” was “an
extension of the prison regime’s technologies of coercion and bodily violence.”681
Interestingly, however, Palestinian educational efforts upended such constructs.
Education empowered and humanized prisons, while also enabling greater complex
understandings amongst the prisoners of Israeli culture, through the Hebrew language and
extensive reading on Zionism and the Israeli political system. The prison educational
system of the 1970s and 1980s yielded a generation of mid-level leaders employed by the
Palestinian Authority of the post-Oslo period
This attempt at sowing division reached fruition with the Israeli-supported
creation of Hamas in the late 1980s. The Israeli prison administration used reading
material as a carrot and stick, suspending access to book when prisoners went on hunger
strike or rebelled in other ways. During this period, Palestinians reportedly sought access
to degree-granting programs, especially since criminal prisoners had been allowed to
study in Israeli prisons since 1978. Qaymery recounts working hard in Ramle prison
during that same year to secure similar privileges for his compatriots. Although Bir Zeit
agreed to be the degree-granting partner in absentia, and although Qaymery had tens of
interested individuals, the Israelis first reportedly pondered and then rejected the plan.682
It was not until 1994, beyond the scope of this dissertation’s archival material,
that Israel granted their “security prisoners” the right to study inside their prisons,
following a 14-day hunger strike in 1992 and the Oslo Agreements.683 Criminal prisoners
already had this access, and Palestinian prisoners sought it. The Tel Aviv Open
681
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University and Hebrew University of Jerusalem were the most popular choices for
prisoners. There was a limit to what the prisoners could study, for security reasons and
lack of facilities: banned subjects included the sciences, such as physics, chemistry and
biology, as well as political nationalism. With the opening of access to open university
systems684, most prisoners chose to study political science/international relations, Israeli
society or Israeli Arab Society, Islamic studies, history of the Middle East, genocide
history, although “all courses of study must be approved by the prison service.”685 In the
early 2000s, prisoners were restricted to studying in Hebrew so the Israeli Prison services
could be monitored.
According to a June 2011 article, just two months before access to formal
education was halted for Palestinian prisoners, the Open University of Tel Aviv’s degree
granting program was extremely popular amongst Palestinian prisoners, with 270
studying for degrees as opposed to just 60 criminal prisoners.686 It helps that the
Palestinian Authority covered the prisoners’ tuition, with the goal of building an educated
society. The Israeli Prison Service halted this program in 2011, according to newspaper
reports “as part of a series of sanctions against prisoners,” in particular for Gilad Shalit’s
continued captivity in Gaza.687 In spite of his release, the programs have not restarted.
Still, Palestinians have demonstrated remarkable resilience, continuing to pursue their
degrees in secret with universities in the West Bank and Gaza. Marwan Barghouti,
according to his wife Fadwa Barghouti, completed his doctorate entitled “The Legislative
684
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and Political Performance of the Palestinian Legislative Council and its Contribution to
the Democratic Process in Palestine from 1996 to 2008,” at Cairo University in 2010.
Although some might see the period of 1994 to 2011 as offering Palestinians ultimate
educational access, this period witnessed the unraveling of the highly functioning,
inspirational informal system.

Conclusion
As this chapter illustrated, the educational system developed inside Israeli prisons
by the 1980s went far beyond that which emerged in the often-compared context of South
Africa. What began as an informal effort by a small handful of individuals in the 1970s
unfolded into an organized, productive and intellectually inspired system and curriculum
that was codified in writing beginning in the early 1980s. A constantly evolving
curriculum that encouraged careful reading and thought, alongside writing and guided
discussion, offered thousands of Palestinian political prisoners an education unrivaled by
that which they could have obtained on the outside. Offering a confined site free of
political interruptions, alongside a stable, immoveable population, the prison as
educational site fell under the auspices of educated Palestinians rather than buckling
under the weight of outside influences. The prison as site of education is remarkable, too,
from the perspective of politicization. Although the Israeli prisons of the 1970s and 1980s
were intended to mitigate security risks, in practice they grouped together hundreds of
politically active individuals within spaces where they shared and developed ideas.
Through struggle, dedication and a belief in the necessity of education for the benefit of
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the maintaining prison resistance and for the wider struggle, these spaces intended for
punishment were transformed into sites where prisoners learned about the ideological
underpinnings, structure and the goals of the Fatah movement and the resistance more
generally; they served as laboratories for sprouting political thought and plans. Although
beyond the scope of this dissertation, this evolution in political ideology and plans is best
exemplified by the stoking of the First Intifada flames inside the prisons. Although
beyond the scope of this dissertation, it was during the early 1980s, behind these
oppressive walls, when the group that came to be known as the Unified Leadership began
to coalesce.688
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Chapter Five
The Dissolving Collective
As illustrated in the previous chapters, Israeli prisons in which Palestinian
political prisoners were held are more notable as sites where collectivity reigned than as
places of punishment. Political structures that promoted democratic elections and
decision-making, as well as an educational system that inspired collaborative learning
and vibrant dialogue, existed in the wider Palestinian resistance movement as a model
and/or ideal rather than a widespread trend. And yet, it was this cooperative spirit that the
Diaspora-based resistance movement promoted in order to garner international attention
and respect. Through political poster art, the PLO, with Fatah at its helm, sought to
internationally legitimize the Palestinian resistance as both part of a global liberation
movement and also as representing all Palestinians, both throughout the Diaspora and
within Palestine’s historic borders. As this chapter will show, political posters were key
to promoting this message of collectivity and cooperation. Moreover, both the PLO and
Fatah appropriated the political prisoner experience to showcase these ideals in lieu of
highlighting their top-down functioning. Through a range of political poster examples,
this chapter shows how the visual shift from collective to individual representation
reflects a significant change in the spirit of the prisoner movement since the 1980s, as
well as a shift in the political goals of the PLO and Fatah.
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The Aesthetics of the Palestinian Global Resistance
From the PLO’s inception, the leaders pursued international legitimacy for the
Palestinian resistance. According to the 1968 Palestinian National Charter, armed
struggle was the only true path, however the political poster tells a slightly amended
story: while violent resistance was key, so too was Palestinian incorporation into the
international liberation network.689 Political posters were a critical medium through
which Fatah and the PLO pursued this goal. As early as 1964, Fatah is said to have
opened a small printing press in Amman with the intention of producing revolutionary
imagery, however there are no accessible surviving examples.690 One scholar surmises
that this press was intended to produce leaflets and posters for the purposes of recruiting
new members to the faction, while another, artist and Fatah member Shafiq Radwan,
claims posters were distributed across the Diaspora community, especially in Jordanian
and Lebanese refugee camps. Underscoring the importance of this political art as part of
an effort to internationalize the resistance movement, by the early 1970s, posters were
produced in centralized offices that were overseen by individual factions, the PLO, or
other unions.691
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One way that Fatah spoke to an international community was by promoting their
military victories against their Israeli oppressors. Among the posters surviving from the
early Occupation, a spate of those featuring combat scenes publically commemorated the
resistance fighters’ successes. Such images were clearly intended to spur on recruitment
by glorifying the expanding revolutionary movement. According to the Palestinian Poster
Project Archive (PPPA), tens of posters were published between 1967 and 1971, for the
express purpose of raising regional interest in the movement. As Radwan confirms, a
Fatah series was almost entirely focused on glorifying al Karameh.692

The above poster, dating to 1968 and the first in the series, illustrates characteristics
common with other images from this time: simple, yet overt symbolism of struggle and
victory, with the fighter charging forward, weapon in hand, the only word on the poster

frames, paint and paper (see Gary Yanker, “The political poster: a worldwide phenomenon,” World affairs, 133:3, December 1970,
215-223). In the 1970s, for example, efforts to free political prisoners in the US resulted in thousands of “hand-scrawled” posters
appearing around California (see for example Tom Wilson, Chapter One in West of Center: Art and Counterculture Experiment in
America, 1965,-1977, University of Minnesota Press, 2012). Likewise, Chicano posters were created by community-based artists and
activists at the grassroots (see Chapter 7 by George Lipsitz of American Studies in a Moment of Danger, published as part of the
Critical American Studies Series by the University of Minnesota Press in 2001).
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positioned inside the sun, al assifa693, marking it as Fatah’s work. As in many posters,
bullets are iconic; they underscore preparedness and professionalism of the male
fedayeen, portrayed as extraordinarily powerful. Especially in the first two decades of
poster production, featured individuals are nameless, which speaks to intentional
anonymity similar to that of Fatah’s written documents in the same period.694
The PLO and Fatah pursued international recognition through public displays of
such poster art. Fatah, with PLO backing, hosted the first event in 1968 at the Beirut Arab
University entitled “The International Exhibition for Palestine.” This was the first of
many shows intended to accomplish the goal of raising awareness and spreading the
resistance message. Coming in the wake of the 1967 war, it was “specifically intended to
display the range of global support enjoyed by the Palestinians,”695 and also to invite
additional involvement. Just one year later, the Baghdad International Poster Exhibition
focused on two themes: The Struggle of the Third World For Cultural and Political
Liberation” and “Palestine: A Homeland Denied.” The Iraqi Cultural Centre in London
hosted, allowing for wide audience viewing.696 Many exhibits followed over the years,
around Europe and the Middle East. What is unacknowledged but striking about these
exhibits is that they were intended for Diaspora Palestinians and foreigners, a kind of
public relations for the resistance.697 Efforts to increase international notoriety were not
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without success. Indeed, the 1980 National Council of the PLO included representatives
from Palestinian communities across the Diaspora, including approximately 60
individuals residing in places as far apart as Saudi Arabia and the United States; the job
of these 60 individuals was to represent the approximately 2.5 million disasporic
Palestinians living in their home countries.
Like the exhibited posters, other public relations materials intended for
international consumption were produced in the Diaspora and geared towards
highlighting a faceless collectivity. The PLO launched public relations-style offices to
help shape their image. For example, the Palestine Information Office in Washington
D.C. was opened in the late 1970s to distribute news releases and pamphlets, spreading
the word about the PLO and its goings on.698 By this time, the PLO had achieved two
milestones: first, widespread formal acknowledgement as the sole and legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people, and secondly, status as an observer mission in
the United Nations. Moreover, as of 1981, over 100 nation states had recognized the
PLO, and 60 countries had welcomed the opening of Palestinian diplomatic missions.
Poster art helped support these efforts.
The sheer number of refugees beyond the historic borders meant that a liberation
movement would confront a range of national and colonial policies across the globe. As
one scholar has argued, “The PLO was thus, from the outset, conditioned to imagine a

Reader, March/April 2001. It can be viewed here: http://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/palestine-a-homeland-deniedkowalski-original.
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This office was closed in 1988 during the First Intifada. See Rajai M. Abu-Khadra, “The Closure of the PLO Offices,” Journal of
Palestine Studies (vol. 17, no. 3), Spring 1988, 51-62.
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political community that was dispersed globally.”699 To that end, the PLO actively
“capitalized on an international network for anti-imperialist activists in order to expand
the terrain of its anti-imperialist agenda;”700 they were committed to a “global offensive”
against Israeli imperialism.701 This commitment dated to the public statement of 1973,
when the Palestinian National Congress submitted a 10-Point Program to the United
Nations, declaring their solidarity with anti-imperialist groups worldwide.702 This was
followed by Arafat’s 1974 visit to the U.N., which catapulted the Palestinian issue to
center stage, including in Latin American society, which was rife with resistance
movements.703 The PLO forged relationships with other liberation movements across the
globe, such as the Black Panthers, groups in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin
America.704 From Fatah’s first formal visit to China in 1964 through the mid-1970s, it
was “the most consistent big power supporter of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations,
arming them, criticizing them, seeking to unify them and… providing moral and material
support.”705
Political posters point to a desire to be part of a global liberation movement,
which Charles Tripp notes were focused on “extolling Palestinian resistance…mainly
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outside Palestinian territory.”706 Such posters promoted a dual purpose: to appeal to an
international audience, but also to remind Palestinians that they were part of a global
resistance movement. Thus, wide accessibility was key, in terms of imagery and
accompanying language. According to Walsh’s broad assessment of posters from his
work with PPPA, from around 1974 posters began to carry faction logos and/or artist
signatures, but also captions in many languages. He notes that one of the earliest posters
directly speaking to the international community was a Fatah poster entitled “105 Nations
Stand with Us,” shown here:
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From that point forward, many surviving Fatah posters speak to this outward-facing urge.
For example, this poster designed by well-known poster artists Hosni Radwan, who
worked out of Beirut in the 1970s and 1980s.708
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Published in 1975 by the Fatah movement, it commemorates their successful battle at al
Karameh seven years earlier. For the purposes of this chapter, there are two points of
interest in this poster. First, the commemoration is intended for an international audience,
to promote the Fatah faction’s victory against the Israelis. The only Arabic on the entire
poster are the words “al Karameh” lightly inscribed on the base of the weapon. Secondly,
this poster features a man with a keffiyeh obscuring his face, which is not even directed
towards the viewer. This anonymous fighter can thus take on any identity. As Tripp
points out in regards to Palestinian poster art, they “show through their languages and
their iconography, the intention was to create international awareness of the plight of the
Palestinians, stressing the need for global solidarity in the ongoing struggle with
Israel.”710 This poster also reflects Fatah’s urge to commemorate and seek connection
through such remembrance. PPPA features countless examples of artistic
commemorations of the beginning of the Revolution (January, 1965), Land Day (March
30th) and the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People (November 29th).
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Similarly targeting an international audience, but also speaking directly to
diaspora Palestinians is the below poster designed by the artist Muwaffak Matta in 1980.

711

Like the al Karameh poster, this, too, seeks to commemorate, however does not invite the
international audience to participate in that aspect. Rather, remembering the 15th
anniversary of the Revolution’s launch is called for in Arabic at the top of the poster. The
bottom text also speaks to a Palestinian audience, reminding them that “the world is with
us… Fatah.” And yet, the middle of the poster draws one’s immediate attention, featuring
multiple languages encased by branches that represent an internationally recognized
symbol of peace. A face adorns the poster – nameless and unidentifiable, a common
theme in early posters– humanizing the revolutionary effort. Posters such as this one were
not intended only to recruit new fedayeen. Rather, they can be read as reaching out
beyond the borders of Palestine to emphasize belonging to a worldwide resistance. As
Tripp says, posters “affirmed the existence of community and the presence not simply of
an abstract Palestinian nation but also of the organization claiming to speak in its
name.”712
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This kind of dual messaging appears in many posters from the mid-1970s through
the 1980s. Dating to 1980, designed by the popular artist Radwan, and published by both
Fatah and the PLO, this poster reminds the international community that Palestine is
seeking Arab solidarity.
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The Arabic text is more interesting, however, proclaiming “Palestine needs the weapons
of all of the Arabs.” By sending a softer message to the international community, Fatah
and the PLO speak a language of international resistance to oppression and colonialism,
rather than violence.
Augmenting efforts to raise their global profile, the PLO and Fatah also engaged
in public relations within the Occupied Territories. Leaflets were produced by local
affiliates of the Diaspora-based movement, and distributed around the West Bank and
Gaza Strip to recruit and promote the work of the leadership.714 From the mid-1970s,
some attention was directed towards building infrastructure for the purposes of promoting
the PLO’s ability to provide state-like services. One example is the establishment of the
713
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Palestine Red Crescent Society, which launched hospitals and clinics around the Middle
East where Palestinians resided. 715 By the 1980s, Fatah realized that maintaining “its
centrality in the Palestinian national movement” meant focusing on the Occupied
Territories. To that end, the group spotlighted its “break with its previous emphasis on
clandestine military action” and put its weight behind social programs and non-violent
political activity, which “effectively transformed [it] from a shadowy network into a mass
movement.”716
Besides the use of leaflets to promote the diaspora-based movement within
historic Palestine, some political posters were produced in Beirut, Jordan, and other
locales specifically for an audience in the Territories. According to the Israeli Military
Order 1010 of August 1967 entitled the “Order Concerning Prohibition of Incitement and
Hostile Propaganda,” political posters were seen as a form of incitement for violent
resistance. Thus posters produced in the Diaspora had to be smuggled in and cleverly
employed metaphorical symbols with messages only locals could decode.717 As one
Ramallah-based commentator has rightly pointed out, “posters created for local
consumption and part of the daily visual environment have a different role to play from
that of the press and a different audience to address.”718 For Fatah and the PLO, this
meant recruitment to the movement, as evidenced by the below poster:
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This is one example of a PLO poster that was reportedly smuggled into and widely
circulated within the West Bank. Produced by an unknown artist, but entitled “We are the
Revolutionaries,” it maintains the PLO/Fatah early commitment to anonymity. As a
recruitment tool, this image reminds the viewer that the revolution is total, and needs the
support and participation of women, children, and men. This is part of a poster trend that
“took up the theme of steadfastness [sumud]. They used the common imagery of popular
revolutionary and resistance movements to suggest that the people’s endurance and
indeed their sheer numbers would win the struggle against occupation.”720 Each is
looking in a different direction for the enemy and each is holding a weapon, with no
exception for age or gender, underscoring fedayeen inclusiveness.
Thus, Fatah and PLO poster art vibrantly illustrates that the Palestinian Diaspora
leadership was attentive to their public relations strategy. Drawing on the internationally
recognizable medium of political poster art, the factions were able to join the discourse of
global resistance.
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The Political Prisoner: The Faceless Collectivity
A survey of surviving images clearly demonstrated that political prisoners have
been a trope in Palestinian poster art since the early 1970s.721 Indeed, the PLO and Fatah
mobilized the intentional anonymity and collectivity of the political prisoner experience
of the 1970s to internationally project a particular image of the resistance movement.722
This section will highlight a selection of these posters, illustrating how the faction
appropriated the political prisoner for the purposes of international propaganda. It builds
on Zeina Maasri’s notion, expounded upon in her book on political posters during the
Lebanese Civil War, that the poster does not record a fixed identity, but rather provides
the canvas on which it is cultivated.723 In so doing, I trace the evolution of posters that
reference Israeli prisons, the prison experience or the political prisoners themselves. The
images of the 1970s and early 1980s, either completely faceless or featuring anonymous
individuals, shifted dramatically by the second Intifada into those focusing on specific
individuals who in turn became icons of the movement, a style that continues until today.
As the majority of posters were not produced inside the Territories, and certainly not
inside the prisons, images can be read as reflective of a changing relationship between the
prisoner movement and the Palestinian resistance in the four decades after the beginning
of the Occupation.
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For the Fatah faction of the 1970s, political posters highlighting the political
prisoner issue were a common form of advertising. They fit into a category identified by
art historian Alan Gowans called “persuasive art,” which he notes is intended to play on
our ethics and morals to make a “psychological hard sell.”724 For Fatah, prisoners held in
Zionist detention inside Israel or the Territories served as evocative tools to raise
awareness of the conflict, as well a means of garnering sympathy for Palestinian
suffering. Like other Fatah posters, those featuring prison issues tended to speak to both
international and Palestinian audiences. Posters such as those featured below (left, circa
1975; right, 1981) also play on the Fatah/PLO narrative of commemoration. Fatah and
the PLO created an annual day of solidarity with the prisoners, which they could then use
as a platform for internationalizing the Palestinian issue.725 Like countless other posters,
they include English and Arabic script, with the intention of speaking to two audiences:
the Palestinian Diaspora, but also to an international audience.
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In both, the imagery is vivid: streaming blood evokes the torture and suffering of the
prison; the locked door with only a small grated window common in many prisons of the
1970s speaks to isolation and restrictions; and the sun peeking through the bars, both of
which are common in prison imagery. Also like other Fatah posters, in the 1981 image,
the Arabic text sends a different message from the English: “To my love: the darkness of
the prison cell will not hinder us from the light of freedom.” A message of this nature
glorifies the prison experience as a kind of suffering that inspires rather than quashes
political dreams and even action. The act of stoking a solidarity movement that is
international in scope might evoke sympathy, but offers no call for an end for an end to
the experience. The act of creating an annual day of solidarity speaks to a kind of
perpetuity of the cause. For posters that intend to mobilize, that are “something that
makes people march,”728 Fatah’s goal here is to augment the resistance movement writ
large rather than supporting specific prisoner-born initiatives. By viewing the prison
experience through the bars and/or the door of a solitary confinement cell, as featured on
these posters, the international audience sees nothing of the weapons and violence
involved in Palestinian resistance. The international viewer would see the cruelty of such
punishment, while the Palestinian resident within the Territories might view the blood
differently: as blood spilled in an act of martyrdom inside political prisons.729
To support their mission, posters reflecting the prison experience drew on images
that had been imbued with meaning by the Revolution. The keffiyeh and the olive branch
appear in the Hosni Radwan’s 1981 Fatah poster below:
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Speaking to an Arabic-reading audience, this poster proclaims “the chains must
inevitably break,” provocative language that extends beyond prison walls to the
Occupation more generally. In a similar vein, a 1985 Fatah poster incorporates the oftused symbol of the dove, the universal symbol of purity, as well as of freedom and hope
for Palestinians:731
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Floating above the two doves mapped onto bound hands, Arabic script calls for “Freedom
for the Palestinian detainees in the prisons of the Occupation.” In both of these posters,
one can see that the prisoner experience is a site for the cultivation of resistance identity,
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without speaking to the specifics of prison, both its horrors and the successes discussed in
earlier chapters of this work.
As the above posters illustrate, those produced in the 1970s and 1980s by Fatah
were almost always faceless, as they were intended to promote the faction broadly. Such
images spoke in generalities, including calling for “freedom,” such as in the below poster
(left) published by Fatah in 1984:
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Not unlike the four posters discussed thus far in this section, this one also uses vibrant
imagery of prison bars cutting into an inmate’s hand, demanding “freedom” and all its
accompaniments. Such posters speak to the way in which Fatah as a Diaspora-based
organization connected itself with the suffering of those surviving the Occupation within
the Territories. Indeed one can see how the political prisoner and the prison experience
were used as tools to help achieve the blanket demands of organizations “fighting” for
Palestinian freedom and rights. The prison as trope was popularized not only by Fatah’s
many posters, but also by those produced by organizations, including The Committee for
the Defense of Palestinian Prisoners and Detainees in the Prisons of the Occupation
(below):
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Adorned only with Arabic script, this 1985 image features the familiar prison bars, a
rope, and language calling for “Freedom of Palestinian detainees in the Occupation’s
prisons.”
Almost all posters before the First Intifada remained impersonal, even when they
featured the image of a human being. In the three examples shown below, dating to 1978,
1981, and 1983 (from left to right), individual men are front and center.
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All three of these posters are plainly commemorative. On the far left, the image of the
startlingly beautiful landscape and the fighter breaking through the prison bars displays
power in the 13th year of the Palestinian Revolution. The message is to both English and
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French speaking audiences. The fighter’s head is wrapped in the Palestinian keffiyeh, but
he is without a particular identity. The middle poster also features an unknown man,
extending the peace symbol beyond the oppressive bars. In contrast with his assertion, the
text reads “steadfastness in the prisons of the enemy,” underscoring the fierce will of
Palestinians to win through peaceful means, even whilst imprisoned. Finally, the poster
on the right combines the symbol of determination and power – the raised fist – with the
more passive two-fingered peace symbol. Commemorating 18 years of Fatah’s armed
struggle, this poster speaks to the many angles the faction claims to have taken in its
efforts to liberate Palestine. By remaining anonymous and/or faceless, posters of the
1970s and 1980s did not cultivate human icons as representative of the resistance
movement.
Although most posters continued to remain unidentified with particular people,
the early 1980s witnessed the very beginning of a shift towards connecting individual
stories with the movement. The 1983 poster below was designed for an Arabic-speaking
audience to make public and resist one individual’s experience inside an Israeli prison:
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The text asserts reads: “We are struggling to save the life of the progressive, patriotic
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fighter, Fadil Al Borno, from death in a prison cell in the Zionist prison in Gaza,” and the
signatories of the effort were many, listed in the left hand black box of the poster,
including:
“The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
The Iraqi Socialist Front
The Egyptian Socialist Front
The Popular Struggle Front
Coalition of Egyptian nationals in foreign countries
The Palestinian Socialist Front in the Gaza Strip
The Union of Asian and African Writers
The Union of Palestinian Writers and Journalists
The Union of Lebanese Writers
Fatah”
This poster speaks to a united front against the Occupation, even though the
factions encountered many moments of disagreement that sometimes turned violent.
Punishment and torture were issues around which all of the movements could rally. They
were also a direct line to other politically oppressed people around the world; the colonial
prison was an internationally shared experience, not to mention a vibrant image that
could speak to a wide audience via a political poster.
Thus, Fatah and the PLO employed the image of prisoners and prisons in the
service of generating international interest in and support for the movement. The posters
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addressing the Arabic-speaking audience were intended to help cultivate, shape and
sustain a collective Palestinian identity. Via references to the prisoner experience, Fatah
humanized their Diaspora-based movement by connecting it with the very poignant
experience of those suffering inside the Territories on behalf of the resistance
movement’s cause. As the next section will illustrate, visual illustrations related to the
prisoner experience produced by Fatah and the PLO slowly began to highlight the
experience of specific individuals rather than that of a collective.

From the Collective to the Individual
In the early 1980s, the operations of the PLO and Fatah were impacted by the
expulsion from Lebanon, its last foothold in a country adjacent to Israel, and a splintering
of the resistance with a mutiny in Fatah’s ranks. Both of these events had serious
consequences for the leadership. First, they faced an erosion of the institutional
infrastructure, and second, they had to struggle to maintain their power. As a result, the
movement’s self-conceptualization began to shift: Arafat and his fellow leaders to
sharpen their focus on establishing a presence in the Occupied Territories; they
“eschewed military action, focusing instead on voluntary work and socio-political
mobilization and so gaining quasi-legality.”739 So too, Arafat was increasingly
emphasizing a diplomatic solution to the conflict, publicly embracing a two-state solution
that would establish an independent Palestinian state alongside an Israeli one. By the time
of the First Intifada, the PLO had clearly asserted itself as representing a state-in-waiting.
This entailed not only downplaying guerrilla actions, but also opening dialogues with
739
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various political powers. Reversing a 1975 ban on discussions with the US about the
future of a Palestinian state, the PLO announced in late 1988 its decision to open a
dialogue with the superpower in 1988.740 This move involved compromise and giving
into certain international demands, including the acknowledgement of the right of Israel
to exist, accepting UN resolution 242, renouncing guerrilla activity, and accepting the
two-state solution along the 1947 partition lines.741 By the time of the First Intifada, the
PLO, with Fatah at its helm, were so focused on maintaining their own power from their
seat in Tunis that projecting an image of unity was no longer the first priority.
The cracks in the wider resistance movement’s image of unity were also reflected
inside the prison movement. For starters, the unified leadership of the First Intifada,
“graduates of Israel’s prison system,”742 did not work in total concert with Tunis.
Internally, they maintained some semblance of collectivity through the First Intifada. As
Khalidi pointed out, the “arrest of one person [led] to the immediate replacement by
another representative of the group…” and thus the unified leadership was able to “avoid
paralyzing differences” and to operate by “a rule of consensus.”743 And yet, the
competition between the local Intifada leaders and those in the Diaspora solidified with
Oslo, when many of those leaders were ostracized in the wake of the establishment of the
Palestinian Authority.
Contemporary political posters showcasing individual prisoners as icons of
Palestinian resistance represent a radical departure from the collectivity of the 1970s and
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early 1980s. We see in these posters a dramatic shift towards an effort to “iconicize” the
Palestinian prisoner, to give those inside ’48 and the Territories an image with which they
can identify through an individual’s story. Much has changed since the Oslo Accords,
including that posters are no longer published in a centralized locale in the Diaspora, but
are produced inside the Territories, sometimes by factions, but more frequently by other
organizations or via grassroots efforts. Significantly, the majority of prison/er-related
posters that appear on walls and at rallies are related to ongoing individual hunger strikes;
they are no longer faceless nods towards a collectivity. Rather, popular posters make a
case on behalf of a particular person. This is deeply symbolic in terms of what has
changed since the days of the highly organized and community-driven environment of the
1970s and 1980s.
As a result of this new tradition in poster making, individuals have become icons
of the prisoner movement and Palestinian resistance more broadly. For example, Khader
Adnan is a face that even the non-specialist is likely to recognize. Since his first hunger
strike in 2012, he has come dangerously close to death several times by self-starvation
inside Israeli prisons, with his struggle carefully followed by the local and international
press. Moreover, his image has become a memorable icon. The posters featured below
are two common images that have been circulated around the Territories.
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The form and presentation of both is radically different from earlier posters addressing
prisoner issues. For starters, the poster on the left more closely resembles a martyr poster
than the poster art of the 1970s that called attention to Palestinian political posters. The
poster on the right has often adorned signs at protests demanding his release, protests that
are framed as anti-Occupation, but executed within a narrowly framed rhetoric.
Indeed, Adnan’s image has become such an icon, it has been turned into a stencil that is
plastered around the West Bank, as shown below painted on the Separation Wall.

Another household name and image is that of Hana Shalabi, who was arrested
from her home in Jenin for her alleged involvement with the Islamic Jihad movement.
The now familiar hand drawn image featured below dates to a public rally calling for the
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release of all Palestinian prisoners held inside Israeli jails, held on the 24th of March 2012
at the Damascus Gate of the Old City of Jerusalem.

At the time, Shalabi had been on hunger strike for 43 days. Her solitary hunger strike was
translated into a visual representation of something much larger: what remains of the
Palestinian resistance.
Arguably the most enduring image is that of Marwan Barghouti. Barghouti has a
long relationship with the Israeli prison system, having initially been arrested during the
First Intifada. However, it was not until after his 2002 arrest that his image became a
symbol of Palestinian resistance and the fight against Israeli occupation. Barghouti’s
image is everywhere in Territories, and comes in various forms, from posters, to graffiti
art, to frequent photographs in newspapers. The most well known painted image of him
adorns the wall beside the Qalandiya checkpoint:
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Below are three different kinds of images of Barghouti, including in poster form, a
newspaper photo of his arrest, and a painting of him.

Barghouti has become a stylized icon: always shown with his shackled and clasped hands
raised. As a symbol of the resistance, his now trademark standard pose simultaneously
points to passive resistance and the strength of an eventual victory; the gentle hand clasp
speaking to the former, while his hands held high in the air nod towards the latter.
The move towards iconic images in poster art and other images of the early 2000s
reflects a radical shift away from the community and collectivity of the 1970s and the
first half of 1980s to the fragmented resistance and prisoner movements evident today.
The use of named individuals as the face of all political prisoners and/of of the resistance
movement is a visual representation of other changes within the prisons themselves.
Individuals like Adnan, Shalabi and Barghouti are household names. Their stories – or at
least what is conveyed of their stories by the local press as well as their own writings –
can be retold with precision. Resistance not only has a face, but a particular direction that
is narrated through the stories. And yet, such images continue to function in an
264

interestingly similar way to those Fatah produced during the first two decades of
Occupation: they still reflect an act of appropriation of the prisoner issue and cause for
reasons other than prisoner well-being. In the case of the spate of hunger striker posters,
the purpose is purely rhetorical; it acts as a replacement for real activism or resistance.744

Conclusion
Thus, since the Occupation’s inception, the political poster has been a key means of
communication with those beyond historic Palestine. As illustrated, the political prisoner
and the prison experience have served as propagandistic tools for Fatah and the PLO in
promoting the movement abroad by speaking to the determination and strength of the
Palestinian people to continue their resistance.745 Notably, the prison experience was
framed as a community experience, with anonymous faces, in posters produced in the
1970s. In so doing, the posters reflect the prison experience during this period, one that
was driven by community rather than by individuals. By the turn of the twenty-first
century, this had shifted radically, as evidenced by posters adorned with particular faces
as a way to promote individual prisoners’ struggles. Although a more in depth
exploration of the period beyond the mid-1980s is beyond the scope of this project, it is a
noteworthy shift, one that is deserving of further research. Indeed, it is my contention that
the shift evident in political poster art reflects something far deeper about the political
prisoner experience: systems that were once derived from and emphasized collectivity in
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the 1970s and 1980s have broken down, leaving in their wake an individually focused
and fragmented prisoner movement.
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Conclusion
The Abu Jihad Museum for Prisoner Movement Affairs proudly rises from the
edge of the Al Quds University Campus, set against the stark backdrop of the separation
wall. Composed of traditional Jerusalem stone arranged in such a way that the building
resembles a composite of interesting geometric shapes, it is an architecturally striking
monument. Opened in 2007, with funding from the Kuwaitis, the Museum’s self-declared
aim is “to highlight the role of the Prisoner Movement in Palestinian life and to recreate
the journey of the prisoner through stories and artifacts.”746 Holding the largest available
collection of Palestinian prisoner notebooks and books taken from prison libraries, in
addition to political posters and photographs, the museum certainly contains all the right
ingredients to tell a good story. And, the director, Abu El Haj, has this story down, telling
it with great passion to anyone who will listen. Strikingly, however, the museum is
almost always empty, visited rarely by the university’s students and even more rarely by
school students or other outsiders. The building echoes with one’s footsteps upon
entering, and even the lights are more often turned off than on. The emptiness and
general disuse of this space speaks volumes: the role of the political prisoner today is
merely a footnote in an already much abridged resistance discourse.
The individuals cited in this dissertation, and others who were imprisoned
between 1967 and 1985, are relics of a time past. They tell stories of an era in Palestinian
history when acts of resistance were celebrated by neighbors and colleagues, when
families of those resisting were offered support by the leadership of political factions
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when they fell victim to fighting or were imprisoned. Many of them are eager to tell these
stories, once one gains their trust. Almost every interview subject emphasized a desire to
get the story out there, to let the world know about what it means to live under
Occupation. As noted, the story of imprisonment for participating in – or being perceived
by the Israelis as part of – the Palestinian resistance has not been told widely, with the
bulk of the available material on NGO websites, as blog posts, and as small press or selfpublished personal accounts. Scholarly resources pertaining to Israeli security prisons are
few and far between, as is engagement with the rich resources available in the OPT,
including oral, written and visual.
Capturing the oral stories is key to understanding the 1970s, as much of the
history has little to no written material from which to draw. Furthermore, many of these
men and women are aging – and fast.747 As discussed in Chapters One and Two, writing
implements were extremely rare during much of the first decade of the Occupation, thus
necessitating a reliance on individuals’ memories to capture the period and tease out the
finer points. After a concentrated semester of interviewing, as well as sporadic follow up
during the subsequent years, I recognized a general atmosphere of wistfulness as subjects
recollected the pre-First Intifada period as one in which they were all working towards
something greater, as a period when the resistance was full-blooded, when there was a
common belief that the armed struggle could have an impact. This nostalgia is best
exemplified by how ex-prisoners talked about their time in captivity. Amongst former
inmates, these decades are fondly remembered as “the Golden Years,” with many
asserting it was the best time in their lives. As Chapters Three and Four illustrate, the
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1970s through the first half of the 1980s was a period in which collectivity reigned.
Regarding the 1970s, ex-prisoners told countless stories about how they came together
within their factions to create and implement political, behavioral, and educational
structures. Relying on memory for the planning stages, precise details of meetings and
conversations are mostly lost. What remains behind, and what I captured in Chapters
Three and Four, is the spirit and energy of the work they did to bring into existence a
clear program, as well as discrete and powerful stories about moments of clash or
inspiration.
By the late 1970s, prison programs were beginning to be codified in writing. As
the largest faction inside the prisons, Fatah’s systems, comprehensively outlined in
documents discussed in detail in the second halves of Chapters Three and Four, represent
a kind of well-oiled machine; a machine that was debated within rooms and sections, and
then democratically approved by prison-wide voting. Fatah prisoners also worked beyond
the group’s parameters, reaching across faction lines through their elected representatives
to settle inter-factional disputes and to contend with the Israeli administration. In addition
to the level of cooperation amongst prisoners, what made this period inside Israeli prisons
so noteworthy were the opportunities for social and political mobility. Unlike on the
outside, political prisoners were not constrained by family or neighborhood connections,
but were free – and also encouraged – to cultivate deep knowledge on a wide array of
subjects as a means of advancement within the system. A remarkably strong educational
curriculum invited these prisoners to take charge of their learning, and instilled
intellectual growth, as well as ideological and political preparation. By the turn of the
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1980s, these factors combined with a democratic election process to allow a previously
illiterate or apolitical person the opportunity to advance through the ranks, even to the top
level of leadership. As mentioned, some of those same people are now public figures,
either as middle management within the Palestinian Authority or in other high-ranking
positions, including senior administration at universities. This was a radical departure
from the way in which one climbed the ladder on the outside, both within historic
Palestine’s local leadership, as well as within Fatah’s hierarchy in the Diaspora; in both
cases, connections, family, and pre-existing power were keys to success, rather than a
cultivated knowledge, ability or competency.
By the late 1970s, one can clearly see evidence in both oral and written sources of
a prisoner movement. As implied throughout the dissertation, but discussed specifically
in Chapters Two and Five, a key characteristic of this movement was a faction wide, and
even inter-faction, investment of all in a collective mission. Hunger strikes are an ideal
manifestation of mass action. As noted, from the early years of the Occupation, strikes
were negotiated actions, with agreed up and then publicly declared demands. The
decision to wage a hunger strike was made across faction lines, with careful deliberations
before launching it in recognition of the seriousness involved in staking lives for a cause.
They were never individually waged, but always the result of wider decision, and in some
cases, an actual vote. The organization that had evolved meant that strikes would often
spread from one prison to another, also evidence of a prisoner movement. This project
emphasizes that this movement’s main features including promoting a kind of
anonymous and collective identity. The anonymity of the prisoner movement is captured
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in political poster art of the period. Although these posters were produced outside historic
Palestine, they visually reflect the ways in which political prisoners were seen (and saw
themselves) as a collective.
Ex-prisoners strive to tell their stories positively, framing their accounts in the
context of their involvement in the period leading up to and then their experience of what
they call the Golden Years. Almost without fail, the surface narrative was a story of
glory, of success in motivating thousands of prisoners across the prison system to move
towards a new kind of group mentality and functioning, different from what they were
used to in their communities. It is clear that a major driver in this positioning is a desire
to demonstrate strength in the face of sometimes overwhelming odds, whether it is the
suffering one undergoes during interrogation or the material, familial, sexual, societal
deprivation one lives for the duration of his sentence. Thus, lurking beneath the veneer is
a much darker side to the wistful, nostalgic narrative. By the 1980s, there were clearly
divisions within the wider Palestinian resistance, tensions between the arrested who
evolved their own leadership structure and the official leadership in the Diaspora. One
can see in Chapter Five the ways in which the prisoner movement was appropriated for
propagandistic uses by Fatah (and the PLO), as a way to demonstrate strength in the face
of suffering to the international community. But what, if any, positive role did the Fatah
faction play in the lives of prisoners? One thing is certain: life after prison was difficult.
The accolades that came while one was imprisoned, affirmation of one’s bravery and
assistance for the family, disappeared with one’s release. Indeed, one aspect of the prison
experience that is under researched is the reality of post-prison life. Difficulty readjusting
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to life on the outside resulted in major psychological challenges, including destroying
marriages and breaking up families. Many were unable to find employment, a fact
alluded to in this project when I mentioned that Sami al Jundi now works in an Old City
supermarket. The political leadership offered no assistance. Moreover, one can argue that
the Diaspora leadership that returned with the Oslo Accords crushed the grassroots
organization that had grown up inside the prisons in the pre-Intifada days. They either
completely disempowered individuals or situated them in middle management positions
within the newly formed Palestinian Authority, quashing any further expectations of
mobility and societal and political accomplishment these ex-prisoners might have
cultivated whilst on the inside. With all these losses, ex-prisoners harken back to the
Golden Years, when places of punishment offered the organized movement certain
degrees of freedom.
Another striking element of conversations with ex-prisoners is that it is clearly
important for them to mourn the loss of this idyllic era, to emphasize that prisons are not
what they once were. While the prison movement has fragmented, so too has the
resistance writ large. It is this notion that I touch on in Chapter Five by illustrating a clear
visual shift from collectivity to a focus on the individual, as evidenced by political
posters. The chapter privileges the ex-prisoners’ narratives in the sense that its tone
somehow commemorates the end of these Golden Years and regrets the fragmentation.
While a qualitative assessment of one era versus another is tricky – after all, what did
collectivity produce? – it is clear that there has been a shift since the First Intifada, with
subtle changes beginning to take root even before the onset of that uprising. It is true that
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some aspects of the prison experience have carried over from the 1970s and 1980s,
including the way Palestinians are arrested or detained. Intensive arrest activity was and
still is carried out when special investigation teams conduct operations, especially at
night, usually leaving behind a ransacked house or destroying large swaths of a village in
their wake. But more has changed than not. The movement is no longer unified,
democratic, or faceless. One might even say that to call it a movement is entirely
inaccurate. As one ex-prisoner recently said to me: “now people are only using 3% of
themselves for resistance and the other 97% for other things.”748 The reasons for this shift
are beyond the scope of this project and will form the basis of the book project that will
follow this dissertation. In short, though, one can point to the three historical events that
led to a fracturing of the prison movement: the mass 1985 prisoner release, the formation
of the Hamas movement in the late 1980s inside the prison, and the Oslo Accords when
almost all political prisoners were released. Also, conditions improved slightly post-Oslo,
thus collective mass actions, like hunger strikes, became far less frequent. What we do
see an increase in is individual hunger strikes, usually to demand personal release or the
end of indeterminate administrative detention. Even when others join the strikes, as has
happened several times since 2000, there is a face to it. It is these questions of what
changed and why that will be the subject of my future scholarship. As I embark on new
research for the book that will come out of this dissertation, it is the question of why this
sense of collectivity and these organized democratic structures did not take hold within
the Palestinian Authority that interests me. Given the number of ex-prisoners occupying
positions of middle management within the current government, the gap is striking.
748

Samman Khoury, March 2016.

273

Finally, another thing that has not changed is the near impossibility of
encountering a Palestinian who has not had a brush with the prison system through a
friend or family member. And so, today, individuals demonstrate with posters of wellknown hunger striking prisoners; they build museums commemorating the prisoner’s role
in society; and they form associations and NGOs to deal with the prisoner issue. The
political prisoner is today an actor in the conflict’s wider performance.
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